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Preface
0.1 Organizations and Human Behavior
Anthropologists estimate that the first humans evolved approximately 2.5 million years
ago in Africa. In his history of humankind Yuval Noah Harari points out that “[a]bout
70,000 years ago, organisms belonging to the species Homo sapiens started to form even
more elaborate structures called cultures.”(Harari (2011), p.3). The time difference
between human’s first appearance and the first signs of culture is humbling from the
perspective of the 21st century. We are used to living in functioning societies that are
organized through political institutions∗, the rule of law protects each individual from
transgressions and we work together to further our own interests or a common goal we
believe in. Even technological changes are rapidly incorporated into our daily lives as the
development of the internet has shown.
While institutions are natural to us, the transfer of knowledge about and the design
of institutions has come a long way. Despite developing scripture, the first high cultures,
dating back to 4000 b.c.†, relied on knowledge transfer through oral tradition in the form
of myths and tales‡. The first philosopher to make human behavior and institutions the
object of knowledge was Socrates (470 - 399 b.c.). In contrast to the natural philosophers
before him, he “brought philosophy from the sky”(Socrates autem primus philosophiam
∗ Throughout the introduction I use “institutions” and “organizations” as interchangeable. To me both
have the same purpose as “means of achieving the benefits of collective action in situations in which
the price system fails.” (Arrow (1974), p.33). Kenneth Arrow equates both by defining principles of
ethics as invisible institutions as well as organizations.
† see Sommer (2013)
‡ The Gilgamesh Epos is the first written record of the interaction between humans and their interaction
with nature.
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devocavit e caelo, Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes, V 10, 11.). The Socratic turn found
its immediate response in Plato and Aristotle, who developed ideas about good behavior
(ethics) and the optimal organization of states (polis).
However, rather than designing optimal institutions, that incorporate human strengths
and weaknesses, Post-Socratic philosophers worked on ethics as a code of conduct for
each individual, that would ensure optimal social outcomes as long as each individual
adheres to the code. Even though they were well aware that temptations cause problems
for decision maker which made it difficult to follow strict ethics, in their perception it was
more important to devise optimal organizations along the line of impeccable behavior.
The idea of individual behavior as solution to problems in collective action carried
through till the Enlightenment. Through the work of Adam Smith philosophers became
widely aware that most social problems could not be solved through a strong code of
ethics. After the French Revolution and with the beginning Industrial Revolution philoso-
phers began to think about the organization of societies and institutions. Not by chance
this period marks the birth of sociology, statistics and economics not by chance.
Economists started developing theories of individual rationality based on the liberal
tradition that emerged from the Enlightenment. For the best part of the 20th century
economics was focused on perfecting the theory of individual rationality. With this theory
it became possible for economists to analyze institutions§.
However, while philosophers underestimated the importance of individual rationality,
economists neglected other sources for behavior. When analyzing optimal institutions,
be they political, social or business, it becomes clear that both matter: self interest and
other motivations of human behavior, like doing the “right thing”. With the surge of
behavioral economics the old knowledge became fruitful again. Thus, a whole research
agenda evolved around the question “how individual behavior plays out in organizations
and markets, what [are] the welfare consequences, and how policy should respond to
market outcomes” (Ko˝szegi (2014), p.1075) when psychologically based models of hu-
man behavior are used.
§ Of course, a proud tradition of economists worked on institutions, the rule of law and optimal or-
ganizations before. Max Weber and Joseph Alois Schumpeter are well known representatives of the
Historical School of Economics.
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Of course, even throughout the course of economics in the 20th century prominent
economists discussed alternatives (see Simon (1955)). Their ideas and approaches can
now be used by researches to venture into new territories. For example, Cyert and March
(1963) in their book “Behavioral Theory of the Firm” try to give an extensive assessment
of different motives in firms that go beyond self-interest in order to explain observed
behavior. Kenneth Arrow in his Fels Lectures “The Limits of Organization” emphasizes
the role of non-self interest motives, when he writes:
the fact that we cannot mediate all our responsibilities to others through
prices (...) makes it essential in the running of society that we have what
might be called ’conscience’.
(Arrow (1974), pp.26)
As economists at the beginning of the 21st century we are in the unique position to have
a very powerful set of tools (theoretical, experimental, statistical and computational) at
our disposal so we can analyze both standard, i.e. self-interested, rationality as well
as behavioral factors. With regard to organizations the questions at hand is, how can
organizations set optimal incentives if their agents are motivated by more than mere self
interest. How should organizations be optimally designed when faced with both types of
agents?
0.2 Contribution
My research contributes to the aforementioned question by analyzing how organizations
react and optimally should react to behavioral agents. I provide three different angles
that are loosely connected by the overarching question of optimal organization as reac-
tion to heterogeneous motives for agents. These three angles try to highlight features of
the general question, rather than painting a full picture.
3
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0.2.1 First Chapter: Focusing Attention in Multiple Tasks
The first chapter discusses how optimal incentive schemes should be set, when agents
face limited cognitive capacities and react intuitively to complex incentive contracts. Fol-
lowing Arrows claim that “the scarcity of information-handling ability is an essential
feature for the understanding of both individual and organizational behavior”(Arrow
(1974), p.37), I analyze how increasing complexity can reverse optimal incentives into
bad incentives.
Agents face a multitude of different tasks in modern jobs. The increase in complexity is
facilitated through new technological possibilities and a shift to flatter hierarchies. Stan-
dard contract theory predicts complex contracts, however, actual contracts are simpler.
In order to explain this puzzle I propose a model in which agent’s limited attention leads
to an instinctive focus on tasks with high outcome variation. Therefore agents end up
exerting too much effort in those tasks. This provides an explanation of findings in field
studies, where the reduction of incentives increases overall productivity or the introduc-
tion of new performance measures has negative effects on some tasks.
0.2.2 Second Chapter: On the Dynamics of Prospect Theory
The second chapter is methodological in the sense that it provides an experimental test
for a widely used psychological model, Prospect Theory. We are interested in the role
Prospect Theory plays for dynamic inconsistent behavior of decision makers.
For Prospect Theory decision makers, there are massive spillovers between sequential
choices. The outcomes of early decisions determine whether the decision makers face
their subsequent choices from the gain or loss domain, which influences their preferences
toward risk. So when it comes to early decisions, their choices can be driven by the
anticipations of their own reactions to these domain shifts.
We experimentally investigate the quality of Prospect Theory anticipations for a stu-
dent subject pool and how individual differences in these anticipations are driven by
the subjects’ cognitive ability, personality, demographics, and overall stability of Prospect
Theory behavior. We find evidence that loss aversion drives dynamic inconsistent behav-
4
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ior. Contrary to our predictions individuals with higher cognitive reflection are not better
planners.
Businesses can exploit dynamic inconsistencies by offering sequential lotteries in form
of products, e.g. trading card games, sticker albums, fantasy football leagues. In deter-
mining the role of Prospect Theory in dynamic inconsistent behavior we provide a angle
for policy maker and consumer protection, i.e. organizations that protect behavioral
agents from exploitation.
0.2.3 Third Chapter: Unions, Communication, and Cooperation in Organizations
The third chapter seems to be out of line with the previous two, because it does not
assume behavioral agents. Rather we use a different perspective on the question how
conflict within organizations, in this case firms, can be reduced through the introduction
of a union. Unions reduce the cost of communication.
We show that in a relational contracts model with imperfect public monitoring unions
can mitigate equilibrium conflict and improve the efficiency of interaction. We modify
the standard relational contracts model by assuming asymmetric information regarding
the state of the world. Specifically, we assume there are some states of the world in
which the firm is hit by an adverse shock, unobservable to the worker, and cannot honor
its payment promises. In this situation, the firm always has an incentive to claim that it
was hit by the adverse shock and to renege on its promises.
We characterize an equilibrium that has periods of cooperation (high effort and bonus
payment) and conflict (low effort and no bonus payments) along the equilibrium path.
Though in equilibrium there is always truthful revelation of the state of the world, the
conflict phases are needed to sustain cooperation. Unions help to communicate the state
of the world and to reduce conflicts.
Thus, we are able to provide a reason for an organization within an organization that
helps to reduce conflicts even with purely self interested agents.
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Chapter 1
Focusing Attention in Multiple Tasks∗
“One of the most puzzling and troubling failures of incentive models has been their inability to
account for the paucity of explicit incentive provisions in actual contracts.”
Holmström and Milgrom, 1991, p.34
1.1 Motivation
Related to the puzzle by Holmström and Milgrom (1991) is the question why increasingly
complex jobs do not involve more complex incentive provisions. My work suggests that
the reason for the observed simplicity of incentive provisions is driven by the agents’
intuitive response to complexity: focusing too much on tasks, that stand out.
Recently the idea of intuitive focus was modeled by Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) who
use an additional weight in those dimensions with high outcome variance to generate
context-dependent preferences. This approach yields a different explanation for simple
incentive provisions than Holmström and Milgrom (1991), who assume that the perfor-
mance in some tasks cannot be measured. In contrast, context-dependent preferences
create a negative externality of complex contracts, even and especially when the perfor-
∗ For helpful comments and discussions I thank Heski Bar-Isaac, Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Wouter Des-
sein, Florian Ederer, Benjamin Enke, Florian Englmaier, Matthias Fahn, Dominik Fischer, Hideshi Itoh,
Botond Ko˝szegi, David Laibson, Yves Le Yaouanq, Rocco Macchiavello, Takeshi Murooka, Emilien
Prost, Marco Schwarz and Andrei Shleifer as well as seminar participants in Munich and at the LEOH.
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mance of all tasks can be measured.
While focusing has been applied to consumer choice, I believe that it has a natural
application to multiple tasks. A short glimpse at job descriptions on online job platforms
reveals a variety of different tasks. For example, a retail sales manager needs to organize
his staff, control his finances and decide on the product stock. Additionally, multiple tasks
are not limited to white collar jobs but can be also found for field workers (e.g. Englmaier
et al. (2016)).
The increasing complexity is described in a report issued by the World Economic Forum
in 2012. While its main argument is the growing importance of mastering several skills
in order to be able to deal with the growing number of challenges on the job2, these skills
become important because jobs are getting more complex.
The aim of this essay is to how optimal incentive provision changes when agents start
focusing because of complex incentive schemes. A complex contract with incentives for
multiple tasks will divert the agents focus to those tasks that have the highest influence
on their compensation, since those stand out relative to the other. The variation in the
outcomes influences the agents perception, which in turn leads to higher effort in tasks
with higher variation. Therefore an incomplete contract with only one performance mea-
sure can increase overall performance. My results not only give a new perspective agent’s
perception of contracts but also on the optimal use of performance measures. While in
the accounting literature Feltham and Xie (1994) additional performance measures never
can leave agent nor principal worse of, the externality through complex contracts can re-
verse the effect.
My main results first show a focusing agent’s reaction to a standard contract to build
intuition. A standard contract that is not focusing-proof induces an effort allocation that
can be contrary to the principal’s intentions. The first result already provides a good
intuition for the externality introduced through focusing.
Second, I describe the optimal contract for a focusing agent, a focusing-adjusted con-
tract. As an application of focusing theory (see Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013)) I can show
that in order to avoid the wrong effort allocation, the optimal contract will assimilate
2 For the full report, see http://reports.weforum.org/future-of-jobs-2016/skills-stability/.
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incentives. This results in a higher perceived similarity of the different tasks, that takes
into account the accuracy of performance measures.
My third result derives boundaries when it is better to use one compound performance
measure than several. As long as a single compound performance measure avoids distor-
tions through the agent’s focusing it can be optimal to not use the full space of available
performance measures. The result can explain why contracts don’t become more com-
plex with an increasing number of tasks in work environments, because the efficiency
loss through the use of one additional measure is outweighed by the accumulated ex-
ternalities. Even if all outcomes can be measured, the principal will not condition the
optimal contract on all available information.
My results provide insight for findings in field experiments (Manthei and Sliwka (2013)
and Englmaier et al. (2016)), how a change in the perception of incentives results can
influence effort choices. Especially in Englmaier et al. (2016) the focusing effect is very
clear, because worker focus on the task with a high prize and high uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature
in the fields of behavioral contract theory, field experiments in organizational economics
and limited attention models. Section III illustrates the main mechanism of distorted
effort decisions through a simple example. Section IV introduces the general model for
risk neutral agents and derives the main results. Section V concludes.
1.2 Literature
My work contributes to the intersection of organizational economics and behavioral eco-
nomics. First, with regard to classic contract theory it complements the literature on
unintended consequences of incentive contracts. When the objective performance mea-
sure is imperfect, an explicit incentive contract can crowd out effort in tasks that are im-
portant to the firm but cannot be contracted upon (see Holmström and Milgrom (1991)
and Baker et al. (1994)). The result is either fraudulent behavior, e.g. the sales agents
deceiving their customers to increase sales, or the neglect of important (but unincen-
tivized) tasks, e.g. the teacher who only cares for his students’ test scores and neglects
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their personal development. These unintended consequences are the result of poor con-
tract design that ignores unmeasurable tasks. Better monitoring or fewer incentives are
the proposed remedies, depending on the structure of effort costs. Nonetheless, as long as
tasks are measurable, the informativeness principle states that all available information
should be considered in the incentive contract. My approach complements this strand of
literature by changing the perspective. Instead of the task’s observability the agent’s reac-
tion to increasing complexity drives the results: the agent simplifies his work by focusing
on certain tasks.
Second, in order to model the agent’s reaction to complexity, I use recently developed
models in behavioral economics. The main idea of these models is that an agent’s percep-
tion of tasks is influenced by the decision context. These context-dependent preferences
provide a simple explanation for a variety of violations of vonNeumann and Morgen-
stern’s Independence Axiom. The decision context influences the agent’s perception sub-
consciously, i.e determining which dimensions it is worth using the limited attention on.
Therefore focusing is a fast and intuitive assessment of a given situation, similar to Daniel
Kahneman’s System 1 (Kahneman (2011)). Economists have started developing focusing
models in economic choice that endogenously derive which dimensions stand out and
receive more weight in the agents’ perception. I follow Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) who
assume that the sensitivity increases with the range of observed values in an attribute. I
contribute to this literature through the application to a new field, that hasn’t been dis-
cussed so far. While the authors already proposed several applications, there has been
to the best of my knowledge only one further application by Wisson (2015), who uses
focusing agents to study screening in second degree price discrimination.
Third, my application answers to empirical findings from field experiments that raise
questions about agent’s perception of incentive contracts. Manthei and Sliwka (2013)
find that at different bank branches the supervisors’ use of objective performance mea-
sures can have a detrimental effect in small branches. While in big branches the in-
troduction of an objective performance has a positive effect on all products, in small
branches the increased effort on some products is accompanied by a decrease for the
major product, customer loans. The authors explain the effect through division of labor
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that is possible in big but not in small branches. The implication is that when agents face
multiple tasks with objective performance measures for each tasks they substitute effort
towards one task reducing the overall positive effect of objective performance measures.
Englmaier et al. (2016) show that in a setting with two measurable tasks, quantity and
quality of harvested lettuce, agents put too much effort in the quality dimension, because
it is rewarded by a tournament prize. The high variation of outcomes in the tournaments
draws agents attention in comparison to lower variation induced by the piece rate for
quantity. These findings suggest another force at work than the observability of out-
comes in multiple task models. My approach is able to provide a model that is able to
explain the distorted effort decisions as a result of the perceived contracts.
Fourth, in the literature on behavioral contract theory there have been experiments
on framing effects in contracts. The research has been focusing on penalty contracts,
i.e. contracts that use a loss rather than a gain framing in order to provide agents with
additional incentives (Hossain and List (2012), de Quidt (2017), Imas et al. (2016)).
Although the contracts are equivalent from a classic contracting perspective, the authors
find that the loss frame increases the agents’ effort, which is in line with Prospect The-
ory. A puzzling result both Imas et al. (2016) and de Quidt (2017) find is that subjects
select into loss contracts contrary to Prospect Theory. While Imas et al. (2016) claim
that this behavior is rational if agents use their loss aversion to overcome other sources
of dynamic inconsistent behavior, de Quidt (2017) points out that this explanation is
unlikely. He concludes that the higher base wage in loss contracts is perceived as a bet-
ter deal by the agents. These empirical findings raise the question how the framing of
contracts influences the agents’ perception and therefore their effort decisions. Outside
the field of organizations the empirical evidence on limited attention on decisions has
been documented by Chetty et al. (2009) and Finkelstein (2009) in field experiments on
non-salient taxes. In both experiments grocery shoppers and drivers are not aware of the
taxes they face and don’t adjust their behavior accordingly. In a lab experiment Abeler
and Jäger (2015) show that in a complex tax system participants adjust too little to new
tax rules. They find, that this effects subjects differently on the basis of their ability. While
highly able subjects adjust properly to increasing complexity, other subjects disregard the
10
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increasing complexity at all.
Last, I provide a new angle on the accounting literature on the usage of performance
measures started by Feltham and Xie (1994). Since the variety in performance measures
is the driving factor of the focusing model, I use a simplified version of their model. They
define necessary and sufficient conditions for additional performance measures to be of
use to determine the agents contribution to the principals outcomes. However, additional
performance measures can never have a negative effect in their framework. I provide an
argument why a multitude of performance measures can have a detrimental effect on
firms success and a paucity of performance measures can be optimal.
1.3 Example
To fix ideas how focusing can be modeled and influences effort decisions, I use an ex-
ample similar to lettuce harvesting by Englmaier et al. (2016). Suppose a risk neutral
principal (she) needs a risk neutral agent (he) to exert effort, a, in two distinct tasks
i ∈ {1, 2}: quantity (i = 1) of production and quality (i = 2) of the produced goods. The
agent’s effort in both tasks determines the principals profit B(a1, a2).
In order to stay close to the literature I assume that effort allocation and not effort
exertion is the problem. Therefore, effort is costless, c(a1, a2) = 0. The agent only has to
choose one dimension in which he will exert high effort: 〈ah, al〉 or 〈al, ah〉, with ah > al.
The principle sets the reward for quantity as a piece rate w · a1, while for the quality
dimension she uses a quality check, that pays a bonus b if the tested products are of high
quality and 0 if the product is of low quality. The probability of receiving high quality
depends on the effort the agent exerts in the quality dimension, p(a2) with ph = p(a2 =
ah) and pl = p(a2 = al). The agent receives an outside option of U¯ if he doesn’t accept
the offered contract. His utility function is additively separable in both dimensions:
U(a1, a2) = u(a1) + u(a2) = a1w + p(a2)b
I assume that B(a1, a2) is maximized with 〈ah, al〉 and it is socially optimal to employ
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the agent. The production function B(a1, a2) = t1a1 + t2a2 fulfills these assumptions for
t1 > t2.
1.3.1 Rational Benchmark
I first establish the solution for a non-focusing agent. The principal maximizes her ob-
jective function subject to the agent accepting the contract and choosing the right effort
allocation.
max
w,b,a1,a2
B(a1, a2)− wa1 − p(a2)b (1.1)
s.t.
(PC) wa1 + p(a2)b ≥ U¯ (1.2)
(ICC) max
a1,a2
wa∗1 + p(a
∗
2)b ≥ wa1 + p(a2)b (1.3)
Both the participation constraint (PC) and the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC)
have to bind, otherwise the principle would leave a rent to the agent. Therefore the
optimal choices for the piece rate w∗ and the bonus b∗ are given by:
w∗ = U¯
ph − pl
phah − plal (1.4)
b∗ = U¯
ah − al
phah − plal (1.5)
The optimal bonus payment and the optimal piece rate depend on the difference in
outcomes generated through effort in the other task. For example, the piece rate has to
increase if effort has a higher impact on the quality test relative to the piece rate.
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1.3.2 A focusing agent
In this section I show that if the agent’s attention is drawn to the task with the highest
variation in pay, the optimal choices for piece rate and bonus payment reverse. The
agent is a focusing thinker unbeknownst to the principal. Focus is generated in each
task separately and influences the agent’s perception of the task. The basic formalization
is taken from Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) with the extension for decisions under risk by
Bushong et al. (2015). Each task in the additively separable utility function receives an
additional weight that captures how much the agent focuses on the task. The weight
is determined by the range of outcomes in this dimension ∆ai that serves as argument
for the weighting function g(·). In line with Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) I use a convex
weighting function. The utility function for the focusing thinker is defined as follows:
UFT (a1, a2) = g(∆a1)u(a1) + g(∆a2)u(a2) = g(∆a1)a1w + g(∆a2)p(a2)b (1.6)
Since the quantity task does not involve any risk, the definition of its range is straight
forward:
∆a1 = max
a1∈{ah,al}
u(a1)− min
a1∈{ah,al}
u(a1) (1.7)
Therefore:
∆a1 = wah − wal = w(ah − al) (1.8)
The second task, however, involves the risk of a bad product being detected and therefore
the agent not receiving the bonus b. In order to determine the range under risk Bushong
et al. (2015) propose a formulation that considers the expected value EF as well as the
average self-distance SF for risky prospects, where F denotes the probability distribution:
∆a2 = max
F∈F
(EF [u(a2)] +
1
2
SF [u(a2)])−min
F∈F
(EF [u(a2)]− 1
2
SF [u(a2)]) (1.9)
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The average self difference is defined as
SF [u(a2)] =
∫ ∫
|u(a′2)− u(a2)| dF (a′2)dF (a2). (1.10)
The intuition for using the average self-distance of a distribution is that in comparison to
only using the expected value it also depicts the variation in outcomes in a distribution.
The minimum for the focusing range is always given by al, whereas the maximum is given
by ah.3
Therefore, the range for the product test is given by:
∆a2 = b[2ph − p2h − p2l ] (1.11)
The difference in the ranges of both tasks results solely from the higher variation of
the quality task through its design as bonus. While my example compares a task without
risk to a task with risk, even for two risky reward schemes (e.g. tournament and bonus
payment or bonus payments in both tasks) the basic intuition remains the same. The
agent will focus on the task with the higher variation in outcomes.
The higher variation of the quality task is also the driving force in the lettuce harvester
example. The tournament rewards teams that produce less low quality lettuce, i.e. han-
dle the lettuce with care. A tournament is a source of outcome variation for two reasons.
First, outcomes have to be skewed to generate incentives for agents to participate. Sec-
ond every tournament involves risk through the competition with other agents. Both
sources of outcome variation increase the agent’s focus on the tournament.
1.3.3 Effort Allocation of a Focusing Agent
For a focusing agent, the perceived contract changes, therefore I introduce a new partici-
pation constraint (PCp) and a new incentive compatibility constraint (ICCp), that reflect
the agents perception. I show that the agent’s perception leads him to choose the wrong
effort allocation. This provides an explanation for the findings in the field.
3 See Appendix for the derivation.
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(PCp) g(∆a1)wa1 + g(∆a2)p(a2)b ≥ U¯ (1.12)
(ICCp) max
a1,a2
g(∆a1)wa
∗
1 + g(∆a2)p(a
∗
2)b ≥ g(∆a1)wa1 + g(∆a2)p(a2)b (1.13)
In order to show that a focusing agent will chose an effort allocation contrary to the
principal’s plan, I use the compensation schemes b∗ and w∗, that were optimal for a
rational agent, and show that the perceived participation constraint, (ICCp), results in
the opposite behavior to (ICC) for a rational agent. Therefore the perceived utility for
effort allocation 〈al, ah〉 is higher and a focusing thinker will choose it.
For the proof I rearrange (ICCp):
g(∆a2)b
∗(ph − pl)) ≥ g(∆a1)w∗(ah − al) (1.14)
Using the previously optimally chosen w and b as well as the derived ranges for both
piece rate and quality test, I can rewrite the violated incentive constraint:
g(U¯
(ah − al)(2ph − p2h − p2l )
phah − plal )U¯
(ah − al)(ph − pl)
phah − plal >
g(U¯
(ah − al)(ph − pl)
phah − plal )U¯
(ah − al)(ph − pl)
phah − plal
(1.15)
The only difference between LHS and RHS is the range of tasks. Therefore the equation
simplifies to
(2ph − p2h − p2l ) > (ph − pl).
Rearrangement leads to:
ph + pl > p
2
h + p
2
l (1.16)
which is true for all increasing weighting functions g(·).
This result states, that under the optimal compensation scheme for a rational agent, a
higher variation in pay for the quality task draws the focusing thinker’s attention. Thus,
the reward scheme implements the effort allocation 〈el, eh〉, opposite to the principals
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intention. In comparison to classic contract theory, the distortion stems entirely from the
agent’s biased perception of the reward scheme. This result is captured by Lemma 1:
Lemma 1.3.1. If a work contract is not focusing proof, i.e. it does not account for the agent’s
perception of different compensation schemes, the agent will choose an effort allocation that
is distorted towards tasks with high outcome variation.
In the specific example it distorts the effort to its opposite 〈el, eh〉.
1.4 Model
The baseline model generalizes the example in two ways. First, my example uses two
different compensation schemes: a piece rate and a quality test. Both compensation
schemes represent different combinations of risk and outcome distributions. For the
baseline model I follow closely the literature on multiple tasks Holmström and Milgrom
(1991) and performance measures (Baker et al. (1994),Feltham and Xie (1994)), where
each task’s compensation scheme can be represented as a linear sharing rule.
Second, each task generates a signal with the chosen effort being the mean and a
normally distributed error term. While focusing in the example was purely driven by
variation in outcomes, in this setting it is driven by the noise of performance measures.
I simplify the literature on multiple tasks by introducing risk neutrality for both princi-
pal and agent.4 A risk neutral principal (she) needs a risk neutral agent (he) to perform
several distinct tasks i ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. The agent’s effort in the different tasks, ai deter-
mines the principals revenue y according to:
y =
T∑
i=1
fiai + .
Where fi is the productivity of each task and  is a common shock normally distributed
with mean zero and variance of σy. The common shock makes it impossible to verify the
agents chosen effort before a court.
4 The results are robust to risk averse agent’s. See Appendix A.3
16
FOCUSING ATTENTION IN MULTIPLE TASKS
I deviate from the literature on multiple performance measures. While Feltham and
Xie (1994) look at compound performance measures, i.e. each performance measure is
influenced by several different tasks, I assume that each task has a separate performance
measure. The assumption simplifies the problem of Feltham and Xie (1994), because it
allows for a direct attribution of each performance measure to the agent’s exerted effort.
Thus, the first best solution is possible, whereas compound measures always fall short
as long as they are not both precise, i.e. zero noise of performance measure, and con-
gruent, i.e. effort influences the performance measure in the same direction as output.
Although the simplification abstracts from the question which compound performance
measures a principal should use, it generates clear cut insight into the role of focusing.
Since the simplification results in the first best in Feltham and Xie (1994) it is clear that
the inefficiency stems solely from focusing and is not driven through the setup of perfor-
mance measures.5
I chose the simplifying assumptions to generate tractable results, where the influence of
outcome variation in one task can be determined as the source for the agent’s behavior.
However each of the assumptions can be relaxed giving rise to additional interesting
interactions.
The principal uses multiple performance measures. I assume one performance mea-
sure, pi, for each task i. These measures provide some information on the agent’s perfor-
mance, however entail error term, ϕi, that is normally distributed with mean zero and
standard deviation σi. The correlation between the different measures is assumed to be
zero. The performance measures for each task, i, are defined as follows:
pi = giai + ϕi.
The principal has to pay the agent according to a linear sharing rule w = s+
∑N
i=1 bipi.
6
The principal’s net payoff is the difference of the revenue and the payment to the agent:
5 An extension for the role of focusing for the choice of compound performance measures is possible,
but not within the reach of the current work.
6 Risk neutrality and the use of a linear sharing rule make the typical assumption in the literature of
additive separability of utility dimensions obsolete.
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Π = y − w. In order to show that the results are not driven by technical assumptions
regarding the complementarities in effort costs or production function, all dimensions are
assumed to be perfect substitutes. Thus, the cost function is assumed to be c(a1, ...aN) =
1
2
∑N
i=1 a
2
i . The agent’s utility function is given by U = w − c(a1, ...aN).
The timing is as follows: First the principal offers an incentive contract to the agent,
who decides to either accept or decline. Second, the agent chooses effort in each dimen-
sion. Third the shocks are realized which generate in the fourth step the outcome and
the performance measures.
1.4.1 Introducing Focusing
In this section I introduce the agent’s focusing. Following Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) I use
a concave weighting function for each task. In decisions without risk the weight of each
task is determined through the range of maximum and minimum utility obtainable. Since
effort decisions involve risk, the weight should also include a measure for the likelihood
of differing outcomes. Therefore I use a combination of the first and second moment of
the distribution to determine the range. The idea is to capture aspects of decision under
risk while remaining tractable for field and laboratory evidence7.
To model the effect of focusing, I include an additional weighting function, g(·), over
the range of each task, ∆i, in the additive separable utility function:
w = s+
N∑
i=1
g(∆i)bipiai. (1.17)
A common assumption for g(·) is
g′(·) > 0, g′′(·) < 0,
therefore I use g(x) = xα, 0 < α < 1.
7 I chose a different formalization than Bushong et al. (2015), because the difference between their
measure for average self-distance and variance are small. In addition variance is given by the principal
agent models, while average self-distance requires an additional transformation.
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The argument of the weighting function, g(·), is the range for each task, ∆i, that is
determined through a linear combination of the expected value and the variation of out-
comes. 1 ≥ β ≥ 0 determines the relative weight put on the expected value. The formula
is similar to Bushong et al. (2015) with the exception that instead of their definition for
average self-distance I use the variance to increase tractability:
∆i = max
F∈F
(βEF (Ui(ai)) + (1− β)VF (Ui(ai)))
−min
F∈F
(βEF (Ui(ai))− (1− β)VF (Ui(ai)))
. (1.18)
Since the difference in outcomes is not driven by the choice of different lotteries, but
through the choice of effort the expected values reduce to:
EF (Ui(ai)) = bigiai + biE[φi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= bigiai.
Similarly, the variance reduces to:
VF (Ui(ai)) = V (bi(giai + φi)) = b
2
i (V (giai) + V (φi) = b
2
iσ
2
i .
For notational simplification, I assume that both the expected value as well as the vari-
ance receive the same weight in ∆i, β = 1− β = 12 .8
∆i =
1
2
bigiai +
1
2
b2iσ
2
i −
1
2
bigiai +
1
2
b2iσ
2
i
Thus, the range of each dimension is determined through the quadratic slope of the linear
sharing rule bi and the variance σi of the noise φi of the performance measure.
∆i = b
2
iσ
2
i (1.19)
8 I assume that the agent can exert the same amount of effort in each task, i.e. there are no limitations
to the amount of effort. Without this assumption the results do not change, however they are now
dependent on exogenous assumptions on the range of effort that can be exerted in each task, since
this range drives the agents perception.
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The agent’s perceived payoff of the offered contract is given by:
w = s+
N∑
i=1
b2αi σ
2α
i bipiai.
Therefore the agent’s optimization changes to:
max
a
E(w)− c(a) = s+
N∑
i=1
b2αi σ
2α
i bipiai −
1
2
N∑
i=1
a2i . (1.20)
The agent’s optimization now contains the additional term b2αi σ
2α
i that puts additional
weight on dimensions with high variation in outcomes, either through a steep slope bi
or through a noisy performance measure σi. The curvature α of the weighting function
determines how much the decision maker is influenced by focusing.
For α > 0 all tasks that fulfill bi ∗ σi > 1 will be overvalued by a focusing agent. The
perceived utility from a marginal unit of effort is inflated through the focusing. Whereas
the tasks with bi∗σi < 1 are undervalued and perceived less valuable than they objectively
are. For the special case of bi ∗ σi = 1, a focusing agent perceives the task the same way
a non-focusing agent does.
For α = 0 focusing vanishes altogether and the agent is a standard decision maker. In
the next section I develop the benchmark contract for a non-focusing agent.
1.4.2 Multiple Performance Measures, Benchmark
Starting with α = 0, I can derive the optimal contract for a non-focusing agent. As long as
the principal is able to use multiple performance measures, she can condition the contract
for each task on those performance measures. Thus, without limited liability and because
of risk neutrality, the principal is able to implement the first best.
The agent’s choice is given by his utility maximization:
max
a
E(w)− c(a) = s+ (
N∑
i=1
bigiai)− 1
2
N∑
i=1
a2i . (1.21)
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The optimal choice for each agent is therefore given by
a∗i = gibi. (1.22)
The principal takes the agent’s choice into account while maximizing the expected total
surplus:
E(Π + U) = E(y)− c(a) =
T∑
i=1
fiai − 1
2
N∑
i=1
a2i (1.23)
s.t.
a∗i = gibi.
The optimal choice of bi is therefore:
b∗i =
fi
gi
. (1.24)
The use of multiple performance measures results in the first best result, where the
agent exerts effort in each dimension optimally, a∗i = fi, i.e. marginal return equals
marginal costs of effort. Therefore the use of multiple performance measures increases
the total expected surplus. Since I ignore the typical tradeoff between risk and incentives,
it is not surprising that the first best can be achieved.
1.4.3 Non-Focusing Proof Contracts
As soon as α > 0 the agent is a focusing thinker. I first analyze the agent’s effort decision
in the case where the principal either does not know that the agent is a focusing or she
cannot adjust the contract due to institutional constraints or short term contractual rigid-
ity. The perspective on non-focusing proof contracts helps to formalize the findings in the
empirical literature (see Manthei and Sliwka (2013) and Englmaier et al. (2016)). When
the agent faces several tasks, he will focus on those tasks, that entail higher variation in
outcomes.
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While multiple performance measures ensure the first best effort allocation, when the
agent uses the performance measures as signals in which dimensions it is worth to exert
effort, the optimality of complex contracts is not ex ante clear for focusing agents.
As long as the principal does not adjust the contract to account for the agent’s focusing
towards tasks with high outcome variation, she uses the previously optimally determined
slopes for the linear sharing rules:
b∗i =
fi
gi
.
However the agent optimizes according to the perceived contract leading to the first
order condition:
max
a
s+
N∑
i=1
(
fi
gi
)2ασ2αi
fi
gi
giai − 1
2
N∑
i=1
a2i . (1.25)
The non-focusing proof contract results in the agent exerting effort in each dimension
according to the focusing weight:
aNFPi = fib
2α
i σ
2α
i . (1.26)
The effort a focusing thinker will exert in a task depends not only on the marginal pro-
ductivity of effort, but also on the slope of the linear sharing rule. Since the slope moves
in the same direction as the marginal productivity, focusing works as an additional in-
centive for those dimensions where marginal productivity is high and the performance
measure p does not overshadow the productivity. However, also the variance of outcomes
plays an important role in the determination of the optimal effort. The higher the vari-
ance and therefore the noise of the performance measure in a dimension, the more will
the focusing thinker be drawn to this dimension. Proposition 1.4.1 captures these results
Proposition 1.4.1. The effort a focusing thinker will exert is increasing in those dimensions,
with steeper slopes in the linear sharing rule and with higher variance in the performance
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measure:
∂aNFPi
∂bi
> 0 (1.27)
∂aNFPi
∂σi
> 0. (1.28)
Proposition 1.4.1 states the influence of focusing on the agent’s decision making for
non-focusing proof contract. Effort increases with the share the agent receives, i.e. tasks
become salient when they are more productive. This result is in line, both with intuition
and the principal’s interest, because focusing is more pronounced in tasks that are very
profitable for her as well.
In addition a focusing thinker’s attention is driven by the variance of the performance
measure. Noisy performance measures attract the agent’s attention resulting in a higher
focus and perceived importance of the task. Focusing implies that although the agent is
risk neutral the risk involved in the performance measure influences his perception of the
tasks. Tasks whose performance measures involve more noise than others become salient
and a focusing agent is drawn to them.
For models where instead of performance outcomes in each dimension can be directly
measured, it is the variance in outcomes that drives the agent’s attention. Section 1.3
builds on this version of the model.
The second result of Proposition 1.4.1 opens up two options. If the principal is con-
strained in the contract design, the noise of the performance measures can counteract
the initially set incentives. However, as long as the principal can choose performance
measures and the noise works as additional incentive. So far, I have considered that ef-
fort distortions are to the principal’s disadvantage, however the exchange of both tasks
productivity in the example in Section 1.3 gives rise to a different mechanism.
The additional focus through the higher variation in outcomes in the second task works
as additional incentive that allows the principal to reduce the agents performance pay
without violating the incentive compatibility and participation constraint. It is straight
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forward to show that the principal has an incentive to choose noisier performance mea-
sures for tasks that are more productive. As long as the principal is free to choose perfor-
mance measures, she can use them to increase a focusing agents effort in very productive
tasks without further costs.
1.4.4 Focusing Adjusted Contracts
In Section 1.4.3 I assumed, that the principal could either not adjust the contract due
to external rigidities or was not aware that the agent is a focusing thinker. Now I lift
the assumption and analyze the optimal contract that adjusts for focusing agents. The
principal’s optimization remains the same:
E(pi) = E(y − w) =
N∑
i=1
fiai − s− (
N∑
i=1
bigiai).
However, she anticipates the agent’s perception of the contract that changes the agent’s
individual rational:
E(U) = E(w)− c(a) = s+
N∑
i=1
b2αi σ
2α
i bipi −
1
2
N∑
i=1
a2i .
Since the agent’s perception does not influence the objective expected total surplus, it
enters only through the agent’s distorted effort decisions. Therefore the principals opti-
mization problem looks like the benchmark with the exception of the agent’s participation
constraint:
E(Π + U) = E(y)− c(a) =
T∑
i=1
fiai − 1
2
N∑
i=1
a2i
s.t.
∀ai ai = b2αi σ2αi bipi.
The solution to this problem gives the optimal slope for tasks in a focusing proof con-
tract:
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bFPi = (
fi
pi
1
σi
)
1
2α+1 . (1.29)
In comparison to the optimal slope for non-focusing agents where only the ratio of
productivity and influence on the performance measure determined the slope, now the
slope is overall flatter, because of the exponent 1
2α+1
and additionally accounts for the
variance of the noise term. To fully understand the behavior of bi I look at the first and
second derivative for both productivity and noise. The results are captured in Proposition
1.4.2 and Proposition 1.4.3.
Proposition 1.4.2. A focusing-proof contract counteracts the additional attention through
the noise within the performance measure. Higher variance results in a decrease of slope.
With increasing variance the slope decreases further:
∂bFPi
∂σi
= (
fi
gi
)
1
2α+1 (−1) 1
2α + 1
σ
− 2α+2
2α+1
i < 0 (1.30)
∂2bFPi
∂σ2i
= (
fi
gi
)
1
2α+1
2α + 2
(2α + 1)2
σ
− 4α+3
2α+1
i > 0. (1.31)
Proposition 1.4.2 states that, ceteris paribus, noisier performance measures result in a
decrease of slope, bi. The reduction of slope increases with additional noise.
Proposition 1.4.3. The optimal linear sharing rule counteracts the additional incentives in
a highly productive task fi
gi
. Although it still increases with productivity, the increase becomes
slower the higher the productivity is:
∂bFPi
∂ fi
gi
=
1
2α + 1
(
fi
gi
)−
2α
2α+1 (
1
σi
)
1
2α+1 > 0 (1.32)
25
FOCUSING ATTENTION IN MULTIPLE TASKS
∂2bFPi
∂(fi
gi
)2
= − 2α
(2α + 1)2
(
fi
gi
)−
4α−1
2α+1 (
1
σi
)
1
2α+1 < 0. (1.33)
Proposition 1.4.3 states that, ceteris paribus, higher productivity still results in steeper
slopes. However, in the benchmark case the increase was linear, while in the focusing
proof contract the increase diminishes. Thus the difference between more and less pro-
ductive tasks decreases in comparison to the benchmark.
Both propositions combined, characterize the principal’s ability to set incentives. On
the one hand steep incentives will draw a lot of attention. Focusing adjusted contracts
allow the principal to reduce the offered marginal product without impeding the incen-
tives. On the other hand the principal needs to counteract the effect of the performance
measure. For tasks whose performance measures entail high variation she can reduce
incentives. In contrast, tasks with low variation performance measures need additional
incentives.
The focusing proof contract induces effort in each task:
aFPCi = fiσ
2α−1
i . (1.34)
In comparison to the benchmark effort, a∗i = fi, the effort distortion becomes apparent:
aFPCi > a
∗
i ⇔ σ2α−1i > 1. (1.35)
As long as α > 1
2
, i.e. the weighting function is not too concave, a σi > 1 will result in
more effort in task i. Even the focusing proof contract will optimally not prevent some
degree of focusing. In dimensions with less noisy performance measures the agent will
reduce his effort. A σi < 1 results in less effort in task i. Therefore it becomes clear
that the noise of the performance measure influences the agent’s perception and through
this his choice of effort. It is worth noticing that, although the productivity of a task
influences the perception of a contract it does not influence the effort choice compared
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to the benchmark.
1.4.5 Single vs. Multiple Performance Measures
For non-focusing agents clearly the use of multiple performance measures is optimal, be-
cause it achieves first best. Therefore it is no surprise that the accounting literature knows
examples of the usage of multiple performance measures. Anthony et al. (1992) sum-
marize for example the measures used by McDonald’s for their store managers: product
quality, service, cleanliness, sales volume, personnel training, and cost control.
It is apparent that most principals do not use multiple performance measures. In cases
where incentive pay is provided multiple performance measures are either contracted to
a compound measure of success or used in balanced scorecards. Compound measures
are commission payments or stock options, that measure the overall success of a firm.
Balanced scorecards are used to combine the effort in different dimensions and present
the agent with an overall assessment. These incentive schemes are simpler than standard
economic theory prescribes.
Therefore I analyze how a single performance measure can be preferable to multiple
performance measures if it can avoid the agent’s focusing distortions. The setup changes
only in one aspect with respect to the use of multiple performance measures. The sin-
gle performance measure is a compound measure of all different tasks. Therefore the
measure measure p provides information on the agent’s performance, but entails an er-
ror term ϕ that is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ. The
correlation between the different measures is assumed to be zero.
p =
T∑
i=1
giai + ϕ.
I assume ϕ =
∑N
i=1 ϕi, i.e. the joint measure does not have an advantage through the
structure of noise terms in comparison to the multiple performance measures.
The linear sharing rule is accordingly, w = s+ bp.
I assume that the single performance measure does not distort the agent’s focus. This
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assumption captures the most clear cut case, where the principal has a technique to com-
municate and explain simpler schemes more efficiently. Therefore the principle prevents
focusing through the choice of contract design. Thus the optimal choice of slope b is
determined through the maximization of the expected total surplus E(Π + U) and the
agent’s optimal decision maxaE(U) comparable to the non-focusing benchmark.
The agent’s choice for a single performance measure (SPM) is given by:
max
a
E(w)− c(a) = s+ b(
N∑
i=1
giai)− 1
2
N∑
i=1
a2i . (1.36)
The optimal choice for each agent is therefore given by
aSPMi = gib. (1.37)
In order to determine the optimal slope of the linear sharing rule, b, the principal needs
to maximize the expected total surplus subject to the individuals maximization:
E(Π + U) = E(y)− c(a) =
T∑
i=1
fiai − 1
2
N∑
i=1
a2i (1.38)
s.t.
aSPMi = gib.
The optimization can be transformed into:
E(Π + U) =
T∑
i=1
fibi − 1
2
N∑
i=1
b2i . (1.39)
The optimal choice of b is therefore as in Feltham and Xie (1994):
bSPM =
∑N
i=1 figi∑N
i=1 g
2
i
. (1.40)
The slope of the single performance measure has to balance the influence of the tasks on
both the performance measure and principal’s outcome.
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Using multiple performance measures induces an inefficiency if the principal is con-
fronted with a focusing agent. I assume that a single performance measure avoids these
inefficiencies because it prevents the agent to focus on one task. The tradeoff between
a single and multiple performance measures is given by the loss of efficiency through a
single performance measure in comparison to the loss of efficiency through the agent’s
focusing by using multiple performance measures.
When comparing multiple and single performance measures, the mentioned tradeoff
strengthens the basic intuition: If the number of tasks increases the loss through a single
performance measure increases, however the loss of a focusing agent increases at a faster
rate. Therefore there exists a cutoff for which it is optimal to switch from multiple to a
single performance measure.
As a measure of overall welfare I use the expected total surplus generated through the
single as well as multiple performance measures and compare it to the first best, i.e. the
use of multiple performance measures for a non-focusing agent.
First, the expected total surplus for a single performance measure:
SSPM = E(y − c(a)) = 1∑N
i=1 g
2
i
[
1
2
N∑
i=1
(figi)
2 +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
figifjgj]. (1.41)
Second, the expected total surplus for multiple performance measures with a focusing
agent:
SFP = E(y − c(a)) =
N∑
i=1
(f 2i σ
2α−1
i −
1
2
f 2i σ
4α−2
i ). (1.42)
It is straightforward that the expected surplus for multiple performance measures is
first best, when the agent is not a focusing thinker, i.e. α = 0.
Comparing the expected total surplus of the single performance measure to the con-
tract for the focusing thinker highlights the central tradeoff. While the single performance
measure always stays positive, the focusing proof contract can contain tasks (high varia-
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tion tasks) that have a negative impact on the expected total surplus:
f 2i σ
2α−1
i −
1
2
f 2i σ
4α−2
i = f
2
i σ
2α−1
i (1−
1
2
σ2i ) < 0↔ σi ≥
√
2 (1.43)
Since the optimal choice of single versus multiple performance measures depends on
the tuple (σi, gi, fi), I simplify the analysis. I assume that all tasks (and all potential
tasks) have the same productivity ∀i fi = f and the same influence on the performance
measures ∀i gi = g . Therefore the expected total surplus of the single performance
measure simplifies to
SSPM = E(y − c(a)) = 3
2
∑N
i=1(fg)
2∑N
i=1 g
2
=
3
2
f 2. (1.44)
The expected total surplus for multiple performance measures is given by:
SFP = E(y − c(a)) = f 2
N∑
i=1
(σ2α−1i −
1
2
f 2σ4α−2i ) (1.45)
Comparing both shows, that an increase in noise, σi results in a lower expected total
surplus.
3
2
>
N∑
i=1
(σ2α−1i −
1
2
f 2σ4α−2i ) (1.46)
Assume in addition, that additional performance measures increase in noise terms,
i.e. ∀iσi+1 > σi. Since the expected total surplus is fixed for the single performance
measure, with increasing noise in the performance measures of the multiple performance
measures of a focusing agent, there exists a switching point. The inefficiency of the single
performance measure is outweighted by the negative externality induced by focusing.
Proposition 1.4.4. As long as ∀iσi+1 > σi holds, i.e. additional performance measures in-
clude increasing noise terms thereby increasing the focusing distortion, there exists a switch-
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ing point of tasks t∗ s.t.
3
2
N>t∗∑
i=1
i >
N>t∗∑
i=1
(σ2α−1i −
1
2
f 2σ4α−2i ) (1.47)
Any number of tasks above this switching point increases the negative externality of focusing
more than the inefficiency of a single performance measure.
Proposition 1.4.4 implies that with an increasing number of performance measures it
becomes optimal to switch from a complex to a simple contract that rewards on the basis
of one overall measure. Complete and complex contracts generate a negative externality
through the focusing bias. When the tasks increasingly influence the agents perception,
then at some point it is socially optimal to switch to a simpler contract. In essence,
Proposition 1.4.4 provides a rational for incomplete contracts.
Once I lift the simplification, the result depends on the specific dynamics of the tasks.
In general it remains true that increasing variation increases the likelihood of the com-
pound performance measure being more efficient. However, the increase in variation
can be offset by an increase in productivity of tasks. Therefore two different empirical
predictions arise. First, performance measures with high variation in outcomes should
not be empirically observed. This prediction is close to Holmström and Milgrom (1991).
Second, the more productive the tasks are individually and the better the performance
measures represent this productivity, the more likely are multiple performance measures
instead of a compound measure.
1.5 Conclusion
In complex environments classic economic theory predicts similar complex contracts in
order to provide the agent with the right incentives. However, if the agent is not fully
capable of processing all information, a natural reaction for an agent is to reduce the
complexity by focusing his attention. When he focuses on those tasks that have the
highest influence on his payoffs, the agent ends up allocating his effort among the tasks
contrary to the principal’s intention.
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Through a combination of a model on multiple tasks with a model on focusing in eco-
nomic choices, I can derive this result. It provides another argument for the existence
of incomplete contracts and the observed paucity of complex incentive schemes. When
I compare the choice between a compound performance measure and multiple perfor-
mance measures, I find that an increasing number of tasks increases the benefits of the
compound performance measure. The distortion through focusing increases with the
tasks therefore it becomes is optimal for the principal rather than using several different
measures to resort to one overall measure of productivity.
My results explain findings of field experiments in organizational economics, where
the reduction of incentives increases overall productivity. While I was able to show the
distortion for a general multiple task framework, it is an open and interesting question
how different contract frames influence the agent’s perception and therefore influence
his effort choices beyond the financial incentives. The work by Hossain and List (2012),
de Quidt (2017) and Imas et al. (2016) is instructive in thinking about the differential
effects of contract frames on workers motivation and effort choice.
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Chapter 2
On the Dynamics of Prospect Theory -
Experimental Evidence∗
ita duae voluntates meae, una vetus, alia nova, illa carnalis, illa spiritalis, confilgebant
inter se, atque discordando dissipabant animam meam.
“Thus did my two wills, one new, and the other old, one carnal, the other spiritual,
struggle within me; and by their discord, undid my soul.”
Augustinus, Confessiones VIII, V
2.1 Motivation
Most of us have experienced willed weakness. Augustinus uses a pointed description in
his confessions: the old will makes a plan and struggles to follow through with it, because
a new will emerges. We research one potential cause for this behavior, the experience of
losses on risk taking in sequential lotteries, and test for personality traits that exacerbate
or reduce the difficulties to stick to ones plan.
Conventional wisdom helps to circumvent weakness of will by avoiding particular de-
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Dominik Fischer (LMU) and Felix Peterhammer (University of
Regensburg). The authors want to thank their supervisors Florian Englmaier, Andreas Roider and Klaus
Schmidt. For helpful comments we thank Han Bleichrodt, Martin Kocher, Botond Ko˝szegi, Francesco
Pasarelli, Simeon Schudy and Justin Sydnor. For excellent research assistance I thank Michael Hoff-
mann and Regina Seibel.
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cision situations. One particular proverb regarding investing is: ’Never invest money you
cannot afford to lose.’ Closely related, a common tip for casino trips is to leave your credit
card at home. Both suggest that in sequential decisions experiencing a loss will make it
harder to follow the initial plan. The decision maker is tempted to change his behavior
and to take on more risk in order to ’offset’ a loss. Rather than convex preferences the
decision maker’s inability to restrict himself and accept losses seems to be at the core of
the problem.
In the example of casino gambling the dynamics stand out as the cause for increasing
risk taking. Sequential lotteries make it harder for the decision maker to follow through
with their initial plans. Previously, sequential lotteries were bound to locations, like
casinos or racetracks, reducing their availability. Now, through the internet sequential
lotteries are easily accessible. On November 15th 2015 the host of ’Last Week Tonight’,
John Oliver, used a twenty minute segment to educate his viewers about fantasy football
leagues. Users build their own fantasy football team, score points and compete for the
jackpot. These fantasy leagues are a commonly observed in offices, where they are played
over a long period of time. However, the internet leagues take less than a day to be
resolved, leaving customers with a row of sequential lotteries.
Although betting and gambling are well known examples, the same underlying idea
also influenced product design. Trading cards and stickers are sold in packs, where each
pack is a lottery over its content. The desired cards or collections are hard to obtain and
without occurring trade would involve substantial costs2.
The mentioned examples already suggest, that decision maker face difficulties to fol-
low through with plans once they experience losses. While the existence of conventional
wisdom indicates that these difficulties are experienced by many, it also opens the ques-
tion why decision maker enter sequential gambles in the first place. Two explanations
come to mind. First, decision makers are not aware that they compare outcomes to a
reference point, i.e. they are unaware that their preferences are described by Prospect
Theory. It seems highly unlikely that decision makers never experienced losses in their
2 Sylvain Sardy and Yvan Velenik, two mathematicians from Geneva, calculated the costs of filling one
sticker album for soccer with CHF 933.27.
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lives up to entering a sequential lottery. Therefore the second explanation seems more
plausible: In dynamic situations it is harder to exactly predict the feeling of losses.
How good decision makers are in anticipating their Prospect Theory behavior has been
discussed in the literature on penalty contracts (Imas et al. (2016), de Quidt (2017))
and anticipation mistakes have been applied to majority voting by Alesina and Passarelli
(2015). Although research on the endowment effect3 already indicates that decision
makers do not correctly anticipate how much giving up an object impacts their utility
(see Loewenstein and Adler (1995)), the same has to be proven for dynamic decision
situations. In addition, it is an open question if there are personal traits that exacerbate
or reduce anticipation mistakes.
The aim of our paper is to inform the theory about what quality of Prospect Theory
anticipations is to be expected and to identify potential determinants of individual differ-
ences in these anticipations. Therefore, we conducted a controlled laboratory experiment
where our participants were asked to plan, commit, and play a sequential investment
game and where we elicited summary statistics of their demographics, cognitive abilities,
personality traits, and risky choice patterns as potential correlates. We assess the quality
of our subjects’ anticipations by evaluating their planning and commitment choices based
on plan-deviations in their actual play and based on separately elicited Prospect Theory
parameters, and we classify them accordingly.
We show that the deviations from plan are driven by loss aversion for subjects whose
behavior can be described by Prospect Theory. In addition we observe that the willingness
to pay for a commitment increases with the subject’s degree of loss aversion, providing
suggestive evidence that subjects anticipate their inconsistent behavior. In the analysis
of the quality of subjects’ plan and commitment decisions, we find that subjects with
high scores in agreeableness decide significantly better. In contrast, our prediction that
subjects with high scores in the cognitive reflection test or conscientiousness do better
has to be rejected.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the theoret-
ical and experimental literature on anticipation mistakes and Prospect Theory. Section
3 Prospect Theory is regarded as a good explanation for the endowment effect.
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2.3 presents our predictions. Section 2.4 introduces our experimental design and de-
scribes how we conducted the experiment, Section 2.5 presents our data and analysis,
and Section 2.6 summarizes the results and provides an outlook on further promising
research.
2.2 Literature
In many dynamic decision situations, interactions between individual choices occur, i.e.
the optimal decision in one stage can depend on what decisions were taken in other
stages. Therefore outcomes for decision makers are crucially driven by their anticipation
of own future desires and tradeoffs. However, such anticipation is difficult and people
may exhibit systematic errors.
Prominent examples for systematic anticipation errors in decision making are projec-
tion bias (Loewenstein et al. (2003)) and naivete with respect to present bias (O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999)). When preferences are state contingent, projection bias describes
the tendency to under-appreciate the change of own tastes conditional on changes in
the state. For example, preferences over food depend on current hunger, but subjects
who are asked right after a meal to choose a snack for a future hungry state system-
atically underestimate their future desire for unhealthy snacks (Read and van Leeuwen
(1998)). Similarly, preferences over clothing, cars, and outdoor movie tickets depend on
the weather at time of consumption, but subjects who purchase these items in advance
are overly responsive to the weather at time of purchase (Conlin et al. (2007); Busse et al.
(2015); Buchheim and Kolaska (2017)). Naivete with respect to present bias describes
the tendency to under-appreciate own future desires for immediate gratification. For
example, people who sign up for gym memberships underestimate their future laziness
and credit card users underestimate their future reluctance to pay off their debt in due
time. Firms can exploit such naivete by offering contracts that are tailored to these mis-
takes (DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004, 2006); Eliaz and Spiegler (2006); Heidhues
and Ko˝szegi (2010)).
Many dynamic decisions involve also risk tradeoffs. However, there are well docu-
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mented phenomena that cannot be reconciled with Expected Utility Theory, e.g. sub-
stantial deviations from risk neutrality in small stakes gambles (Rabin (2000)). Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), a static model
of decision making under risk, can rationalize these choice behaviors and is, therefore,
frequently applied also to dynamic choices that involve risk.
Prominent domains of dynamic risky choices where Prospect Theory was fruitfully ap-
plied are stock trading, casino gambling, and reactions to advertisements. For specific
assumptions about its dynamics, Prospect Theory can help explain equity premiums and
the disposition effect in asset trading (Benartzi and Thaler (1995); Barberis and Xiong
(2009)), casino gambling strategies and commitment choices (Barberis (2012)), and why
“bait-and-switch” strategies and other misleading advertisements of retailers can be ef-
fective (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2014); Rosato (2016); Karle and Schumacher (2017)).
However, Prospect Theory decision makers do not only exhibit distinct risk preferences
in small stakes gambles, but are subject to massive spillovers between sequential risky
choices. As reference points are fixed in the short term, the outcome of one gamble puts
Prospect Theory decision makers into the gain or loss domain for their next decision, and
they may behave vastly different than they do at the reference point.4 In particular, for
Prospect Theory decision makers a lottery of lotteries is not equivalent to its compound
lottery. Therefore, the way decision makers anticipate their future Prospect Theory trade-
offs is a crucial driver of their behaviors in dynamic choices.
For example, investment decisions of stock traders who form reference points for their
individual portfolio positions based on the initial purchase prices are crucially driven by
Prospect Theory anticipations. If they do not anticipate their future feelings of gains and
losses at all, they will trade in stocks and exhibit a disposition effect, i.e. a tendency to
sell winning rather than losing stocks because of risk aversion in gains and risk seeking
in losses (Odean (1998); Barberis and Xiong (2009)). On the other hand, if they do an-
ticipate their future Prospect Theory behaviors, they either do not trade at all (Hens and
Vlcek (2011)) or demand a compensating equity premium (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)).
4 If reference points would immediately adjust to changes in the environment, they would also immedi-
ately adjust to winning or losing a gamble and feelings of gain or loss could never arise.
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Another interesting dynamic Prospect Theory application is the usage of own loss aver-
sion as a commitment against self control problems. Koch and Nafziger (2011) assume
reference points for the future can be chosen deliberately in advance by setting oneself a
goal which allows present biased decision makers to commit their future selves to desired
actions by exposing them to losses in case of defection. Clearly, using such a commitment
strategy not only requires sophistication about one’s own future present bias (i.e. the
awareness that the future self might actually misbehave from today’s perspective), but
also sophistication with respect to one’s own future loss aversion (i.e. an understanding
how setting a goal will be effective).
Another example has recently emerged in the literature on penalty contracts. Both
Imas et al. (2016) and de Quidt (2017) investigate how framing a reward for a contract as
either gain or loss influences the agent’s effort decision. They find that in accordance with
Prospect Theory, the loss frame increases effort provision, presumably because agents
want to avoid the sensation of a loss. However contrary to theory, subjects select into
the loss contract. Because of this observation Imas et al. (2016) assume that subjects
anticipate the sensation of loss and use penalty contracts as commitment device.
Although Loewenstein and Adler (1995) show in a laboratory experiment that subjects
do not correctly anticipate the endowment effect, to the best of our knowledge there
has never been a test of subject’s anticipation of Prospect Theory in dynamic decision
situations. Hey and Lotito (2009) provide a full taxonomy of different types of dynamic
inconsistent agents through a laboratory experiment. They use choices between lotteries
and the equivalent compound lotteries to classify subjects. Although they find a substan-
tial number of naive decision maker, it is impossible to attribute the results to Prospect
Theory, because the lotteries used only the gain domain. Andrade and Iyer (2009) con-
duct a field experiment with a sequence of gambles, that allows for losses. They find that
after an actual loss, despite the plan to take less risk, subjects increase the stakes of their
bet. While the result is consistent with ’gambling for resurrection’, it is only suggestive
because the authors did not elicit their subjects’ loss aversion.
Our experimental setup is taken from Imas (2016). Alex Imas provides an explanation
for the seemingly contradictory findings of both higher risk taking and lower risk tak-
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ing after a previous loss. Imas introduced the ’realization’ as important design element,
where subjects increase their risk taking after a not-realized loss, while they become more
risk averse after a realization. This finding not only reconciles two strands of the liter-
ature on decisions under risk with loss averse agents, but also provides evidence on the
relevance of shifts in reference points. Although Imas (2016) incorporates an extension
on the subjects anticipation of their own future behavior and finds dynamically incon-
sistent behavior, the evidence is only suggestive, because he cannot relate the observed
behavior to a subject’s loss aversion, since he does not elicit Prospect Theory parame-
ters. Therefore, we use the same setup of a four period investment game but include a
separate planning stage, elicit our subjects willingness to pay for the plan and their loss
aversion according to Abdellaoui et al. (2008). With the elicited parameters, we are able
to classify our subjects and provide further insight on how accurate subjects predict their
own behavior.
2.3 Predictions
Prospect Theory makes two contrary predictions with regard to risk taking in sequential
lotteries: after losses in previous rounds agents invest either more or less. Imas (2016)
reconciles both strands of literature through the “realization” effect. Losses that immedi-
ately become payoff relevant induce risk averse behavior, while paper losses induce more
risk taking in order to offset previous losses.
The increased risk taking in case of paper losses is contrary to the optimal strategy of
spreading the risk among all lotteries. Therefore loss aversion creates a wedge between
the optimal plan and the decision makers per-round investment decision. This wedge
becomes bigger with the decision maker’s loss aversion. This results in the first prediction.
Prediction 1. The deviations from plans increase in the degree of the decision makers loss
aversion, because the self control problem becomes stronger:
∂deviation
∂λ
> 0.
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The second prediction follows directly from the first. The more pronounced the dy-
namic inconsistency, induced by loss aversion, becomes, the higher a sophisticated agent
will value her plan. Thus, for sophisticated agents the willingness to pay for the plan,
captured in our experiment through a commitment decision, increases in the level of
sophistication and loss aversion. While it is hard to directly assess sophistication, an in-
crease in willingness to pay for plan with increasing loss aversion indicates sophistication.
Prediction 2. The willingness to pay for the commitment increases with the degree of loss
aversion for sophisticated subjects:
∂(actual commitment|sophisticated)
∂λ
> 0.
To the best of our knowledge, economic research has either assumed perfect ability
to anticipate future behavior or a complete lack thereof. So far nobody tried to identify
channels that promote or hinder anticipation. Our experiment allows us to calculate
the optimal choice of commitment that equalizes the utility of the plan and the actual
investment game:
U(plan− optimal commitment) = U(investment).
A decision maker who experiences no dynamic inconsistencies should value the com-
mitment at zero, since her behavior will not differ between plan and actual investment
decision. In contrast, for each decision maker with dynamic inconsistent behavior the
optimal commitment is non-zero. Decision makers who anticipate problems in sticking
to their plan are willing to pay for their commitment. The willingness to pay increases
with the magnitude of anticipated problems.
Through the difference between optimal and actual commitment decisions we learn
about a subjects decision quality and can infer how well she anticipated dynamic incon-
sistencies:
decision quality = actual commitment− optimal commitment.
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Currently, there is no knowledge on how different personality traits influence the decision
quality. Therefore we test for several different traits and try to determine their influence
on a subject’s decision quality.
∂decision quality
∂personality trait
≶ 0
We follow Kahneman and Frederick (2002) who state that cognitive processes can be
partitioned into two different systems, “System 1”, intuition, and “System 2”, reason.
Subjects who are prone to use intuition are more likely to react spontaneously, thereby
creating dynamic inconsistencies. A good measure of a decision makers use of System 2
rather than System 1 are cognitive reflection tests (CRT). Our CRT uses three questions
for which an answer intuitively springs to mind, but is wrong. To get to the correct
answer, one has to show a certain level of reflection and override the System 1 answer
with the more deliberate System 2 answer. For example, one of the questions asked is:
”A bat and a ball together cost EUR 110. The bat costs EUR 100 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost?”
Frederick (2005) shows that for the question with ball and bat, almost everyone answers
either EUR 5, the correct System 2 answer, or EUR 10, the incorrect but intuitive System
1 answer.
We expect a similar positive influence of both the math skills and the personality trait
“conscientiousness” that are connected to System 2. Math skills are captured by the A
level grade in math. Conscientiousness on the other hand is part of the Big 5 personality
test and covers covers questions on how important plans are for the decision maker and
how she assesses her ability to stick to plans. Therefore our third prediction links the
decision quality to these personality traits.
Prediction 3. Personality traits that are associated with System 2 allow the agent to better
anticipate his future behavior and therefore increase sophistication and decision quality:
∂decision quality
∂CRT
> 0.
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∂decision quality
∂Mathgrade
> 0.
∂decision quality
∂Conscientiousness
> 0.
2.4 Experimental Design and Conduct
Our experiment consisted of a Prospect Theory parameter elicitation task (PTPE), an
investment game (IG), and of measurements of potential correlates. Each subject had to
show up for two sub-sessions that took place one week apart from each other.
In week 1, we asked our participants for a complete contingent plan for the invest-
ment game, elicited their willingness to pay for committing to the plan, conducted a
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and a short Big Five personality test, and elicited their
Prospect Theory parameters. In week 2, we elicited their Prospect Theory parameters
again, played the investment game, and conducted a brief survey required by the lab.
The time-line is depicted in Figure 2.4.1.
Plan IG
Commit IG
CRT
Big 5
PTPE
PTPE
Play IG
Survey
Week 1 Week 2
Figure 2.4.1: Time-line of the Experiment
The experiment was conducted in the Regensburg Economic Science Lab (RESL) in
November 2016. We did 3 sessions with a total of 66 participants, 64 of whom showed
up for both sub-sessions. Subjects were recruited from the RESL subject pool and were
mostly students of the University of Regensburg from various backgrounds.
The first sub-session took on average 110 minutes, the second 50 minutes. Our sub-
jects earned on average EUR 28.28, including a show-up fee of EUR 5.00 per week. All
payments were made at the end of the second sub-session in week 2. The experiment
was programmed in z-tree version 3.4.7 (Fischbacher (2007)) and organized via ORSEE
(Greiner (2015)).
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2.4.1 Prospect Theory Parameter Elicitation
We elicited Prospect Theory parameters according to the method of Abdellaoui et al.
(2008), which has the advantage of requiring only a very limited number of observations
and involving only cognitively simple choices.
In line with the usual Prospect Theory notation, we write (x, p; y) for a binary prospect
that yields payoff x with probability p and payoff y with probability 1 − p. Payoffs are
relative to the Prospect Theory reference point, which is assumed to remain constant
throughout the experiment. If both x and y are positive, the prospect is called a gain
prospect G. If both x and y are negative, it is called a loss prospect L. If one of the two
payoffs is positive and the other one is negative, the prospect is called a mixed prospect
M . We normalize |x| > |y| for gain and loss prospects and x ≥ 0 ≥ y for mixed prospects.
According to (Cumulative) Prospect Theory, prospects are evaluated as follows.
U(G) = w+(p)v(x) + (1− w+(p))v(y)
U(L) = w−(p)v(x) + (1− w−(p))v(y)
U(M) = w+(p)v(x) + w−(1− p)v(y)
with w+(.) and w−(.) the Prospect Theory probability-weighting functions for gains and
losses, respectively, and v(.) the Prospect Theory value function. We assume the usual
power form of the value function,
v(x) =
 xα, for x > 0−λ(−x)β, for x ≤ 0
where α and β denote the (curvature) parameters of diminishing sensitivity and λ the
loss aversion parameter. Further, we assume the usual power form of the probability
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weighting functions,
w+(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ) 1γ
and
w−(p) =
pδ
(pδ + (1− p)δ) 1δ ,
where γ and δ denote the shape parameters of the probability weighting functions for
gains and losses, respectively.
These parameters can be estimated based on simple choice data of the following three
types: certainty equivalents EG for gain prospects G with probability pG, certainty equiv-
alents EL for loss prospects with probability pL, and offsetting “loss equivalents” EM for
mixed prospects with gain x of probability pG, where probabilities pG and pL add up to
one. These equivalents satisfy the following equations.
EαG = w
+(pG)x
α + (1− w+(pG))yα
−λ(−EL)β = −λw−(pL)(−x)β − λ(1− w−(pL))(−y)β
0 = w+(pG)x
α − λw−(pL)(−EM)β
We set pG = 0.5 = pL throughout, which is without loss of generality and reduces the
cognitive burden of the task even further compared to any other choice of probabilities,
and use a bisection method with 7 iterations for the elicitation of the equivalents instead
of directly asking for them.5
We elicited certainty equivalents for 7 gain prospects (4 in week 1), 7 loss prospects (4
in week 1), and 5 mixed prospects (3 in week 1, one of them redundant in week 2), which
yields 20 observations per subject in total. In each week, we started the elicitation with
5 See Abdellaoui et al. (2008) for a discussion of these two design features. In the bisection method,
participants have to decide between a risky prospect and a safe payment. For the certainty equivalent
elicitation, the safe payment of the first iteration is set to be the expected value of the prospect. If
a subject chooses the risk, the safe payment for the next iteration is reduced to the average of the
current safe payment and the lower payoff of the lottery. If a subject chooses the safe payment, it is
increased for the next iteration to the average of the current safe payment and the higher payoff of
the lottery. For the loss equivalent elicitation, the loss of the first iteration is minus the gain and the
safe payment is zero for all iterations. If a subject chooses the risk, the loss for the next iteration is
increased by half of the last loss increment. If a subject chooses the safe amount, the loss for the next
round is decreased by half of the last loss increment. The first loss increment is the original loss.
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gain lotteries, continued with loss lotteries, and finished with mixed lotteries. Abdellaoui
et al. (2008) found that this order is the easiest one for the participants. Table 2.4.1
provides an overview of the lotteries we used and of their timing. For example, lottery
G1 offered a payoff x of EUR 1.20 and a payoff y of EUR 0.00, each with probability 50%,
and was conducted in week 1.
Lottery Payoff x Payoff y Week
G1 1.20 0.00 1
G2 2.20 0.00 2
G3 2.80 0.00 1
G4 4.40 0.00 1
G5 7.80 0.00 2
G6 7.80 2.80 2
G7 2.80 1.20 1
L1 −1.20 0.00 1
L2 −2.20 0.00 2
L3 −2.80 0.00 1
L4 −4.40 0.00 1
L5 −7.80 0.00 2
L6 −7.80 −2.80 2
L7 −2.80 −1.20 1
M1 −1.20 1.20 1
M2 −2.20 2.20 2
M3 −2.80 2.80 1 & 2
M4 −4.40 4.40 1
M5 −7.80 7.80 2
Table 2.4.1: Lotteries for the Prospect Theory parameter elicitation, payoffs x and y in
EUR
We deviated from Abdellaoui et al. (2008) who make use of “substantial money amounts”
and used money amounts in the range of EUR 1.20 to EUR 7.80 as payoffs for the lotteries.
The reasoning behind our design choice is threefold. First, the investment game part of
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our experiment relies on the assumption that our participants have Prospect Theory value
functions with substantial curvature over small amounts, which seems to be confirmed
both by Imas (2016) and our own curvature estimates. Second, we want to make infer-
ences about our participants’ behaviors in the investment game based on the parameters
we elicit in this task and, therefore, use similar amounts to ensure comparability. Third,
the very choice of power functions for the functional form of the value function implies
that curvature is biggest over small amounts6.
As usual, only one of all 20 lottery choices was actually played out in order to prevent
diversification and hedging7. As this task was spread out over two weeks, subjects got to
know which lottery was payoff-relevant only in week 2. In order to avoid expectational
spillovers regarding payoffs from other parts of the experiment, the uncertainty from this
task was resolved only at the very end of the experiment.
2.4.2 Investment Game
We conducted a four-round investment game in week 2 of our experiment which mimics
the experiments of Imas (2016) and Gneezy and Potters (1997). Similar to the planning
treatment in Imas (2016), we asked our subjects for a complete contingent plan for the
investment game before actually playing it. In order to avoid diversification and hedging
considerations, only either the plan or the play was payoff-relevant for a subject. The
probabilities of implementing the plan respectively the play were individually determined
for each subject in a separate commitment task.
In contrast to Imas (2016), we did not ask for the plan right before playing, but one
week ahead. This was meant to reduce anchoring effects and any related emotional costs
of deviations from the plan such that each choice can be seen as purely instrumental for
generating a payoff and its respective Prospect Theory utility. Moreover, our subjects had
the opportunity to (stochastically) commit to their plans. All subjects had to participate
6 In particular, the concern that utility is approximately linear over small amounts should hold only for
subjects of the Expected Utility type with wide bracketing, not for subjects of Prospect Theory type
with narrow bracketing.
7 We use the standard assumption of narrow bracketing here, i.e. that subjects make their decisions
in each lottery as if it was the only one to be played out instead of viewing their choices as one big
compound lottery.
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both in the planning and in the playing stages of the investment game, regardless of their
commitment choices.
The ultimate purpose of eliciting plan, play, and commitment choices for each subject
is to assess the quality of each of these decisions, both by comparing them to one another
and by evaluating them according to the separately elicited Prospect Theory parameters.
In the actual play of the investment game in week 2, our subjects faced a sequence
of 4 identical investment decisions. In each investment decision, the subjects had to
choose what fraction of their per-period endowment of EUR 1.60 to invest in a risky asset,
where choices were limited to integer-multiples of EUR 0.20. The risky asset returned
seven times the invested amount with probability 1/6 and zero otherwise. The non-
invested amount was added one-for-one to the subject’s final payoff. The probabilities
and multipliers resemble the ones in Imas (2016) and imply that the risky asset has a
higher expected value than the safe outside option.
Each randomization was directly realized after the respective investment choice, such
that subjects knew in each decision how much they had won and lost in all preceding
rounds. In order to facilitate the randomization, each subject had to pick a “success
number” between 1 and 6 in each round which was then compared to a die roll. If a
subject’s success number matched the die roll, her investment was successful and she
received seven times her investment on top of the non-invested part of the endowment.
If not, the invested amount was forfeited. In each investment round, one participant was
randomly selected to manually roll a die and announce the result, which was then typed
into the system by one of the experimenters and automatically compared to all subjects’
choices.
Furthermore, we replicated the realization treatment of Imas (2016). Therefore, we
handed out envelopes to our subjects that contained the total endowment of EUR 6.40 in
cash at the beginning of the second sub-session. In two of our three sessions (randomly
selected), realization of gains and losses was physically carried out between rounds 3
and 4, i.e. money that was lost in rounds 1 to 3 was taken away from the participants’
envelopes and money that was won in rounds 1 to 3 was added to the participants’
envelopes.
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In week 1, subjects were asked for complete contingent plans for the investment game
in week 2. Therefore, the exact procedure of the investment game was already explained
to the subjects in week 1. Understanding was ensured by three control questions that had
to be filled in correctly before one was able to proceed to the actual planning phase. While
planning, subjects saw the complete game-tree on their screens, which they had to fill in
line by line. After a line was completed, the payoffs for the next stage’s contingencies
were calculated and displayed in the interface to help the subjects keep track of each
contingency’s proceedings. In particular, we allowed our subjects to plan their round 4
investment decisions separately for the contingency of a cash realization after round 3.
Subjects were made aware that their plans were to be implemented only stochastically,
that their subsequent commitment choices would determine the exact probabilities, and
that they had to participate in playing the investment game in any case.
After the planning stage, subjects faced a list of 45 choices between plan implementa-
tion plus some (positive or negative) money amount, and play implementation. One of
the 45 choices was randomly selected at the end of the second sub-session, and based on
the selected choice either the plan became payoff-relevant for that subject, or her week
2 play. The money amounts ranged from EUR -4.80 to EUR +4.80, were arranged in
increasing order, and had smaller increments around zero and larger increments towards
the boundaries. We enforced single switching points by implementing an error message
in case of multiple switching and take each subject’s switching point as her individual
willingness to pay for commitment to the plan (in case of a negative money amount) re-
spectively for flexibility (in case of a positive money amount). Subjects could completely
determine whether their plan or play was to be implemented by not switching at all, but
knew that they could not avoid participating in the play by doing so.
The random draw of the relevant choice was facilitated by a computer at the very end
of the experiment. For plan-implementations, a subject’s winning-and-losing history of
her actual play was applied to her planned investment amounts of the respective contin-
gencies.
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2.4.3 Correlates Elicitation
Our experiment aims at classifying our participants as naive respectively sophisticated.
Taking for granted that such a classification is possible and sensible, it is natural to ask
for the drivers of such behavioral differences. Hence, we elicited a series of potential
correlates that might explain some of the variation.
Our correlates tests comprise a Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick (2005)), a short
Big Five personality test (Schupp and Gerlitz (2014)), and a brief survey of basic demo-
graphics, which was also required by the lab.
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) consists of three short questions that involve basic
calculations. Each question lends itself to an intuitive, but incorrect answer and requires
some reflection for finding the correct solution. Each correct answer added a point to
a subject’s CRT score (which, hence, ranges from 0 to 3) and was incentivized by EUR
0.50. We did not impose a time limit, but tracked the response times of our participants.
The short Big Five personality test consisted of 16 questions. Each question contained a
personal statement and asked for a 7-points Likert self-assessment of how much it applied
to the subject. The incentive for participating in this test was a flat payment of EUR 2.00.
The survey asked for age, gender, and high school math grade. Older subjects might be
better in anticipating their own Prospect Theory behavior as they have more experience
of life, in particular more experience of gains and losses. The math grade could be a
proxy both for cognitive ability and for diligence, which also might improve anticipation.
2.5 Results
In Subsection 2.5.1, we first estimate Prospect Theory parameters for all subjects and for
each week individually. Second we distinguish between subjects whose behavior can be
described by Prospect Theory. In Subsection 2.5.2 we analyze the causes for subjects’ de-
viation from their plans. In Subsection 2.5.3 we classify our subjects as sophisticated or
naive with respect to their anticipation of their own Prospect Theory behaviors along two
dimensions: the quality of their complete contingent plans for the investment game, and
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the quality of their commitment decisions. Further we analyze which personality traits
are connected to sophistication and naivete. Since classifying decision maker as sophis-
ticated crucially depends on the Prospect Theory parameters, we provide an extensive
discussion of classification and consistency between weeks in Appendix B.2
2.5.1 Prospect Theory Parameter Elicitation
We estimated all Prospect Theory parameters of the usual power-specification introduced
in Section 2.4.1 above. These comprise curvature parameters α, β and probability weight-
ing parameters γ, δ for gains and losses, respectively, as well as a loss aversion parameter
λ. As only one probability was used in all lotteries (p = 0.5), it suffices to estimate
probability weights w+(0.5) and w−(0.5) instead of γ and δ, as the latter can be derived
deterministically from the former.
We followed the overall approach of Abdellaoui et al. (2008) in using a non-linear least
squares estimation, but deviated slightly in its specification. Whereas Abdellaoui et al.
(2008) separately estimated the gain and loss curvatures α and β from the certainty
equivalents of the gain respectively loss lotteries alone and deterministically calculated
one λ for each mixed lottery, we used all observations to estimate all parameters simul-
taneously. In particular, we did not calculate multiple loss aversion parameters to take
their median as estimate. Instead, we estimated only one loss aversion parameter and
thereby fed the information from the mixed lottery choices also into the estimation of the
curvature parameters and probability weights.
For each subject, we collected 20 observations of certainty and loss equivalents of the
lotteries listed in Table 2.4.1. Let E jointly denote the elicited certainty equivalents EG
and EL of the gain and loss prospects, respectively, and the elicited loss equivalents EM
of the mixed prospects. Further, let 1j for j ∈ {W1,W2, G, L,M} denote the indicator
function for an observation being a week 1, week 2, gain, loss, or mixed prospect observa-
tion. As all probabilities were p = 0.5, we drop the argument of the probability weighting
50
ON THE DYNAMICS OF PROSPECT THEORY
functions in order to reduce notational overload. Then, our regression equations read as
E =1W1
[
1G(w
+
1 x
α1 + (1− w+1 )yα1)
1
α1 − 1L(w−1 (−x)β1 + (1− w−1 )(−y)β1)
1
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.
The results of the pooled regressions of both weeks separately are summarized in Table
2.5.1.
Coefficient Std.Error t.value p.value
w+1 0.4723 0.0868 5.442 6.23E − 08
α1 1.1608 0.2913 3.985 7.14E − 05
w−1 0.3429 0.0899 3.815 1.43E − 04
β1 1.5226 0.3828 3.978 7.35E − 05
λ1 1.2276 0.1494 8.215 5.19E − 16
w+2 0.3871 0.0376 10.290 6.61E − 24
α2 1.5522 0.1769 8.773 5.50E − 18
w−2 0.2247 0.0345 6.522 1.00E − 10
β2 1.8660 0.2124 8.785 4.98E − 18
λ2 1.6710 0.2035 8.212 5.28E − 16
Table 2.5.1: Pooled estimation, both weeks separately
In the pooled regression, we find under-weighting both for gains and losses as well as
loss aversion, as Prospect Theory suggests. However, we do not find the usual S-shape of
the value function, but an inverse S-shape, as our curvature parameters are bigger than
1, not smaller.
Our main focus, however, lies on the individual estimations per subject, as we aim at
individually classifying our subjects with respect to the quality of their anticipations. The
results of the individual regressions per subject are summarized in Table 2.5.2 for both
weeks separately. The complete list of all participants’ individual estimations is deferred
to Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix.
From the table we see, that although the median loss aversion λ is the same in both
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Table 2.5.2: Distribution of individual estimates, both weeks separately
Minimum 25% Median 75% Maximum Average
w+1 0.00 0.35 0.48 0.60 0.96 0.46
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.13) (0.20) (0.31) (113.42) (2.00)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.35] [1.00] [0.21]
α1 0.29 0.82 1.09 1.34 24.00 2.38
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.43) (0.72) (1.20) (1.3E + 05) (2.1E + 03)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.05] [0.19] [0.44] [1.00] [0.28]
w−1 0.00 0.22 0.35 0.50 0.68 0.33
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.11) (0.20) (0.30) (599.90) (9.59)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.02] [0.19] [0.63] [1.00] [0.33]
β1 0.54 1.00 1.46 2.55 19.77 2.97
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.47) (0.95) (3.77) (1.3E + 05) (2.1E + 03)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.05] [0.20] [0.45] [1.00] [0.29]
λ1 0.00 0.78 1.30 2.71 1.9E + 11 2.9E + 09
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.23) (0.45) (2.33) (1.9E + 14) (2.9E + 12)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.08] [0.53] [1.00] [0.28]
w+2 0.00 0.24 0.43 0.53 0.86 0.39
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (1.72) (0.14)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] [1.00] [0.17]
α2 0.42 1.00 1.41 2.40 21.51 2.77
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.22) (0.44) (1.52) (1.0E + 03) (26.13)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.11] [0.99] [0.17]
w−2 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.44 0.56 0.22
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.03) (0.06) (0.10) (0.20) (0.07)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.71] [1.00] [0.31]
β2 0.77 1.16 1.96 3.64 54.95 5.04
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.26) (0.62) (3.25) (910.79) (33.10)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.23] [0.99] [0.18]
λ2 0.00 0.95 1.29 5.51 1.1E + 04 269.38
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.14) (0.50) (8.06) (1.2E + 05) (3.1E + 03)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.63] [0.99] [0.28]
weeks, already the 25 and 75 percentiles differ across both weeks. The probability
weights w+, w− as well as curvature in the gain domain α and in the loss domain β
differ substantially.
Therefore the distribution of individual estimates not only shows that there is a dif-
ference between the estimated parameters for week 1 and week 2, but also casts doubt
on the fit of Prospect Theory for some subjects. Especially the maximum values indicate
that for some subjects Prospect Theory has little explanatory power. In order to to ac-
count for the quality of fit, we exclude subjects whose parameter estimations cannot be
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rationalized within Prospect Theory.
We do so by setting upper bounds on acceptable standard errors for estimates. Subjects
whose standard error is bigger than 100% of sensible intervals of [0, 1] for probability
weights, [0, 2] for curvature parameters, and [0, 4] for loss aversion are classified as “bad
fit”. In addition subjects whose p-values for estimates exceed 50% are also classified as
bad fit. An extended discussion is in Appendix B.2.
Our results show that for 29 subjects Prospect Theory is a bad fit. Since our predictions
only work for Prospect Theory behavior, we treat those subjects separately in our further
analysis.
2.5.2 Deviation of Actual Investment from Plan
We can test the first predictions from Section 2.3. First, the experience of a non-realized
loss makes it harder to stick to the plan. This effect becomes stronger the more loss
averse the decision maker is.
As dependent variable we use the mean deviation for each subject:
Mean Deviationi =
1
4
4∑
t=1
(investmenti,t − plani,t).
Mean deviation captures both the magnitude of deviation from plan and the overall
tendency of either investing less(Mean Deviationi < 0) or more (Mean Deviationi > 0)
than planned. Our baseline regression focuses on those subjects who have experienced
losses, i.e. subjects that have never won in a round8. Additionally, we restrict our sam-
ple to those subjects who are consistently estimated by Prospect Theory. We lift these
restrictions in later regressions.
The baseline regression uses the Prospect Theory parameter of both weeks as explana-
tory variables.
Mean Deviationi = cons + γ1α1i + γ2β1i + γ3λ1i + γ4α2i + γ5β2i + γ6λ2i (2.1)
8 Every subject that won one round in our experiment always ended up in the gain domain
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In column (2) we add demographics. Female is a binary variable that takes value 1 if
the subject is female. Age is the subjects age measured in years. Mathgrade is the subjects
grade in her math A levels, ranging from 1 to 5, where 1.0 is the best grade. Complex
measures how many unique investment choices the subject made in her plan. Plans that
contain the same investment in every period receive the lowest number 1. Complex is
a proxy for the difficulty to remember the plan after one week. CRT is the number of
correctly solved questions in the cognitive reflection test. Columns (3) and (4) are the
same regressions as (1) and (2), however we lifted the restriction of subjects in the loss
domain. In columns (5) and (6) we drop the restriction that Prospect Theory is a good fit
for subjects’ behavior. When we include the demographics the variance inflation factors
for β1 and β2 become critical hinting at multicollinearity. Therefore we drop β1 and β2
when we include the demographics. Table 2.5.3 presents the results.
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Table 2.5.3: Drivers of deviation from plan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
α1 -0.393 -0.0246 0.0279 -0.118 0.0439 0.0189
(0.539) (0.334) (0.283) (0.200) (0.0336) (0.0161)
λ1 -0.255* -0.435** -0.0129 -0.0354 -0 -0
(0.144) (0.156) (0.106) (0.111) (0) (0)
α2 -0.247 -0.250 -0.0933 -0.0957 -0.0242 -0.0119
(0.155) (0.145) (0.171) (0.170) (0.0147) (0.0167)
λ2 0.162* 0.235** 4.57e-05 0.0228 5.62e-06 6.26e-06
(0.0893) (0.0912) (0.0646) (0.0696) (0.000108) (0.000112)
Female 0.0349 -0.203 -0.116
(0.191) (0.182) (0.120)
Age 0.0145 -0.00511 -0.00364
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.00708)
Mathgrade 0.0331 0.00868 -0.0172
(0.0953) (0.0984) (0.0646)
Complex -0.00564 0.0222 0.0264
(0.0293) (0.0307) (0.0230)
CRT -0.175* -0.128 -0.0150
(0.0841) (0.0922) (0.0565)
β1 0.115 -0.0850 -0.0171
(0.200) (0.177) (0.0252)
β2 -0.0941 -0.0887 0.00331
(0.106) (0.119) (0.00610)
Constant 0.890* 0.620 0.416 0.642 0.0111 0.0752
(0.452) (0.593) (0.355) (0.634) (0.0652) (0.317)
Observations 26 26 35 35 64 64
R2 0.305 0.489 0.087 0.198 0.092 0.113
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level
We find a significant positive effect for in columns (1) and (2) for loss aversion
in week 2. The effect indicates that subjects’ deviation from plan is driven by loss
aversion rather than complexity of plan or personality traits. The interpretation of
our result is additionally strengthened by columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) where it
vanishes, when we extend our analysis to subjects who did not experience losses
and whose behavior is a bad fit with Prospect Theory.
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Columns (1) and (2) show that prediction 1 is correct. Subjects who behave according
to Prospect Theory and experience losses invest more than planned in each period with
increasing loss aversion in week 2. The effect is significant at the 10% level and the size
is 0.16, i.e. an increase in loss aversion by 1 results in a higher investment of EUR 0.16
than originally planned in each round. This effect is 10% of the per round endowment.
This is strong evidence that once subjects face a situation of loss, they start investing
more because of their loss aversion.9
The second observation is not backed by theory, but nonetheless interesting. A higher
loss aversion in week 1 induces subjects to invest significantly less than planned. The
effect is significant at the 10% level and the size is −0.25, i.e. an increase in loss aversion
in week 1 by 1 results in a decrease of investment in comparison to the plan of EUR 0.25
per round. The result suggests that loss averse subjects involve too much risk in their
plans and reduce their investment once they receive their endowment.
Unsurprisingly the result for loss aversion in week 2 vanishes once we include subjects
who are in the gain domain (columns (3) and (4)). The result for loss aversion in week
1 has a p-value of 0.11, therefore barely not significant anymore. This observation backs
our previous interpretation that subjects with higher loss aversion in week 1 include too
much risk in their plans, because this result is not tied to winning or loosing in the actual
investment game. Once we include subjects whose behavior is not described by Prospect
Theory, all results vanish.
Our second prediction states that the willingness to pay for commitment should in-
crease in the loss aversion for sophisticated decision maker. Since naive agents do not
anticipate their dynamic inconsistencies and in turn underestimate the value of a care-
fully crafted plan, a positive effect of loss aversion on the willingness to pay for com-
mitment is at least suggestive that some participants are sophisticated about their loss
aversion.
The baseline regression uses the Prospect Theory parameter of both weeks as explana-
9 This result is especially important, because previous research has failed to establish the link, see
AppendixB.1.
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tory variables and the subject’s commitment choice as dependent variable.
WTPi = cons + γ1α1i + γ2β1i + γ3λ1i + γ4α2i + γ5β2i + γ6λ2i (2.2)
In column (2) we add the same demographics as in Table 2.5.3 with the addition of
the duration (in seconds) subjects took for their plans. Columns (3) and (4) are the
same regressions as (1) and (2), however we drop the restriction that subjects have to be
consistent. Table 2.5.4 presents the results.
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Table 2.5.4: Willingness to Pay for Commitment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
α1 0.0952 0.0848 0.131 -0.0938
(1.931) (1.988) (0.233) (0.261)
β1 -0.402 -0.312 -0.124 0.0532
(1.210) (1.296) (0.175) (0.206)
λ1 0.916 1.547* -9.57e-11 -5.64e-11
(0.726) (0.849) (5.92e-11) (6.58e-11)
α2 -1.318 -0.207 -0.0192 -0.0632
(1.170) (1.298) (0.102) (0.127)
β2 -0.849 -0.973 -0.0338 -0.0379
(0.814) (1.170) (0.0423) (0.0426)
λ2 -0.208 -0.391 0.00126* 0.00112
(0.441) (0.566) (0.000746) (0.000799)
Female -0.974 -0.936
(1.470) (0.806)
Age 0.0283 0.0575
(0.0803) (0.0485)
Mathgrade 0.830 0.334
(0.723) (0.471)
Complex 0.117 -0.00235
(0.265) (0.167)
CRT 0.652 0.0297
(0.710) (0.409)
Duration -0.00645* -0.00466**
(0.00331) (0.00228)
Constant 3.531 0.119 0.776* 0.861
(2.426) (4.447) (0.452) (2.274)
Observations 35 35 64 64
R2 0.221 0.397 0.068 0.199
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% sig-
nificance level;
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We find a strong positive effect of λ1 on the willingness to pay for commitment. While
the result is not significant in the baseline regression, once we control for demographics
it is at the 10% level with a strong effect of EUR 1.54. An increase of loss aversion by 1
increases the willingness to pay for commitment by EUR 1.54. The effect becomes a clear
null effect once we include the “bad fit” subjects, which strengthens our interpretation.
Loss aversion in the second week, λ2 should have no impact on willingness to pay for
commitment other than through its correlation with λ1. The exception in column (3)
is a most likely generated by coincidence, since the result vanishes when controlled for
demographics.
The time subjects took for their plan has a significant and negative influence on the
willingness to pay. The effect holds for both the restricted as well as the full sample. In
the mean subjects spent around 383 seconds on their plan with a standard deviation of
160 seconds. Therefore if the time spent on a plan increases by one standard deviation,
subject’s willingness to pay decreases by EUR 1.03. The result suggests that subjects who
plan with more care are more confident in their ability to carry through with the plan,
thereby reducing their willingness to pay for it.
2.5.3 Naivete with respect to Prospect Theory Behavior
Having established that loss aversion has an impact on the behavior in the investment
game and on the willingness to pay for the commitment, we can investigate the quality
of our subjects’ anticipations of their own Prospect Theory behaviors. We do so by es-
tablishing two measures of naivete: the quality of the complete contingent plan and the
quality of the commitment decision.
We assess the quality of our subjects’ complete contingent plans by interpreting them
as compound lotteries and calculating their Prospect Theory utilities based on our above
parameter estimates.10 As long as a plan yields non-negative Prospect Theory utility, we
classify the subject as a good, otherwise as a poor planer. This is a very conservative
threshold, as each subject could achieve a utility of zero if they would plan to never
10 We focus on our estimates for week 2 as we believe that these reflect the preferences at the time when
this compound lottery is actually played.
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invest in any contingency, regardless of their Prospect Theory parameters11:
1good plan =
1 if EU(plani) ≥ 00 if EU(plani) < 0.
In order to assess the quality of our subjects’ commitment decisions, we have to inves-
tigate whether their plans were superior or inferior compared to their actual play, and
to what extent. Hence, we have to calculate a utility from their play. Clearly, we do
not want to assess the quality of our subjects’ decisions based on their outcome luck, so
we have to calculate an ex ante utility of their play. In particular, we have to view their
play as an implementation of an alternated complete contingent plan. As we can observe
our subjects’ behaviors only in the contingencies that have actually realized, we have to
impose an assumption on how they would have played in the contingencies that did not
materialize. We do so in the most conservative way by assuming that they would have
stuck to their initial plans in all other contingencies.
We classify a commitment decision as poor if the utility of the original week 1 plan,
where all payoffs are reduced by the willingness to pay for the commitment (respectively
increased by the willingness to accept) and another EUR 1.00 tolerance, exceeds the
utility of the actual play.12 As we only account for actually observed plan-deviations (i.e.
a maximum of 4 deviations) and allow for considerable trembling (EUR 1.00 tolerance),
a subject’s commitment decision is classified as poor only in case of extremely harmful
deviations:
1good commitment =
1 if EU(plani −wtpi ± 1.00) ≥ EU(investmenti)0 if EU(plani −wtpi ± 1.00) < EU(investmenti).
According to our classification 26 subjects as poor planners and 19 subjects are poor
committers. There are only 3 subjects in the overlap of the two types of errors, which
11 We use this zero threshold as benchmark instead of the optimal attainable plan because there is a total
of 915 possible plans per subject, and it is computationally more than demanding to figure out which
one is actually optimal, whereas the zero utility plan of never investing is easily conceivable.
12 We include this EUR 1.00 tolerance to account for noise in order not to classify a subject as naive
because of a “mistake” of very little consequence.
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is a result of our conservative calibration: To end up in this overlap, one has to make a
plan that yields negative utility in the first place and than play so poorly that it would
have been worthwhile to pay at least one additional euro for committing to that plan.
Put differently, poor planning makes it very unlikely to also commit poorly, as we only
observe the commitment error of paying too little. Table 2.5.5 summarizes the naivete
classification for our original estimations. The italic numbers represent subjects for whom
Prospect Theory is a good descriptive model.
Commitment
poor good Sum
Plan
poor
3 23 26
2 10 12
good
16 22 38
7 16 23
Sum
19 45 64
9 26 35
Table 2.5.5: Classification of naivete, full sample; original regression, bad fit excluded
We create a joint measure that also accounts for the magnitude of mistakes. Therefore
we compute the optimal commitment decision for subject i is implicitly defined through:
U(plani − optimal commitmenti) = U(investmenti).
The willingness to pay for commitment depends on both the quality of the plan and
the actual investment decisions. Subjects that make poor plans rationally would require
compensation for implementing the plan, therefore as long as the plan is worse than the
actual investment decisions, the optimal commitment should be negative (willingness
to accept). In comparison if the plan is better than the actual investment behavior the
decision maker should be willing to pay for the plan, i.e the optimal commitment should
be positive (willingness to pay).
When we compare the actual commitment decision to the optimal commitment deci-
sion, we have a joint measure for both the quality of the plan in comparison to the actual
decisions and for the quality of the commitment decision:
decision qualityi = actual commitmenti − optimal commitmenti.
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The decision quality becomes positive for each subject that is willing to pay more for
the plan than she optimally should. For these subjects the quality of the plan is lower
than their actual investment decisions, but they incorrectly believe that their plan is of
higher quality. The effect can be driven by overestimation of dynamic inconsistencies or a
subjects inability to make reasonable plans in the first place. A negative sign for decision
quality implies that the decision maker plans better than her actual investment decisions,
but overestimates her ability to stick to the previous plan and in turn pays too little for
the commitment. Prospect Theory predicts that decision maker who are naive about their
Prospect Theory behavior will systematically pay too little for their commitment.
However, we observe that subjects pay EUR 0.9 too much on average for their plan. The
basic tendency to overpay for commitment is not connected to our theory. In addition
the tendency is at odds with research on failing commitments (see John (2017)), where
subjects systematically underestimate their self control problems which leads them to
choose ineffective commitments. In our case the result is driven by a small number of
subjects who always choose the plan to be implemented.
In our baseline regression we use the decision quality as dependent variable and our
measures for personality traits as explanatory variables:
decision qualityi = cons + γ1Femalei + γ2Agei + γ3Mathgradei+
γ4Durationi + γ5Complexi + γ6Durationi ∗ Complexi + γ7CRTi.
(2.3)
The variables are the same as in Table 2.5.3 except for the interaction term of time
spent on and complexity of the plan. Column (1) displays the results of the regression
for the restricted sample of agents who experienced losses and for whom Prospect Theory
is a good description of actual behavior. In column (2) we include the personality traits
as measured by the Big Five personality test. Columns (3) and (4) include subjects that
won during the investment stage. (5) and (6) represent the results for the full sample.
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Table 2.5.6: Quality of Plan and Commitment Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -1.064 -1.001 -2.351** -0.621 -2.147*** -1.434
(1.097) (1.461) (1.096) (1.374) (0.770) (0.874)
Age 0.192** 0.147 0.0613 0.0584 0.00442 -0.0145
(0.0858) (0.0992) (0.0853) (0.0830) (0.0481) (0.0465)
Mathgrade 0.844 1.822* 0.481 0.985 0.0881 0.141
(0.733) (0.910) (0.723) (0.742) (0.419) (0.417)
Duration -0.0294*** -0.0244** -0.0221** -0.0217** -0.0143** -0.0176***
(0.00891) (0.0107) (0.00867) (0.00855) (0.00632) (0.00637)
Complex -1.174* -0.979 -1.064* -0.984 -0.476 -0.636
(0.589) (0.771) (0.593) (0.604) (0.413) (0.432)
Duration*complex 0.00426** 0.00369 0.00333* 0.00385** 0.00210* 0.00285**
(0.00171) (0.00213) (0.00163) (0.00161) (0.00121) (0.00126)
CRT 0.137 0.456 -0.286 0.0498 -0.194 -0.264
(0.569) (0.667) (0.657) (0.697) (0.405) (0.402)
Conscientiousness -0.105 -0.0266 0.00882
(0.207) (0.169) (0.101)
Extraversion 0.159 0.147 0.180
(0.170) (0.175) (0.121)
Agreeableness -0.298 -0.523** -0.265**
(0.239) (0.206) (0.115)
Openness 0.177 0.139 -0.0547
(0.178) (0.168) (0.103)
Neuroticism 0.139 0.00440 -0.0324
(0.191) (0.174) (0.116)
Constant 3.066 -0.782 7.041 4.715 5.118* 7.543*
(3.787) (6.539) (4.198) (5.807) (2.899) (4.065)
Observations 26 26 35 35 64 64
R2 0.567 0.669 0.353 0.546 0.208 0.343
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level;
Contrary to our prediction subjects with higher scores in CRT, math and conscientiousness do not
plan better. However, a plan’s complexity and the duration taken for the plan decrease overpay-
ment. Carefully crafted plans that combine refinement to different nodes, i.e. higher complexity,
with a longer duration in planing overall increase the likelihood to be optimal.
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Column (1) displays the main results that remain basically unchanged even as the
subject pool widens. First, the time spent on the plan (Duration) significantly reduces
the error that leads to overpayment, significant at the 1% significance level. The effect
−0.0294 is large, because an increase of the time spent on the plan by one standard
deviation implies a reduction of EUR 4.70. The magnitude of the effect makes clear that
duration also facilitates too low commitment choices and not only reduces overpayment.
The complexity of plans has the same direction. Complexity varies between signifi-
cance at the 10% level and narrowly missing significance. The magnitude of the effect is
remarkable, because an increase of a plans complexity by 1 decreases the overpayment
by EUR 1.17. Both effects counteract the general tendency to bid too much, however also
lead to underpayment for commitment. The interaction term is for almost all regressions
significant at the 5% or 10% level and is a countervailing effect. This combination of
duration, complexity and their interaction effect show that the more mental resources
are used the better is the plan. Complex plans that were carefully drafted are more likely
to actually result in a good commitment choice.
The only personality trait that becomes and stays significant at the 5% level is agree-
ableness. Agreeableness captures personality traits for interpersonal interaction, social
preferences, trust, sympathy (see McCrae and John (1992)). Therefore, we argue that
subjects who score higher in this dimension are better in taking another person’s perspec-
tive and anticipate their feeling in a situation. This increases the ability to foresee own
behavior. Effect and size of agreeableness strengthen this line of argument, because an
increase in agreeableness by one standard deviation (3.32 points) reduces the overpay-
ment by EUR 1.73. The increase by one standard deviation can be interpreted on a seven
point Likert scale as changing one answer from indifferent between being social or not,
to displaying strongly social behavior.
It is remarkable that all variables that are naturally associated with sophisticated plan-
ning are not significant. Not even by mere chance become conscientiousness, cognitive
reflection and math skills significant. All three capture a different aspect of sophisti-
cated planning: conscientiousness is the category of the Big Five personality test that is
described with the adjectives efficient, organized, planful, reliable, responsible and thor-
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ough (see McCrae and John (1992)). Cognitive reflection and math skills are a good
proxy for a subject’s ability to reflect on their intuitive assessment of decision situations.
Our interpretation of columns (5) and (6) is limited by the fact that we use subjects’
parameters to calculate the quality of plan for whom Prospect Theory holds little to none
descriptive power. Nevertheless the effects of careful planing through complex plans and
high amount of time spent on the plan seem to be robust and consistent for all subjects,
indicating that the effort put into the plan actually increases its quality.
Since we started with a strong prediction about the positive influence of System 2 on
decision quality, a natural question is if our measurement of cognitive reflection is correct.
In line with Frederick (2005) we find that almost every subject in our experiment answers
either EUR 5 or EUR 10 in the ball and bat question13. 95.3% chose one of those two
answers and two of the remaining three participants seem to have misread the question
as they gave the correct answer for the price of the bat (instead of the ball’s price). A
similar pattern holds for first question, where 93.8% of our Participants chose either the
correct answer or the incorrect answer.
Correct Intuitive Other
Incorrect Incorrect
Q1 31 29 4
Q2 44 17 3
Q3 47 5 12
Answer Types per Question.
No. of Correct Answers
0 1 2 3
6 15 22 21
9.4% 23.4% 34.4% 32.8%
CRT score distribution.
6 out of 64 participants gave zero correct answers. 5 out of these 6 chose the intuitive
incorrect answer at least twice, and the remaining one gave one intuitive incorrect an-
swer. Since our cognitive reflection test was both incentivized and produced no outliers
in the answers given, we are convinced that the CRT is valid. For additional analysis of
CRT see Appendix B.3.
13 see Section 2.3.
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2.6 Discussion
Research on Prospect Theory has focused on static decisions. However most interesting
predictions with regard to behavior and strategies in sequential gambles rely on assump-
tions of the decision makers ability or disability to anticipate their own behavior once
they face losses. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence that loss aversion
actually drives the decision maker’s deviations from her plans. An increase of loss aver-
sion in the second week by 1 unit increases the average deviation by EUR 0.16 per round.
The effect is large at 10% of the per round endowment. We also find suggestive evidence
that at least some individuals are sophisticated as their willingness to pay for commit-
ment increases with their loss aversion in week 1, indicating that they foresee potential
self control problems caused by loss aversion in the investment game.
In a second step we devise a joint measure for the quality of plan and commitment in
order to attribute how personality traits influence the quality of planning. Contrary to
our predictions we find no effect of cognitive reflection, math skills and conscientiousness
although they are all associated with careful planning and a preference for plans. Rather
it matters how much time subjects spent on their plan and how delicate the plan is.
In addition we found a surprisingly robust influence of agreeableness, i.e. the subjects
ability to empathize with other people. This seemingly also increases the self awareness
and foresight of own behavior.
We are aware that our experimental design suffers from several methodological short-
comings. First, the order of the Prospect Theory parameter elicitation and the investment
game were reversed between weeks 1 and 2. So potentially, our measurement of Prospect
Theory parameter in-consistency might suffer from order effects. We cannot address this
issue with the data we have.
Second, our subjects could in principle commit to their plan or play deterministically
by never switching in the choice list, and 14 out of 64 subjects did so. As 11 of them
committed to their plans at any price and as our assessment of the quality of commitment
decisions does only account for the error of paying too little for the commitment, this does
not qualitatively affect our results on the commitment decisions. In total, only two of
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these 14 subjects are classified as poor committers. Also, this deterministic commitment
does not affect our assessment of the planning decisions of the 11 deterministic planners,
as we evaluate plans not relative to the play, but relative to the benchmark of zero utility.
Third, when estimating Prospect Theory parameters on an individual basis, we have to
be weary of “over-fitting” as we estimate up to 10 parameters from only 20 data points.
That is, we have to ask ourselves whether our individual level estimates really do capture
individual level heterogeneity, or simply noise. We believe it is reasonable to assume that
these estimates capture some of both, and we tried to address this issue by our grouping
exercise, i.e. by reporting for each subject how well it fits, or put differently, how much
explanatory power Prospect Theory has for this specific subject’s behavior. Clearly, we
feel much more comfortable in drawing inferences about subjects for which Prospect
Theory is a good descriptive model.
Last but not least, our classifications rely on the assumption that our elicited week 2
Prospect Theory parameters reflect actual risk preferences at the time when subjects get
their payoffs, and that this is the relevant objective both for planning and for playing.
That is, we assume that commitment is used solely in order to avoid the above described
spillovers between individual risky choices, not in order to tie oneself to one’s original
week 1 preferences when these are different form week 2 preferences. Our consistency
classification was meant to control for this second commitment channel, and we found
much more inconsistency than we had originally expected.
If we take this inconsistency classification at face value, we have to ask ourselves how
to interpret such inconsistencies. Do we want to think of this as changing preferences, or
should we rather not view Prospect Theory as description of (non-standard) preferences?
Instead, Prospect Theory behaviors could reflect impulsive, heuristic decision making
which is driven by current moods, emotions, and depletion and could, potentially, be
viewed as mistakes. Whereas both interpretations have their own merit, they give rise to
vastly different welfare implications.
Because of these difficulties further research needs to separate the question for time-
consistency and measurement of Prospect Theory parameters from the question of choices
in sequential gambles. Conducting both the plan and the investment game in the same
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session might induce anchoring, but reduces the degrees of freedom introduced through
different consistency and quality of fit definitions. In addition a better way of presenting
the commitment choice than a choice list is necessary to strengthen the argument that the
results are not driven by the subjects’ lack of understanding. Also a treatment variation
of plans and commitment (e.g. doing a trial round up front) can help to strengthen the
results. Last, a questionnaire on the subjects’ feelings during the planning rounds and
during the investment game can help to identify sophisticated and naive subjects easier
than through our reverse engineered optimal choice for commitment.
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Chapter 3
Unions, Communication, and
Cooperation in Organizations∗
3.1 Introduction
Relational (or implicit) contracts have been widely employed to analyze the relation be-
tween worker and firm.2 In models of relational contracts information that is observable
to the contracting parties, but not verifiable, is utilized in the context of a repeated game
between firm and worker. These models added numerous important insights to our un-
derstanding of the firm-worker relationship and its potential consequences for labor mar-
ket outcomes. However, this approach generally has been less concerned with generating
realistic dynamic patterns of these relations. In reality, firm-worker relations in ongoing
organizations generally seem to be characterized by good cooperation, interrupted by
phases of, sometimes fierce, conflict. Krueger and Mas (2004) and Mas (2008) present
evidence from Bridgestone/Firestone and Caterpillar that documents that these quarrels
can be very costly to firms. In this paper, we present a simple model that is rich enough to
generate such patterns and that still allows us to analyze how unionization can help firms
∗ This paper is based on joint work with Florian Englmaier (LMU) and Carmit Segal (University of
Zurich).
2 Examples for theoretical work are Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989, 1998), Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994), or Levin (2003). Examples that highlight the
empirical relevance of relational contracts are Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) or Hayes and Schaefer
(2000).
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to mitigate this unfortunate cycle and increase efficiency. In this sense, our model links
to the literature on (positive) productivity effects of unions as prominently advocated by
Freeman and Medoff (1984).3
We analyze a situation where a worker and a firm interact repeatedly. Though there
is an underlying contracting problem in that the worker’s effort is observable but not
contractible, the repeated interaction, in principle, enables the parties to rely on a rela-
tional contract to implement the efficient outcome: The worker exerts high effort and
is paid ex-post a bonus by the firm that observes the high effort choice. We modify the
situation slightly and assume that there are some states of the world in which the firm
is hit by a transitory adverse shock, unobservable by the worker, and cannot pay the
promised bonus. In this setting, the firm always has an incentive to claim that it was
hit by the adverse shock and has to renege on the promised bonus. We characterize an
equilibrium that has the property that along the equilibrium path there are periods of
cooperation (high effort and bonus payment) and conflict (low effort and no bonus pay-
ments). Though in equilibrium there are no false claims of adverse shocks by the firm,
the conflict phases are still needed to deter the firm from making a false claim and to
sustain cooperation. Thus, in this framework, firm-worker-quarrels can be interpreted
as an equilibrium property and not as failures of the relational contract. This reasoning
is similar to the one in Green and Porter (1984) or Radner (1985) where the collusive
paths of an oligopoly or the cooperation patterns in a general principal-agent-game are
analyzed, respectively.
Our model allows us to shed light on the role of labor market institutions, in particular
unions. Following the logic of our model, an important function of these institutions is to
ease communication within firms, i.e. to help workers learn the true state of the world.
Therefore, unions may increase efficiency of the firm-worker relationship by reducing
equilibrium conflict. We suggest that stronger unions not only allow workers to capture
a larger share of the accruing rent, but also make it more likely that the workers will
learn the true state of the world. In this case, we extend the model and show that a
stronger union increases efficiency as it decreases the length of conflict phases. Hence
3 Cardoso and Portela (2009) for Portugal and Gartner (2011) for Germany provide evidence that in
unionized firms relational contracts are more prominent means of motivating workers.
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the tradeoff is obvious: A stronger union implies that the firm needs to give up a larger
share, but in return the available pie is also larger as there are less conflicts. We show
that in this environment, optimal behavior of firms is to cede some power to the union.
The results of this extended model confirm and generalize the results in Freeman and
Lazear’s (1995) pioneering work on work councils and unions. Specifically, we show that
their insights regarding the role of work councils and unions in asymmetric information
environments are important in a dynamic relational contracting framework. Moreover,
we show how the presence of unions alters the nature of the relational contract as it
reduces the incidence and the length of conflict phases.
A recent example that allows us to more closely inspect this process and that shows how
important the unions’ role in enforcing this information transmission is can be found in
the case of United Airlines’ endeavors to renegotiate the pay packages with their employ-
ees in 2003 to avoid bankruptcy. The New York Times reported in its issue of January 1,
2003 that the machinist’s union I.A.M. refused to negotiate the package as it had “not yet
been provided with all of the financial information needed to evaluate United’s business
plan”. In response to this setback to United’s restructuring efforts, the company made its
case more conclusively. As a consequence of the company’s efforts and being convinced
of the direness of the companies state, eventually, as The New York Times reported in its
May 1, 2003 edition, the United machinists’ union approved pay concessions amounting
to $794 million a year in wage and benefit concessions for six years, corresponding to
salary cuts of 13% for the employees.
A current and very publicized example for the importance of our paper’s form of asym-
metric information in labor disputes is the breakdown in negotiations leading to the
lockout in the NFL in the 2011 off-season. The dispute was over $800 million (annu-
ally) that the owners of the NFL teams would like the players to give up due to what
they claim are financial difficulties. However, the owners were only willing to grant the
players’ union access to partial accounting information. Vonnie Holliday, the Redskins’
player representative, said “we want a fair CBA [collective bargaining agreement]. That’s
it. The owners are saying that they’re losing money and they want 18% back. Okay, if
you are losing money, then in fact show us that. We are not opposed to restructuring,
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but they refused to do that."4 The lockout ended on July 25, having lasted 130 days. A
new collective bargaining agreement (CBA), running through 2021, became effective on
August 4 and the players won $1 billion in additional benefits.5
The above described equilibrium has the property that there is no separation of the
relationship even though, ex-post, the worker’s outside option is not met in some periods
as the firm cannot live up to its initially promised bonus. The liquidity constraint has the
effect that workers partly insure firms against adverse shocks. This specific kind of insur-
ance has been in the focus of an early literature on relational contracts, surveyed in Hart
(1983), where it has been explained by risk aversion of the firms. While this literature
also dealt with asymmetric information about the true state of the world, it abstracted
from the effort elicitation problem. The focus was on optimal risk-sharing arrangements
between workers and firms in finitely repeated interactions, using the employment level
within firms, which are observable to both the firm and the workers, as means to credibly
transmit information.
Freeman and Lazear (1995) argue that worker representation (by work councils or
unions) improves productivity by easing worker-management communications and im-
proving and speeding-up of decision processes in organizations. They show that, despite
its social desirability, management and labor force still have socially suboptimal incen-
tives to establish worker representation and they show how different election rules will
affect its efficiency effect. Freeman and Lazear sketch models showing how unions (or
work councils) ease the information flow from workers to management, and - central
for our argument - from management to workers. In their latter example, workers have
to be convinced in hard times to exert extra effort to guarantee the firm’s survival. In
4 See: Amy Shipley (March 11, 2011). “Why Won’t NFL Owners Open Their
Books to Players," The Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/10/AR2011031006187.html), Mark Maske and Amy Ship-
ley (March 12, 2011). “NFL Lockout Is Now In Effect; Pro Football Enters First
Work Stoppage Since 1987," The Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031107057.html), Michael Silver (September 8, 2011).
“Fans’ guide to NFL labor battle” on Yahoo! Sports (http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=ms-
laborquestions090810), and (http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/football/nfl/07/25/cba-
settlement-summary/index.html).
5 In detail, major aspects of the new CBA were changes to the free agency guidelines, a salary cap of now
$120.375 million (with a salary minimum of $107.1 million), caps to rookie player compensation, an
increase in the league’s minimum salary, and that players secured a revenue share of 55% of national
media revenue, 45% of all NFL Ventures revenue, and 40% of local club revenue.
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our setting, it is not extra effort that has to be ensured but workers have to accept wage
moderation and have to be held back from punishing the firm by exerting low effort for a
perceived breach of contract.6 So while Freeman and Lazear predict excess effort flexibil-
ity through work councils, we predict less effort variability. Information transmission is
not the only avenue suggested in the literature through which unions may improve wel-
fare. For example, Malcomson (1983) argues that unions may be beneficial in the context
of optimal risk-sharing between workers and firms by overcoming the collective action
problem between workers. Hogan (2001) shows that unions enable firms to increase the
size of their labor force while sustaining a relational contract.
Our paper also relates to the literature on relational contracts. In particular, we build
on Levin (2003) who shows that inefficient punishments occur in equilibrium in an op-
timal relational contract when the agent’s effort is unobservable and the level of output
is observed only by the principal such that there is a situation of private monitoring and
MacLeod (2003) who extends this setting by introducing risk aversion. More specifically,
we relate to a recently emerging literature that derives rich equilibrium dynamics in rela-
tional contracting. Chassang (2010) shows how private information determines to which
of different long run equilibria a relationship converges and Fong and Li (2010) charac-
terize how particular job aspects like job security, pay level, and performance sensitivity
vary over time in a situation of moral hazard combined with limitedly liable agents. As
opposed to the papers by Halac (2012) or Yang (2013), where private information over
the employees type leads to equilibrium updating and convergence to a longterm steady
state, in our paper the source of equilibrium dynamics is moral hazard combined with
private information that is idiosyncratically varying over time. Hence, we do not get
convergence to a steady state but cyclical equilibrium patterns. Closest to our study are
the contemporaneous papers by Li and Matouschek (2013) and Yared (2010). In Li and
Matouschek (2013), the principal has private information about how costly it is in any
given period to live up to his bonus promises. The authors show that equilibrium patterns
are generally characterized by a sluggish decay of the relationship and sudden recover-
ies. Yared (2010) is set in a political economy context and characterizes the equilibrium
6 Note also that in our setting, workers’ effort cannot help the firm to escape a bad state.
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relationship between an aggressive country that seeks concessions from a non-aggressive
country which has private information about the costs of concessions. Li and Matouschek
(2013) and Yared (2010), like us, allow for inefficient transfers and assume one-sided pri-
vate information. Both these papers focus on solving for the optimal relational contract.
In this contract, even though firms do not pay the promised bonus in shock states, they
manage to avoid conflict by promising to make up for this in the next period. These
“escalating demands” improve efficiency, as they avoid some inefficient conflicts. How-
ever, Bewley (1999) documents that firms are very reluctant to reduce wages as they are
afraid of immediate adverse effects on “morale”. Similarly, Campbell and Kamlani (1997)
document that managers expect a reduction in effort (and “morale”) and an increased
turnover in response to wage cuts. Smith (2013) provides evidence from a representative
sample of British workers that substantiates these claims of managers. Specifically, Smith
(2013) finds that workers are “insulted” by nominal wage cuts. This effect is present
also when the industry is contracting and is only alleviated if all similar workers suffer
wage cuts too, which can be interpreted as signal that indeed the firm is in dire state.
In this spirit, our model prescribes a conflict phase whenever the firm does not pay the
promised bonus for high effort. In addition, we are able to pin down the structure of the
contract and to study general cooperation and conflict patterns and the role of unions in
improving the relationship.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next two sections lay out the
basic model and the structure of the relational contract under symmetric, Section 3.2,
and asymmetric, Section 3.3, information with respect to the state of the world. Section
3.4 analyzes how unions can help to mitigate the problems from asymmetric information.
Finally, we conclude. The Appendix contains derivations of key conditions.
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3.2 Symmetric Information Model
3.2.1 Setup of the Model
One firm and one worker are interacting repeatedly with an infinite horizon. The dis-
count factors are β for the firm and δ for the worker.7 The worker decides whether or
not to exert costly effort that has a positive effect on the firm’s profit. The worker’s effort
choice is observable by the firm, but is not contractible. To focus on our main argument,
we abstract from any explicit performance contracts. The firm has all the bargaining
power and makes a take it or leave it offer to the worker.8
The worker’s utility is increasing and linear in monetary compensation, which takes
the form of a contractible base salary, w, and a discretionary bonus, b, and decreasing in
effort. The worker decides whether to exert effort, e = 1, or shirk, e = 0. Only by exerting
high effort the agent occurs costs of c > 0. The agent’s per period utility function for e = 1
is: Ut = w + b− c
The agent’s outside option is by assumption zero U¯ = 0. Since the outside option
determines the base wage, the assumption is without loss of generality. However, the
outside option might influence the decision to employ an agent in the first place. The
worker is assumed to be liquidity constrained, hence all payments have to be weakly
positive.
In each period one of two states of the world materializes, either the good state G or
the bad state B, s = {G,B}. Neither the principal nor the agent can influence these
states, but both know the probability of their occurrence: Prob(s = G) = p, Prob(s =
B) = 1 − p. High effort increases the principal’s revenue Π(s, e) in both states, i.e.
Π(s, e = 1) > Π(s, e = 0).
We assume that in expectation it is always efficient to implement high effort (e = 1),
7 While much of the classical literature on relational contracts has been concerned with the question
when relational contracts are sustainable, i.e. to find a critical β, we are interested in the patterns of
the relational contract and hence implicitly will assume that the discount rates are “high enough” and
the relational contract is sustainable.
8 This assumption is relaxed in Section 3.4 where we allow for unions with varying bargaining power.
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or
[pΠ(G, 1) + (1− p)Π(B, 1)]− [pΠ(G, 0) + (1− p)Π(B, 0)] > 0 (3.1)
In addition we assume, that shirking leads to revenues just enough to provide the
worker with his outside option: Π(B, 0) − U¯ = Π(G, 0) − U¯ = 0. This implicitly entails
that the good and bad state don’t differ in revenues when the agent shirks. Although
the principal has perfect information on the agent’s effort decision, we assume that they
cannot verify the effort before a court.
Since the main focus of the paper is the continued cooperation between principal and
agent, the assumption seems fair.
The timing of the model is as follows: for each period t, first the contract is offered.
Then the worker chooses effort (e = 0, 1). The state (G,B) is realized. Afterwards the
profits are realized and the bonus is paid.
We are looking for a relational contract that, with a combination of contractible wage
and discretionary bonus, implements high effort. A relational contract is a pair of strate-
gies for the firm and the worker that form a Perfect Public Nash Equilibrium. Before
finding the relational contract in this case it is illustrative to first consider two bench-
mark cases.
Benchmark Case 1: The Stage Game The firm and the worker interact only once. In
this case it is obviously impossible to implement high effort. Hence, the firm will employ
the worker, pay her a fixed wage w such that u(w) = U¯ = 0 and the worker will choose
e = 0.
Benchmark Case 2: A World with Only One (Observable) State Assume that only
the good state of the world can occur, i.e., the firm’s profit is either Π (G, 1) or Π (G, 0) .
In this situation, the following relational contract implements high effort:
The firm’s strategy is to pay the worker a base salary w such that w = U¯ = 0.
As long as the worker chooses e = 1 the firm also pays a bonus bbenchmark = c.
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If the worker chooses e = 0 the firm does not pay the bonus in this period
and in all subsequent ones. The worker strategy is to choose e = 1 as long
as the firm paid the bonus in all previous periods and to choose e = 0 forever
as soon as the form has defaulted on the bonus once. Thus, the firm and
the worker return to the equilibrium of the stage game once cooperation has
broken down.
See Appendix C.1 for the derivation.
3.2.2 Symmetric Information
Now we turn attention to the original setting where the state can be either G or B and
is observable to the worker. To make this situation interesting we assume that the profits
in the bad state are not high enough to pay bconst even if the worker has chosen e = 1,
i.e., 0 < Π (B, 1)) − w < bconst. We assume that the firm cannot save or borrow money
at the capital market.9 This assumption is equivalent to assuming that there exists an
upper bound on how much the firm can borrow which is lower than what is necessary to
pay bconst or that the costs from borrowing are sufficiently convex.10 Thus, implicitly, we
assume a situation of “large” shocks. While this assumption has little consequences for
equilibrium cooperation in the symmetric information case, it will have a bearing in the
asymmetric information case.
Both states are possible, but the worker can observe which state occurs. However, we
assume that for high effort e = 1 the revenues in the bad state are not high enough
to pay a constant bonus bconst for both states. Therefore the benchmark case 2 cannot
be used to implement high effort, because in the bad state the firm cannot pay high
bonuses. Thus a higher bonus in the good state is required to compensate the worker
for high effort.11 The menu of bonuses in the symmetric information case is denoted by
9 Obviously, then it has to generally hold that Π(θ, e) ≥ w + b. We omit an explicit discussion to focus
on the interesting aspect of liquidity constraints under shocks.
10 See Englmaier and Fahn (2014) for a formal exposition in a distinct but related setting, showing that
allowing for saving or granting the firm access to the financial market does not undo the results.
11 The same argument is even stronger for risk averse agents, since the principal has to compensate those
in addition for the imposed risk.
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b = {b¯S, b}. Here b¯S denotes the bonus payment in the high effort, symmetric information
good state. We are going to compare the bonus payments in the good states in the
different information and institution environments, because the bonuses in the bad state
are fixed by assumption. In order to keep the results close to the risk averse agent setting,
we focus on the equilibria, where Π(B, 1) − w − b = 0. The interpretation is straight
forward: The firm tries to smooth the bonuses over states. Since it is impossible to pay
a constant bonus bconst, the firm tries to avoid huge variations in the bonus payments by
paying the whole revenue created as bonus in the bad state. For a risk neutral agent the
smoothing over states has no additional value, unlike the risk averse case, where this
reduces the firms overall payments, because it imposes less risk on agents.
The new relational contract(symmetric information) is defined as follows:
The firm’s strategy is to pay the worker a base salary w s.t. u(w) = U¯ ,
therefore w = 0. As long as the worker chooses e = 1, the firm pays in
addition a bonus. The bonus of the symmetric information case if the state of
the world is revealed to be a good state is b¯S and for the bad state b otherwise,
where b¯S > b. If the worker chooses e = 0 the firm does not pay the bonus in
this and all subsequent periods. The worker’s strategy is to choose e = 1 as
long as the firm has paid the promised bonus in all previous periods and to
choose e = 0 forever as soon as the form has defaulted on the bonus once.
See Appendix C.2 for the derivation.
The findings above are summarized in the following proposition. Note the general
contract characterizes the most efficient equilibrium in this game.
Proposition 1. In a situation with observable stochastic shocks to the firm’s profit as
described above the following two strategies form an relational contract that implements
e = 1:
The worker chooses e = 1 as long as the firm has paid the promised bonuses in all previ-
ous periods. Once the firm has defaulted on paying the bonus, the worker chooses e = 0
forever. The firm pays the base wage w = 0 and the bonuses, b in the bad state and
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b¯S > b in the good state, in all periods as long as the worker has always chosen e = 1.
The firm stops paying any bonus immediately after the worker has chosen e = 0 once.
b = Π(B, 1)
b¯S =
c− (1− p)Π(B, 1)
p
.
3.3 Asymmetric Information Model
In the asymmetric case the state of the world is only observable by the firm. The relational
contract described in Proposition 1 can therefore no longer implement e = 1 as the firm
has always an incentive to claim that the state is B and save b¯S − b in bonus payments.
We propose a “simple” equilibrium to implement cooperation and truthtelling by a similar
argument to Green and Porter (1984) and Radner (1985). The new equilibrium strategy
entails that the firm announces the state and in case their announcement is B, with a
bonus payment of b, a conflict phase of T periods follows.12 During this conflict the
worker chooses e = 0 and is only paid his outside option, w = 0, i.e. the equilibrium
of the stage game is played. After these T periods the firm and the worker revert to
the cooperative equilibrium in which the firm pays a bonus b¯A, A for the asymmetric
information model, whenever the state is good and the worker chooses e = 1. Another
bad state with a bonus of b triggers a new conflict phase.
While we don’t have to check again that it is optimal for the firm not to default com-
pletely on the bonus (since the argument is qualitatively the same as under symmetric
information), for the new pair of strategies to form an equilibrium it has to hold that:
a) The firm prefers to announce the state truthfully,
b) the worker prefers to execute the punishment, and
c) the worker prefers to choose e = 1 as long as the bonuses are paid (and the game
12 Note that we abstract from divisibility issues in deriving T to ease the exposition of our arguments.
To close the gap to our continuous formulation, there would have to be a public randomization with
suitably chosen probabilities that would determine whether the last period of punishment is executed
or whether the conflict phase is ended.
79
UNIONS, COMMUNICATION, AND COOPERATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
is not in a conflict phase).
Denote the continuation value of the firm’s profits from cooperating (announcing the
state truthfully) if the state is G as V CF (G, 1) and if the state is B as V
C
F (B, 1). The
continuation value of the firm’s profits in the beginning of the conflict period is denoted
by V PF (·, 0). The following equations define these continuation values:
V CF (G, 1) = Π(G, 1)− b¯A + β[pV CF (G, 1) + (1− p)V CF (B, 1)]
V CF (B, 1) = 0 + βV
P
F (·, 0) = βV PF (·, 0)
V PF (·, 0) =
T−1∑
t=0
βt0 + βT [pV CF (G, 1) + (1− p)V CF (B, 1)] = βT [pV CF (G, 1) + (1− p)V CF (B, 1)].
Solving these equations we get that:
V CF (G, 1) = [Π(G, 1)− b¯A]
1− (1− p)βT+1
1− (1− p)βT+1 − βp (3.2)
V CF (B, 1) = [Π(G, 1)− b¯A]
βT+1p
1− (1− p)βT+1 − βp (3.3)
V PF (·, 0) = [Π(G, 1)− b¯A]
βTp
1− (1− p)βT+1 − βp. (3.4)
The continuation value of the firm’s profit if it announces state B when the true state
is G (i.e. if the firm defects), V DF (G, 1), is given by
V DF (G, 1) = Π(G, 1)− b+ βV PF (·, 0).
Substituting for V PF (·, 0) and rearranging we get:
V DF (G, 1) = [Π(G, 1)− b] + [Π(G, 1)− b¯A]
βTp
1− (1− p)βT+1 − βp. (3.5)
We now turn to condition a), the firm has to prefer to announce the state truthfully.
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Thus it has to hold that V DF (G, 1) < V
C
F (G, 1), or more explicitly that
[Π(G, 1)− b] < [Π(G, 1)− b¯A] 1− β
T+1
1− (1− p)βT+1 − βp.
Note that 1−β
T+1
1−(1−p)βT+1−βp is increasing in T . Moreover, for T = 0 the condition above is
violated as it would imply that [Π(G, 1)− b] < [Π(G, 1)− b¯A] and thus that b¯A < b, which
as we know cannot be true. Thus, there exists a T ∗ > 0 for which the condition above
holds. In equilibrium the firm will be just indifferent and thus
[Π(G, 1)− b]1− (1− p)β
T ∗+1 − βp
1− βT ∗+1 − [Π(G, 1)− b¯A] = 0. (3.6)
Implicitly this defines the efficient length of conflict phase T ∗. Choosing the optimal
amount of conflict periods deters the firm from defaulting on the bonus in state G.
Now we check condition b), namely that the worker prefers to execute the punishment.
Given the strategy of the firm, i.e., pay w = 0 for T ∗ periods after announcing state B,
exerting high effort will not benefit the worker as no bonus is being paid. Thus the worker
has no incentive to choose e = 1 in these T ∗ periods.
Finally we check condition c) and show that as long as the firm has never defaulted
on the bonus the worker prefers to choose e = 1. The worker does not know which state
will realize when she makes her effort choice, and thus does not know whether she will
receive a bonus b or b¯A. Define the worker’s expected utility as
U = pb¯A + (1− p)b− c.
The continuation value for the worker’s utility from exerting high effort if the firm
fulfilled its promises, V CW , is given by
V CW = pb¯A + (1− p)b− c+ δ(pV CW + (1− p)V PW ),
where V PW denotes the continuation value for the worker’s utility at the beginning of a
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conflict phase, which is defined as
V PW =
T−1∑
t=0
δtU¯ + δTV CW = δ
TV CW .
We can use these two expressions to solve for V CW :
V CW = pb¯A + (1− p)b− c+ δpV CW + δ(1− p)δTV CW .
Rearranging then yields:
V CW =
pb¯A + (1− p)b− c
1− δp− δT+1(1− p) . (3.7)
The continuation value for the worker’s utility from defecting and exerting low effort
even though the firm did not default on its promises and the game is not in conflict phase,
V DW , is given by
V DW =
∞∑
t=0
δtU¯ = 0. (3.8)
In order to ensure that the worker prefers choosing e = 1, V CW ≥ V DW has to hold:
pb¯A + (1− p)b− c
1− δp− δT+1(1− p) ≥ 0
pb¯A + (1− p)b ≥ c
b¯A =
c− (1− p)b
p
. (3.9)
This is the same condition as under symmetric information, b¯A = b¯S. We summarize these
findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In a situation with stochastic shocks to the firm’s profits can only be
observed by the firm itself, the following two strategies form an relational contract that
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implements e = 1:
In a cooperation period, the worker chooses e = 1 as long as the firm has not announced
a bad state and has always paid the promised bonuses, b in the bad state and b¯A in the
good state, in all previous cooperation periods. When the firm announces the bad state
and pays b a conflict phase starts, lasting T ∗ periods, where in each period the worker
chooses e = 0. Thereafter the worker moves back to cooperating, i.e., choosing e = 1
as long as the firm announces the good state and pays the bonus. Once the firm has
defaulted on paying the bonus in a cooperation period the worker chooses e = 0 forever.
The firm pays the base wage w = 0 and the bonus, b in the bad state and b¯A in the good
state, in all cooperation periods as long as the worker has always chosen e = 1 in the
previous cooperation periods. After a bad state has occurred the firm pays no bonus for
the next T ∗ periods. The firm stops paying any bonus immediately after the worker has
once chosen e = 0 in a cooperation period.
b = Π(B, 1).
b¯A is defined by:
b¯A =
c− (1− p)Π(B, 1)
p
.
T ∗ is implicitly defined by
[Π(G, 1)− b]1− (1− p)β
T ∗+1 − βp
1− βT ∗+1 − [Π(G, 1)− b¯A] = 0.
or explicitly by
T ∗ =
ln (
βpΠ(G,1)+(1−p)(1−βp)Π(B,1)+ 1−p
p
Π(B,1)− c
p
pΠ(G,1)+(1−p)(1−p)Π(B,1)+ 1−p
p
Π(B,1)− c
p
)
ln β
− 1.
To clarify the mechanics of the model, consider a couple of comparative statistic deriva-
tions. Based on these comparative statics it becomes clear that equilibrium inefficiencies
are gravest in past-their-prime (low β), highly volatile (low pi), and more liquidity con-
straint (low b) industries. We derive these in the more general setting treated in Appendix
C.3.5.
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3.4 The Role of Unions
3.4.1 Introducing Union to the Model
Though the conflict phases allow worker and firm to sustain a cooperative equilibrium
also under asymmetric information regarding the adverse shocks, there is still an effi-
ciency loss due to the lost rents in the conflict periods along the equilibrium path. Hence,
there is scope for a Pareto improvement by reducing these inefficiencies. Based on the
comparative statics results, the largest scope for such an improvement should be found
in past-their-prime (low β), highly volatile (low pi), and most liquidity constraint (low b)
industries in which inefficiencies are gravest.
One approach for firms to improve things is to take steps to lower individual worker’s
costs of observing the true state of the world. This could explain the endeavors of firms to
improve the financial literacy of their staff. A prominent example is Gordon Cain who was
one of the precursors of the LBO wave in the 1980s and who dedicated careful attention
to make the workers of acquired firms aware of the true financial situation of their firms
such that they were willing to support his suggested course of restructuring.13
However, often it is very hard for firms to credibly communicate this information.
Unions can be an institution that helps overcoming the asymmetric information problem
and generate more rents. This insight regarding the role of unions as facilitating the
transmission of information between management and workers was first suggested by
Freeman and Lazear (1995). They show in a static environment that economic ineffi-
ciency will be reduced due to unions moderating workers’ demands during hard times.
We use our dynamic environment to investigate how the presence of unions changes
the nature of the relational contract. We then show that Freeman and Lazear’s insights
regarding the role of unions are present in our extended model; we also establish that
unions facilitate wage moderation in times of crises.14
13 Jack Welch stresses in his books, e.g. Welch and Welch (2005), the importance of transparency for a
successful management strategy. According to him it is pivotal that workers understand the situation
of the firm and are willing to follow management’s suggestions to cope with challenges.
14 Interestingly, in a related but distinct vein, the management of labour relationships in the context of
relational contracts has been emphasized by Gibbons and Henderson (2013) and the important role
of unions in this context is discussed in Helper and Henderson (2014).
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An intuitive explanation why unions are necessary in order for the workers to overcome
the asymmetric information problem is that of a collective action problem. Specifically,
consider the case where the true state of the world is observable, although it requires
a costly investment to do so. Assume the costs are such that it does not pay for an
individual worker to acquire this information, but it would be worthwhile for all workers.
Thus, the workers in our model are faced with a collective action problem, similar to
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1986) model of corporate governance where management is not
effectively controlled due to dispersed stock ownership. If this collective action problem
was completely solved, the efficiency of the entire interaction could be improved as full
cooperation without conflict phases could be achieved on the equilibrium path. Similar
to large shareholders in Shleifer and Vishny (1986), unions can serve as a coordination
device to overcome this collective action problem.15
We do not model the information process explicitly but assume outright that unioniza-
tion allows the firm to credibly transmit, albeit stochastically, that it is indeed in a dire
state and has to cut wages. In a non-unionized firm this information could not be as
credibly transmitted to (or observed by) individual workers and wage cuts would thus
lead to a very harsh reaction by the workers. Of course there is also a cost associated
with unions. Allowing the workers to organize themselves will most likely help them to
bargain for a greater share of the profits. However, note that these profits are now big-
ger. Thus, for the firm it might be still worthwhile to receive a smaller share of a bigger
pie. Below we explicitly model these two roles of unions. In doing so, we abstract from
explicitly modeling the collective action problem, but rather focus on the effect of the
union on a representative worker.
The conflict periods ensure continued cooperation, however induce an efficiency loss
due to the lost rents in the conflict periods. Unions can be an institution that helps over-
coming the asymmetric information problem and generates more rents. The introduction
of unions comes at a cost for the firm, it has to pay a higher share of its profits to the
agent. For our analysis we simply assume that the information transmission efficiency
of the union is directly connected to its bargaining power σ ∈ [0, 1]. Even with a more
15 Moreover, only in the presence of unions agents receive a positive rent and thus care about improving
equilibrium dynamics.
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complicated relation, i.e. information transmission is a function of bargaining power
γ = f(σ), the results would not qualitatively change. If they were not connected, the
firm’s problem becomes trivial as firms always prefer unions with less bargaining power
and higher information transmission efficiency. For our analysis of the cutoff level of bar-
gaining power that makes the introduction of a union profitable for the firm, the tradeoff
between smaller profits and higher information efficiency is crucial.
Since the worker now receives a share of the overall revenue, we need to reformulate
the utility function and the revenue function. First for the cases where the worker invests
high effort. The workers utility in the good state is given by:
U(G, 1) = b¯σA + σ(Π(G, 1)− b¯σA)− c = σΠ(G, 1) + (1− σ)b¯σA − c.
The workers utility in the bad state is:
U(B, 1) = σΠ(B, 1) + (1− σ)bσA − c.
Where b¯σA denotes the bonus payment in the good state, while b
σ
A denotes the bonus
payment in the bad state. The expected utility of exerting high effort is therefore:
EUA,σ(·, 1;σ) = p[σΠ(G, 1) + (1− σ)b¯σA] + (1− p)[σΠ(B, 1) + (1− σ)bσA]− c.
The continuation values for workers from exerting in a cooperation period:
V Cw,σ = EUA,σ(·, 1;σ) + δ(pV Cw,σ + (1− p)[σV Cw,σ + (1− σ)V Pw,σ]).
The continuation value at the beginning of a conflict period:
V Pw,σ =
T−1∑
t=0
δtU¯ + δTV Cw,σ = δ
TV Cw,σ.
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With this we can solve for V Cw,σ:
V Cw,σ =
EUA,σ(·, 1;σ)
1− δp− δ(1− p)σ − δT+1(1− p)(1− σ) . (3.10)
Note that for σ → 0, i.e. union power is negligible, we get the same condition that we
got in the case without unions.
The continuation value for the worker’s utility from defecting while the firm did not
default on its promises:
V Dw,σ =
∞∑
t=0
δtU¯ = 0. (3.11)
To ensure incentive compatibility the worker has to weakly prefer to choose e = 1, i.e.
V Cw,σ ≥ V Dw,σ which simplifies to
EUA,σ(·, 1;σ) ≥ 0. (3.12)
The worker receives two different forms of compensation, the bonus payment as well
as his share of the remaining revenue. A higher bonus payment reduces the remaining
revenue and therefore the worker’s share. Thus, if σ is high enough bonus payments are
no longer necessary. We can determine the value for σ¯ when both bonuses become zero
and the agent is entirely compensated through the share of profits in the good state. For
σ > σ¯, condition 3.12 becomes slack. If the bargaining power is low, we assume the firm
to choose bσ = Π(B, 1). Therefore, σ¯ solves the equation:
pσ¯Π(G, 1) + (1− p)Π(B, 1)− c = 0.
The solution is:
σ¯ =
c− (1− p)Π(B, 1)
pΠ(G, 1)
. (3.13)
Therefore, σ¯ is the highest value of σ for which the firm will pay a bonus in the good
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state of the world. Note, as σ increases beyond σ¯, the firm can still make condition 3.12
hold with equality by lowering the bonus in the bad state.
We can derive the bonus payments conditional on the bargaining power of the union:
b¯σA =

c−pσΠ(G,1)−(1−p)Π(B,1)
(1−σ)p if σ ≤ σ¯
0 Otherwise
(3.14)
and
bσ =
Π(B, 1) if σ ≤ σ¯0 Otherwise. (3.15)
We turn to the firm’s optimization problem. In the good state of the world the firm’s
profits are (1 − σ)(Π(G, 1) − b¯σA), while in the bad state the firm’s profits are give by
(1 − σ)(Π(B, 1) − bσ). If σ > σ¯ the firm will have profits in the bad state as well, a
difference to the case without unions.
Keep in mind that conditional on the firm announcing the bad state, B, the union
and hence the worker gets informed with probability σ that the state of the world is
indeed B, we denote by V CF,σ(G, 1;σ) and V
C
F,σ(B, 1;σ) the continuation value of the firm’s
profits from cooperating, i.e. announcing the state truthfully. The continuation value
of the firm’s profits at the beginning of a conflict (or punishment) period is denoted by
V PF,σ(·, 1;σ). The following equations define these continuation values:
V CF,σ(G, 1;σ) = (1− σ)(Π(G, 1)− b¯σA) + β[pV CF,σ(G, 1;σ) + (1− p)V CF,σ(B, 1;σ)]
V CF,σ(B, 1;σ) = (1−σ)(Π(G, 1)−bσ)+β((1−σ)V PF,σ(·, 1;σ)+σ[pV CF,σ(G, 1;σ)+(1−p)V CF,σ(B, 1;σ)
V PF,σ(·, 1;σ) =
T∑
βt0+βT [pV CF,σ(G, 1;σ)+(1−p)V CF,σ(B, 1;σ)] = βT [pV CF,σ(G, 1;σ)+(1−p)V CF,σ(B, 1;σ)].
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We use these expressions and solve for the continuation values:
V CF,σ(G, 1;σ) =
(1− σ)[Π(G, 1)− b¯σA][1− β(1− p)(βT (1− σ) + σ)] + β(1− σ)[Π(B, 1)− bσ]
1− β(1− p)[βT (1− σ) + σ]− βp
(3.16)
V CF,σ(B, 1;σ) =
βp[βT (1− σ) + σ][Π(G, 1)− b¯σA] + (1− σ)(1− βp)[Π(B, 1)− bσ]
1− β(1− p)[βT (1− σ) + σ]− βp (3.17)
V PF,σ(·, 1;σ) = βT (1− σ)
p[Π(G, 1)− b¯σA] + (1− p)[Π(B, 1)− bσ]
1− β(1− p)[βT (1− σ) + σ]− βp . (3.18)
The continuation value of the firm’s profits from defecting, i.e., announcing a state B
when the true state is G, V DF,σ(G, 1;σ) is given by:
V DF,σ(G, 1;σ) = Π(G, 1)− bσ − σ(Π(B, 1)− bσ)+
βT+1(1− σ)2[p[Π(G, 1)− b¯σA] + (1− p)[Π(B, 1)− bσ]]
1− β(1− p)[βT (1− σ) + σ]− βp .
The firm has to prefer to announce the state truthfully. Thus it has to hold that
V DF,σ(G, 1;σ) < V
C
F,σ(G, 1;σ).
Substituting and rearranging the equations above yields the condition for continued
cooperation:
σ(Π(G, 1)− Π(B, 1)) + (1− σ)[b¯σA − bσ] ≤
(1− σ)β(1− βT (1− σ))p(Π(G, 1)− b¯
σ
A) + (1− p)(Π(B, 1)− bσ)
1− β(1− p)[βT (1− σ) + σ]− βp .
(3.19)
First, note that if σ = 1 then the firm will prefer to lie and announce that the state
of the world is B when it is in fact G. The intuition is obvious, in this case the firm
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relinquishes all its profits to the workers, and hence defection - which has a positive
value - is attractive from its perspective. We know that when σ = 0 there exists T ∗
such that the condition for continued cooperation holds with equality. For all σ < σ¯, an
increase in σ increases does not change the LHS stays but leads to an increase in the RHS.
Therefore exists a solution for the period of conflicts, T < T ∗. In turn we know, there
has to exits a range of σ values for which the condition 3.19 holds. We summarize these
findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In a situation in which stochastic shocks to the firm’s profits can only
be observed by the firm itself and the worker is part of a union of power σ ≤ σ˜,
the following two strategies form an relational contract that implements e = 1: In a
cooperation period, the worker chooses e = 1 as long as a) the firm either announced
a good state or announced a bad state that was verified by the union and b) the firm
has always paid the promised bonuses, b in the bad state and b¯σA in the good state, in
all previous cooperation periods. When the firm announces a bad state that the union
cannot verify the firm pays b and a conflict phase, lasting T ∗A,σ periods starts, where in
each period the worker chooses e = 0. Thereafter the worker moves back to cooperating,
i.e. choosing e = 1 as long as the firm pays the bonus and announces the good state
or the union can verify that the state is bad. Once the firm has defaulted on paying
the bonus in a cooperation period the worker chooses e = 0 forever. The firm pays the
bonus, bσ in the bad state and b¯σA in the good state, in all cooperation periods as long as
the worker has always chosen e = 1 in the previous cooperation periods. After a ad state
that the union could not verify has occurred the firm pays no bonus for the next T ∗A,σ
(punishment) periods. The firm stops paying any bonus immediately after the worker
has once chosen e = 0 in a cooperation period: bσ, b¯σA and T
∗
A,σ are defined by the
following conditions.
b¯σA =

c−pσΠ(G,1)−(1−p)Π(B,1)
(1−σ)p if σ ≤ σ¯
0 Otherwise
(3.20)
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and
bσ =
Π(B, 1) if σ ≤ σ¯0 Otherwise (3.21)
and
σ(Π(G, 1)− Π(B, 1)) + (1− σ)[σ¯σA − bσ] ≤
(1− σ)β(1− βT ∗A,σ(1− σ))p(Π(G, 1)− σ¯
σ
A) + (1− p)(Π(B, 1)− bσ)
1− β(1− p)[βT ∗A,σ(1− σ) + σ]− βp
(3.22)
3.4.2 (When) is it optimal to cede power to a union?
Next we investigate whether a firm will want to cede power to a union. Meaning, as-
suming that the firm can decide on the size of σ, will it choose a positive one? Because
the result for risk neutral agents strongly depends on the interaction between the union
power σ and the firms time discount factor β, we can only describe the basic intuition. A
more clear cut analysis provides the model for risk averse agents in Appendix C.3.
The main tradeoff the firm faces, is the tradeoff between the reduction of efficiency loss
through cooperation breakdowns and the concession of profit to the agent. For σ < σ¯ the
firm offsets the increasing share it has to pay to the agent through a reduction in bonus
payment for the good state, G. Therefore it always will at least cede σ = σ¯ power to the
union.
For σ > σ¯ we know that the firm has to share rent with the agent. Since σ = 1 hands
over the firm’s whole rent to the agent, we know that it is better for the firm to choose a
union power σ < 1. Therefore the optimal union power, σ, has to lie in between:
σ¯ < σ < 1 (3.23)
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3.5 Conclusion
We present a model generating non-trivial dynamic patterns in an ongoing firm-worker
relationship. Though firm and worker are in an ongoing relational contract there are
phases of cooperation and phases of conflict along the equilibrium path. The reason
for the conflict phases is that the firm needs to be deterred from announcing a false
state of the world and reneging on the contractually specified bonus payments. The
basic logic of the model resembles the reasoning in Green and Porter (1984) and Radner
(1985). We have shown that the conflict phases that are needed in the case of asymmetric
information to implement the high effort levels in the cooperative periods reduce the
totally accrued profits. Thus, being able to shift the situation from one of asymmetric
to one with symmetric information could lead to a Pareto improvement. We show how
unions can help to achieve this goal. Though in this environment giving more power
to the unions increases the share of the rent but improves efficiency by reducing the
occurrence of conflict periods, the firm always finds it worthwhile to cede power to a
union and to thus secure a smaller share of a bigger pie.
Recalling the comparative statics results, unions should be most desirable in industries
where inefficiencies are gravest, i.e. in mature (low β), highly volatile (high pi), and most
liquidity constraint (low b) industries. This prediction is in principle testable.
Nowadays, firms employ more and more novel human resource management prac-
tices.16 Black and Lynch (2001) examine the impact of such workplace practices, infor-
mation technology and human capital investments on productivity. They find that those
unionized establishments that have adopted what have been called new or transformed
industrial relations practices, promoting joint decision making coupled with incentive
based compensation, have higher productivity than other similar non-union plants. This
finding hints at a complementarity between “old” and “new” labor market institutions.
Studying this relation more intensely is possible within our suggested framework and
seems a promising avenue for future research.
Though this is beyond the scope of this paper, we believe that the basic logic of our
16 For evidence on these see Ichniowsky, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) and the references therein.
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model carries over to richer settings than those of our admittedly very stylized model. In
a richer model one would have firms employing more than one worker. In this setting the
firm has an additional strategic variable next to the bonus payment, namely its employ-
ment level.17 The structure of an equilibrium following our basic logic should have high
effort all along the way but the firm would be forced to reduce employment after an-
nouncing a bad state and thus forego profits if it lied about the state. This model would
endogenously generate recalls on the equilibrium path, an issue that has been widely
studied among labor economists, starting with Feldstein (1976), because of its important
effects on the measured unemployment rate.
17 Grossman and Hart (1981) analyze such a setting in a static model in the context of optimal risk
sharing between workers and firms. Hart (1983) surveys the closely related early relational contracts
literature which focussed on optimal risk sharing as opposed to efficient incentive provision.
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Focusing Attention in Multiple Tasks
A.1 Derivation of Focusing Weights in the Example
The minimum for the focusing range is always given by al, whereas the maximum is given
by ah.
min
F∈F
(EF [u(eh)]− 1
2
SF [u(eh)]) > min
F∈F
(EF [u(el)]− 1
2
SF [u(el)])
Since:
p(eh)b︸ ︷︷ ︸
EF [u(eh)]
−1
2
2 |b− 0| p(eh)(1− p(eh))︸ ︷︷ ︸
SF [u(eh)])
= p(eh)
2b
p(el)b︸ ︷︷ ︸
EF [u(el)]
−1
2
2 |b− 0| p(el)(1− p(el))︸ ︷︷ ︸
SF [u(el)])
= p(el)
2b
It always holds that,
p(eh)
2b > p(el)
2b
Therefore low effort generates the smaller minimum range.
The maximum of the focusing range is always given by eh:
max
F∈F
(EF [u(eh)] +
1
2
SF [u(eh)]) > max
F∈F
(EF [u(el)] +
1
2
SF [u(el)])
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With:
p(eh)b︸ ︷︷ ︸
EF [u(eh)]
+
1
2
2 |b− 0| p(eh)(1− p(eh))︸ ︷︷ ︸
SF [u(eh)])
= p(eh)b[2− p(eh)]
and
p(el)b︸ ︷︷ ︸
EF [u(el)]
+
1
2
2 |b− 0| p(el)(1− p(el))︸ ︷︷ ︸
SF [u(el)])
= p(el)b[2− p(el)]
high effort generates the higher maximum:
p(eh)b[2− p(eh)] > p(el)b[2− p(el)]
2[p(eh)− p(el)] > [p(eh)2 − p(el)2]
This translates to
2 > p(eh) + p(el)
which is always true.
A.2 Example - Optimal Contract for Focusing Agents
I derive the optimal contract for a focusing thinker. The principal has to use the perceived
participation (PCp) and incentive compatibility (ICCp) constraints.
max
w,b,a1,a2
B(a1, a2)− wa1 − p(a2)b (A.1)
(PCp) g(∆a1)wa1 + g(∆a2)p(a2)b ≥ U¯ (A.2)
(ICCp) max
a1,a2
g(∆a1)wa
∗
1 + g(∆a2)p(a
∗
2)b ≥ (A.3)
g(∆a1)wa1 + g(∆a2)p(a2)b. (A.4)
I again assume that the principal leaves no rent for the agent, therefore (PCp) and (ICCp)
have to be binding. For simplification, I assume g(x) = x, in order to put as little empha-
sis on the weighting function as possible. The optimal contract now looks as follows:
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wFT = (U¯
1
ah − al
p(ah)ah − p(al)al
p(ah)− p(al) )
1
2 (A.5)
bFT =
1
p(ah)− p(al)(U¯
(ah − al)(p(ah)ah − p(al)al)
2p(ah)− p(ah)2 − p(al)2 )
1
2 . (A.6)
It is not straight forward to compare the new reward scheme (wFT , bFT ) to the old
(w∗, b∗). The conditions for the new reward scheme being smaller than the old are given
by:
Condition 1. w∗ > wFT ⇔ U¯ > 1
ah−al [
p(ah)ah−p(al)al
p(ah)−p(al) ]
3
Condition 2. b∗ > bFT ⇔ U¯ > 1
ah−al [
p(ah)ah−p(al)al
p(ah)−p(al) ]
2 p(ah)ah−p(al)al
2p(ah)−p(ah)2−p(al)2
The first condition, w∗ > wFT , is stronger, i.e. whenever w∗ > wFT is fulfilled b∗ > bFT
is automatically fulfilled as well. Therefore three different cases emerge:
First, when the outside option is high enough, then the new reward scheme is smaller in
both tasks, i.e. w∗ > wFT and b∗ > bFT . Since the outside option enters the weighting
function, a higher outside option increases the overall perception of compensation and
therefore makes it easier to fulfill the participation constraint: U¯ > 1
ah−al [
p(ah)ah−p(al)al
p(ah)−p(al) ]
3.
Second, when the outside option is very low, the focusing thinker wouldn’t accept
the initial proposed contract, since it violates the participation constraint. In order to
motivate the agent in the first place, the principal has to offer higher incentives and
therefore increases both tasks in the new reward scheme, wFT > w∗ and bFT > b∗:
1
ah−al [
p(ah)ah−p(al)al
p(ah)−p(al) ]
2 p(ah)ah−p(al)al
2p(ah)−p(ah)2−p(al)2 > U¯ .
The third case is the most interesting one, because it foreshadows one important
result from the general setup. When the outside option is in an intermediate range,
1
ah−al [
p(ah)ah−p(al)al
p(ah)−p(al) ]
3 > U¯ > 1
ah−al [
p(ah)ah−p(al)al
p(ah)−p(al) ]
2 p(ah)ah−p(al)al
2p(ah)−p(ah)2−p(al)2 , the piece rate has to be
increased, while the bonus payment has to be decreased. Therefore from the focusing
thinkers perspective the incentives for both tasks become more similar.
This leads to my second lemma:
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Lemma A.2.1. As long as
1
ah − al [
p(ah)ah − p(al)al
p(ah)− p(al) ]
3 > U¯ > (A.7)
1
ah − al [
p(ah)ah − p(al)al
p(ah)− p(al) ]
2 p(ah)ah − p(al)al
2p(ah)− p(ah)2 − p(al)2 (A.8)
holds, the principal has to assimilate incentives, i.e. increase the piece rate and decrease the
bonus, in order to prevent the focusing agent from choosing the opposite effort allocation.
The intuition behind the proposition is that a focusing thinker views both tasks differ-
ently, because of their difference in payoffs and involved risk. The higher outcome in
the quality task draws his attention to this task, resulting in higher effort in the quality
dimension. Since this assessment of the tasks works intuitively, the treatment variation
by Englmaier et al. (2016) of pointing out the true payoffs was able to disrupt the assess-
ment of the situation, which led to their effect of higher effort in the piece rate.
A.3 Results under Uncertainty
The model can be translated into a framework similar to Holmström and Milgrom (1991)
and Ederer et al. (2014). A principal hires an agent to perform several different tasks,
N . The performance in each task can be measured, xj with j ∈ N , and is verifiable. The
performance depends on the agent’s effort in the task, ej, as well as a random shock, j.
Neither effort nor the shock can be verified. The performance in each task is therefore
given by xj = ej+j. The realized random shocks have a multivariate normal distribution
with mean 0 and variance σj. For simplicity I assume that there is no correlation of
shocks. This allows for clear results with increasing number of tasks, because only their
individual variance matters and not the interaction with other tasks.
For the first two results, I limit the number of tasks to two, i.e. j ∈ 1, 2. In order to
obtain interior solutions, I assume the cost function to be convex in both tasks, c(e1, e2) =
1
2
(e21 + e
2
2), and the benefit function is B(e1, e2) = e1 + e2. I restrict my attention to
compensation schedules in which the agent’s payment is a linear and separable function
of the performance measures: s(x1, x2) = α1x1 + α2x2 + β. The agent is risk averse
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and has an exponential von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with coefficient of
absolute risk aversion r:
u(s(x)) = −e−r[α1x1+α2x2+β−C(e1,e2))].
Rational Benchmark
The solution for a rational agent is given by choosing the linear sharing rule that max-
imizes the certainty equivalent (CE):
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
− exp(−r[α1x1 + α2x2 + β − 1
2
(e21 + e
2
2)])
1√
2piσ1σ2
exp(−1
2
[(
x1 − e1
σ1
)2
+(
x2 − e2
σ2
)2)dx1dx2 = − exp(−rCE).
(A.9)
This results in the equation for the certainty equivalent:
CE = α1e1 + α2e2 + β − 1
2
e21 −
1
2
e22 −
r
2
α1σ
2
1 −
r
2
α2σ
2
2. (A.10)
From the resulting first order conditions, I know that αi = ei and by setting CE = 0, I
can derive
β = −1
2
e21 −
1
2
e22 +
r
2
α1σ
2
1 +
r
2
α2σ
2
2
The principal is solving her maximization problem: B(e1, e2)− (α1e1 + α2e2 + β).
max
e1,e2
e1 + e2 − e21 − e22 +
1
2
e21 +
1
2
e22 −
r
2
e1σ
2
1 −
r
2
e2σ
2
2. (A.11)
Therefore the optimal choices for effort and the linear sharing rule are given by:
α∗1 = 1−
r
2
σ21 = e
∗
1
α∗2 = 1−
r
2
σ22 = e
∗
2
β∗ = −1 + rσ21 −
3
2
(
r
2
σ21)
2 + rσ22 −
3
2
(
r
2
σ22)
2.
(A.12)
Effort Allocation of a Focusing Agent
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With the rational benchmark I can first analyze how a focusing agent will choose effort
under the optimal incentive scheme for a rational agent. Therefore I introduce a salience
distortion to the agent’s utility function:
uft(s(x)) = − exp(−r[g(∆1)s(x1) + g(∆2)s(x2) + β − C(e1, e2)]). (A.13)
The focusing distortion influences the agents perception of the linear sharing rules for
each task. This influence is generated through a weighting function, that is increasing
in the range of outcomes in each task. I deviate from the authors definition by using
the expected value and the variance of a task instead of expected value and average self-
distance in order to generate results that are easier to interpret. The basic intuition is,
that those tasks with higher payment variation receive more attention and therefore a
higher weight. In addition I normalize the variance by the slope αi for each task, which
also simplifies the analysis and is being relaxed in ongoing work.
∆i =
1
αi
max
F∈F
(EF [αixi] +
1
2
V arF [αixi])− 1
αi
min
F∈F
(EF [αixi] +
1
2
V arF [αixi]). (A.14)
Since the distribution for the error term is always the same, the previous equation sim-
plifies to:
∆i =
1
αi
V arF [αixi] = αiV arF [i] = αiσ
2
i . (A.15)
I include the focus weights into the agents optimization problem with the optimal linear
sharing rule for a rational agent and, again, set the weighting function to be linear,
g(x) = x. The agent will optimize his certainty equivalent by choosing his effort:
max
e1,e2
g(∆1)α
∗
1e1 + g(∆2)α
∗
2e2 + β
∗ − 1
2
e21 −
1
2
e22 −
r
2
α∗1σ
2
1 −
r
2
α∗2σ
2
2. (A.16)
The focusing agent’s effort choice is given by:
eFT1 = (1−
r
2
σ21)
2σ21
eFT2 = (1−
r
2
σ22)
2σ22.
(A.17)
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Comparing the optimal effort choices for the rational and the focusing agent, it is clear
that e∗i > e
FT
i . Taking the partial derivatives of the effort choices with respect to the
variance leads to:
∂e∗i
∂σi
< 0
∂eFTi
∂σi
> 0.
(A.18)
The partial derivative for the second equation holds as long as the variance in the task
dimension is smaller than σi < ( 23r )
1
2 . Therefore, tasks with higher variance in outcomes
attract the agents attention which in turn leads to the effort distortion characterized in
Proposition 1, which I can state more formally now:
Proposition A.3.1. As long as σi < ( 23r )
1
2 holds,
∂eFTi
∂σi
= 2σi(1− r
2
σ2i )[1−
3r
2
σ2i ] > 0. (A.19)
This implies, if the principal does not regard the effect of the framing of incentive contract on
the agent’s perception, the optimal contract for a rational thinker induces a focusing thinker
to exert higher effort in those dimensions with higher variation.
The proposition shows, that if the contract is not ’focusing-proof’ the agent will de-
viate from the principals intended effort. The contract fails to implement the optimal
effort allocation. Comparing this result with the example in section III highlights that the
distortion can also be found in structural similar reward schemes. Although the exact
framing of a contract might have an additional influence.
Optimal Contract for Focusing Agents
The optimal contract for a focusing thinker can be derived similar to the rational bench-
mark with the addition of the focus weighting functions to the linear sharing rule.∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
− exp(−r[g(∆1)α1x1 + g(∆2)α2x2 + β − 1
2
(e21 + e
2
2)])
1√
2piσ1σ2
exp(−1
2
[(
x1 − e1
σ1
)2 + (
x2 − e2
σ2
)2)dx1dx2 = − exp(−rCE).
(A.20)
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The equation for the agent’s certainty equivalent differs from the rational benchmark:
CE = e1α
2
1σ
2
1 + e2α
2
2σ
2
2 + β︸ ︷︷ ︸
linear sharing rule
− (1
2
e21 +
1
2
e22)︸ ︷︷ ︸
effort cost
− (1
2
rα41σ
6
1 +
1
2
rα42σ
6
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk premium
. (A.21)
The optimal choices for the linear sharing rule are given by:
αp1 = e
1
2
1 σ
−1
1
αp2 = e
1
2
2 σ
−1
2
βp = −1
2
e21 −
1
2
e22 + (
1
2
rα41σ
6
1 +
1
2
rα42σ
6
2).
(A.22)
On this basis I can solve the principals optimization problem:
max
e1,e2
e1 + e2 − α1e1 − α2e2 − β. (A.23)
The first order conditions implicitly define ei:
1− 1
2
e
− 1
2
1 σ
−1
1 + e1 − re1σ21 = 0.
The implicit function theorem provides the basic insight, that the optimal effort in each
task is now decreasing in the variance:
∂ei(σi)
∂σ
= −
1
2
e
− 1
2
i σ
−2
i − 2reiσ2i
1
4
e
− 3
2
i σ
−1
i + 1− rσ − i2
< 0. (A.24)
In order for this to happen, the linear sharing rule has to compensate for the focusing
weight. This implies a higher correction factor for dimensions with a higher variation
in outcomes. In order to balance the focusing weights, the principal needs to increase
the slopes of flatter linear sharing rules, while she decreases the slope of steeper ones.
This could be achieved through introducing additional noise terms. In expectations this
results in a higher perceived similarity between the different tasks.
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On the Dynamics of Prospect Theory
B.1 Prospect Parameter and External Validity of Results
The design of our investment game over four rounds is borrowed from Imas (2016).
Hence, we can use our data to replicate his analysis. Since our investment game also
entails both the paper and the realization group we can estimate the treatment effect.
The replication has to goals. First, we want to discuss potential differences in our experi-
ments, as we find significant differences to Imas (2016). Second, we want to discuss how
robust Imas’ findings are without the inclusion of covariables.
Imas uses in his analysis a t-test to compare the difference in investments of round four
and round three between the treatment and the control group. If a subject invests more in
round four than in round three the difference becomes positive. Therefore, positive signs
indicate increased risk taking, while negative signs indicate a reduction in risk taking.
Since his model only makes predictions for decision maker in the loss domain, Imas
conducts the analysis for subjects who were in the loss domain after the third round1.
In Table B.1.1 we report the effect of realization treatment and control. The first col-
umn we included the estimation from Imas (2016), in the second column we report our
estimation of his data. The third column reports the result of the same t-test for our data.
1 We reverse engineered the analysis, since Imas does not explicitly describe his approach. However, we
cannot replicate which subject he excluded, therefore our estimations differ slightly from the original
report.
102
ON THE DYNAMICS OF PROSPECT THEORY
Imas (2016) Replication Our Data
Paper Treatment +0.23*** 0.28*** 0.16
Realization Treatment −0.15*** −0.15*** 0.01
Total Effect −0.38*** −0.42*** −0.18
N (Paper/Realized) 53(?/?) 54(28/26) 41(13/30)
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level;
Table B.1.1: Comparing Realization Effects
In the fourth row we display the number of observations and distinguish between
subjects in the paper and the realization group. The first number in brackets denotes the
observations in the paper group, the second the observations in the realization group.
Although our control group, i.e. the paper treatment, has only 13 observations, the
effect has a p-value of 0.13 and therefore barely misses the 10% significance level. With
respect to the results of Imas (2016) our effect has the same sign and when put into
relation to the the amount of endowment (USD 2 vs. EUR 1.60) the same magnitude
as well. Therefore the effect of paper losses is robust among the experiments. Subjects
invest more in round four than in round three if they only experienced losses so far and
However, when we compare the results of the realization treatment, we find huge dif-
ferences between Imas (2016) and our experiment. Imas has a strong negative effect,
that is significant at the 1% significance level, whereas we have a null effect. It is impor-
tant to note that our result is not driven by lack of statistical power, as our realization
treatment has more observations than Imas. Our results strongly suggest that there is no
effect at all.
Our experiment differed to Imas (2016) in two dimensions. First, our subjects were
asked beforehand to make a complete contingent plan. The plan forced them to antici-
pate how they would feel when they experience losses. Perhaps this anticipation on its
own made them aware on how to close the mental frame, thereby reducing the effect of
realization. Although this explanation is appealing, it cannot account for the fact that we
still find a strong effect of the paper treatment. Additionally, it is far fetched to assume
that the plan is able to influence the mental frame of decisions made one week later.
103
ON THE DYNAMICS OF PROSPECT THEORY
Second, our subjects had to do the Prospect Theory elicitation task, before they could
actually choose their investments. The elicitation task could have interfered with the
investment decisions as both entailed decisions in the loss domain. However, one would
expect that all investment decisions becomes noisier and not only the realization treat-
ment.
Thus, it remains unclear as to why the results of Imas (2016) and our experiment differ
significantly in the realization treatment.
In order to discuss how robust the results of Imas (2016) are without the inclusion of
covariables, we can take a look if his predictions are backed by his own data. Although it
is not explicitly stated, in all rounds of the investment game previous to the fourth round
decision makers are in the paper loss control group. Since their losses are not realized
subjects who experience losses according to Imas’ theory are supposed to increase their
invested shares.
We test this hypothesis for each round separately in columns (1) and (3). In columns
(2) and (4) we condition the results in the subject being in the treatment group. Being
in the treatment group should not influence investment decisions in previous rounds,
because Imas hypothesized that only the act of taking away money closes the mental
account. Table B.1.2 presents our results.
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Table B.1.2: Effect of losses on risk taking in previous
rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆3,2 ∆3,2|real ∆2,1 ∆2,1|real
Loss -0.134 -0.0666 0.0111 -0.0666
(0.0878) (0.111) (0.0949) (0.129)
Constant 0.0741 -0.0227 -0.0926 -0.0227
(0.0717) (0.0938) (0.0775) (0.109)
Observations 81 39 81 39
R2 0.029 0.010 0.000 0.007
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *
10% significance level;
Although conditioning on the realization treatment results in different effect signs in
round 2, all effects remain insignificant. Therefore, we know that randomization in
treatment and control group worked. However, while the effect of being in the losses
should lead to increased risk taking in the subsequent round, the effects in Imas’ data
set are insignificant at best. It is important to note, that almost all effects point in the
opposite direction. The effect in column (1) has a p-value of 0.13, barely missing the
10% significance. With an effect size of −0.134 it indicates that subjects reduced their
investment after a loss in the second round by USD 0.13.
The missing effects in the previous rounds are troubling for the theory of Imas. Al-
though his treatment effect is significant and goes in the predicted direction, theory also
has clear predictions for the previous investment rounds. That there are null results at
best, that point in the opposite direction casts serious doubt if the results for the treatment
effect could have a different cause than loss aversion and mental accounts. Therefore it is
inevitable for further research to also establish a link between investment decisions and
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Prospect Theory parameters of subjects. Only through this link it can be unambiguously
established that increasing risk seeking is driven by Prospect Theory behavior.
B.2 Quality of fit and consistency of Prospect Theory Parameters
In this section we first discuss the joint estimation of Prospect Theory parameters. Sec-
ond, we suggest a more fine tuned classification of quality of fit, as well as potential
remedies through complexity reductions. Third, we discuss the role of consistency be-
tween both weeks.
The regression equation for joint estimations for both weeks together is:
E =1G(w
+xα + (1− w+)yα) 1α − 1L(w−(−x)β + (1− w−)(−y)β)
1
β
−1M
(
w+xα
λw−
) 1
β
.
The results of the pooled regressions of both weeks jointly and both weeks separately
are summarized in Table B.2.1.
Coefficient Std.Error t.value p.value
w+ 0.3896 0.0343 11.36 1.43E − 28
α 1.5236 0.1548 9.84 4.54E − 22
w− 0.2412 0.0321 7.51 1.11E − 13
β 1.8359 0.1866 9.84 4.54E − 22
λ 1.5831 0.1441 10.98 7.06E − 27
Table B.2.1: Pooled estimation, both weeks jointly
In the pooled regression, we find under-weighting both for gains and losses as well as
loss aversion, as Prospect Theory suggests. However, we do not find the usual S-shape of
the value function, but an inverse S-shape, as our curvature parameters are bigger than
1, not smaller.
As in previous analysis our main focus lies on the individual estimations per subject, as
we aim at individually classifying our subjects. The results of the individual regressions
per subject are summarized in Table B.2.2 for both weeks jointly. The complete list of all
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participants’ individual estimations is deferred to Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix.
Minimum 25% Median 75% Maximum Average
w+ 0.00 0.21 0.41 0.53 0.85 0.39
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (1.67) (0.14)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.14] [1.00] [0.18]
α 0.47 1.00 1.48 2.39 17.81 2.54
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.27) (0.48) (1.34) (743.33) (15.76)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.26] [0.98] [0.15]
w− 0.00 0.03 0.23 0.42 0.55 0.24
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.04) (0.09) (0.12) (0.29) (0.09)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.72] [1.00] [0.30]
β 0.82 1.25 1.91 3.59 37.38 3.96
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.40) (0.64) (3.13) (717.38) (20.47)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.31] [0.98] [0.17]
λ 0.01 0.91 1.40 4.64 1.5E + 09 3.7E + 07
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.19) (0.48) (2.87) (1.7E + 11) (4.1E + 09)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.50] [1.00] [0.24]
Table B.2.2: Distribution of individual estimates, both weeks jointly
The trouble with these individual estimations is that they substantially lack power, as
only 20 observations are available per subject, but up to 10 parameters are to be esti-
mated. The natural approaches to this issue are reductions of the model-complexity (i.e.
dropping parameters), disregarding subjects (i.e. dropping observations), and combina-
tions of the two.
Complexity reductions of Prospect Theory are quite common, e.g. disregarding prob-
ability weighting (i.e. w+ = w− = 0.5), assuming a reflection property of probability
weights (i.e. w+ = w− as suggested in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) or w+ = 1−w− as
suggested in Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), disregarding curvature (i.e. α = β = 1),
assuming a reflection property of curvature(i.e. α = β), or even disregarding loss aver-
sion (i.e. λ = 1). However, which complexity reduction is appropriate, if any, depends
on the individual behavior. For a risk neutral Expected Utility Theory type on the one
hand, any complexity reduction is completely fine. As a matter of fact, all of them to-
gether would be fine. On the other hand, for each possible complexity reduction, there
are some subjects for whom they harm the quality of fit.
Dropping observations (e.g. by classifying them as “outliers”) is also a common ap-
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proach to restore model fit, but poses two major challenges. First, it reduces power for
subsequent analyses and second, it entails the risk of disregarding potentially relevant
heterogeneity in our subjects’ behaviors.
We pursue the following mixed approach. First, we group our subjects according to
their model fit such that we can selectively exclude the worst-fitting subjects from subse-
quent analyses. Second, we apply 2 “layers” of complexity reductions.
Grouping
When grouping our subjects, we assess the quality of fit based on p-values and standard
errors. Usual measures for quality of fit, such as R2 or Akaike’s An Information Criterion
(AIC) are not suitable in our case. First, our regressions are non-linear least squares, and
there is no consensus on how to define R2 for these. Second, the AIC is designed to com-
pare quality of fit of different models for one data-set, whereas we have to do the exact
opposite, i.e. comparing quality of fit of one model (the fully-fledged Prospect Theory
parameterization) for several data-sets (the various participants of our experiment).
The p-values are relevant here because fitting the Prospect Theory parameterization
with any zero coefficient is clearly defeating the model: a zero probability weight for
gains would imply rejection of 50:50 gambles with arbitrarily high gains and an ε loss;
a zero probability weight for losses or a zero loss aversion would imply acceptance of
50:50 gambles with arbitrarily high losses and an ε gain; zero curvature parameters
would imply a complete neglect of magnitudes, i.e. an ε payoff would be perceived as
just as good or bad as an arbitrarily high payoff. The standard errors, on the other hand,
are relevant because they are a measure of precision.
We are aware that setting such thresholds is somewhat arbitrary and driven by the data.
In order to impose at least some discipline on us, we tie the thresholds for the standard
errors to the maximum (sensible) range of the respective parameters, which we believe
to be the intervals [0, 1] for probability weights, [0, 2] for curvature parameters, and [0, 4]
for loss aversion. As thresholds for the standard errors, we impose 10%, 25%, 50%,
and 100% of the respective interval length. For the p-values, we start with “confidence-
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levels” of 5% and 10%, but then increase the thresholds to 25% and 50%. These latter
thresholds may seem extraordinary high, but as they apply to 10 parameters separately
they are mostly non-binding. To illustrate this fact, Table B.2.3 not only summarizes the
thresholds per group, but also the average p-values and standard errors of their respective
group members.
Table B.2.3: Definitions and basic characteristics of groups
Std. Error of
Group p-value w+, w− α, β λ #
Green ≤ 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.40
∅ 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.07 8
Yellow ≤ 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00
∅ 0.01 0.09 0.31 0.15 6
Blue ≤ 0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00
∅ 0.04 0.14 0.53 0.60 8
Purple ≤ 0.50 1.00 2.00 4.00
∅ 0.10 0.16 0.76 1.29 13
Red ≤ 1.00 ∞ ∞ ∞
∅ 0.49 6.38 2.3E + 03 3.2E + 12 29
For the definition in 2.5.1, we use category red as “bad fit” and treat those subjects
separately.
Complexity Reductions
When contemplating potential complexity reductions to improve the model fit, there are
a few decisions to be taken. First, complexity could either be reduced uniformly by
applying the same reduction to all subjects, or heterogeneously by applying different
reductions to different subjects. The former approach has the advantage of maintaining
comparability between the subjects at the cost of not suiting everyone’s behaviors as good
as possible, whereas the reverse holds true for the latter. Second, one model could be
applied to both weeks, or they could have different models. Again, the benefit of the
former is comparability, whereas the latter could be better tailored to individual behav-
iors. Third, and probably most importantly, a decision has to be made which parameter
is to be dropped. An obvious choice seems to be the worst-fitting parameter, but it is
not necessarily clear which one it is and, due to the simultaneous determination of all
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parameters in the regression, it is not even clear whether this would actually be the best
choice.
Minimum 25% Median 75% Maximum Average
w+ 0.00 0.44 0.54 0.70 0.96 0.57
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15) (0.07)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [1.00] [0.02]
α 0.14 0.55 0.87 1.09 15.94 1.07
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.11) (0.15) (0.24) (201.45) (3.32)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.94] [0.04]
β 0.31 0.88 0.99 1.07 2.06 0.95
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.09) (0.12) (0.17) (0.32) (0.14)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
λ 0.69 0.92 1.17 1.68 1.6E + 09 2.5E + 07
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.14) (0.20) (0.35) (4.1E + 11) (6.5E + 09)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [1.00] [0.02]
Table B.2.4: Distribution of individual estimates of complexity reduction 1, both weeks
jointly
We chose to maintain as much comparability as possible and, hence, apply uniform
complexity reductions to all subjects and to both weeks. Table B.2.2 and Table 2.5.2
reveal that the w− estimates have the highest average p-values and that their point-
estimates are closest to zero. Hence, our first complexity reduction drops the parameter
w−. Trial and error suggests that this is in fact the best choice in terms of quality of fit,
both for all subjects and for the subjects in the red group. Table B.2.4 and B.2.5 sum-
marize the results of this first complexity reduction for both weeks jointly and for both
weeks separately, respectively. The complete list of all participants’ individual estimations
is deferred to Tables A.3 and A.4 in the appendix.
Clearly, subjects can be grouped again using the same thresholds as for the original
regressions. A big advantage of this first complexity reduction is that it does not harm any
subject’s quality of fit so much that they would drop to a lower group, but improves the
quality of fit for 42 subjects, many of whom improve by multiple steps. In particular, 20
out of 29 originally red subjects enter some non-red group. Table B.2.6 summarizes the
average p-values and standard errors of the various groups for the complexity reduction
1 regressions.
To allow for probability weighting for gains but not for losses feels unnatural. This is
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Minimum 25% Median 75% Maximum Average
w+1 0.00 0.41 0.61 0.75 1.00 0.57
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.08) (0.13) (0.20) (0.47) (0.15)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [1.00] [0.06]
α1 0.11 0.56 0.82 1.10 25.71 1.29
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.22) (0.34) (0.49) (2.2E + 04) (342.62)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.16] [1.00] [0.14]
β1 0.40 0.86 1.00 1.32 3.54 1.09
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.16) (0.24) (0.38) (1.45) (0.30)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.21] [0.02]
λ1 0.37 0.86 1.18 1.80 1.2E + 11 1.9E + 09
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.22) (0.32) (0.56) (2.4E + 15) (3.8E + 13)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.05] [1.00] [0.08]
w+2 0.01 0.46 0.53 0.64 0.98 0.56
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (194.99) (3.12)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [1.00] [0.03]
α2 0.00 0.67 0.90 1.01 4.75 0.88
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.11) (0.16) (0.26) (7.88) (0.32)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [1.00] [0.06]
β2 0.26 0.83 0.95 1.04 1.70 0.92
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.09) (0.13) (0.18) (0.35) (0.14)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.00]
λ2 0.30 0.96 1.16 1.64 654.64 11.74
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.15) (0.24) (0.54) (6.3E + 03) (102.40)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [1.00] [0.05]
Table B.2.5: Distribution of individual estimates of complexity reduction 1, both weeks
separately
not meant to be taken literally as if people would actually weight their gain probabilities,
but not their loss probabilities, but has to be interpreted rather as an artifact of the lack of
power and the non-linear least squares regression, which is well known to have a range
of coefficients that all fit almost equally well. We impose this complexity reduction not
to “repair” our subjects’ behaviors, but to “repair” our regression.
Still, we feel inclined to provide the “full” reduction without any probability weighting
as well, which is our complexity reduction 2. However, this reduction harms the quality
of fit for several subjects, both compared to the original regression as well as compared
to the complexity reduction 1. Table B.2.7 and B.2.8 summarize the results of this second
complexity reduction for both weeks jointly and for both weeks separately, respectively.
The complete list of all participants’ individual estimations is deferred to Tables A.3 and
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Std. Error of
Group p-value w+, w− α, β λ #
Green ≤ 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.40
∅ 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.09 13
Yellow ≤ 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00
∅ 0.01 0.09 0.20 0.28 24
Blue ≤ 0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00
∅ 0.04 0.14 0.33 0.61 12
Purple ≤ 0.50 1.00 2.00 4.00
∅ 0.08 0.15 0.37 0.59 6
Red ≤ 1.00 ∞ ∞ ∞
∅ 0.27 11.03 609.14 1.3E + 14 9
Table B.2.6: Definitions and basic characteristics of groups for complexity reduction 1
Minimum 25% Median 75% Maximum Average
α 0.57 0.82 0.93 1.09 3.66 1.02
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.08) (0.13) (0.19) (1.55) (0.17)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00]
β 0.30 0.93 0.99 1.10 2.02 1.02
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.09) (0.13) (0.20) (0.36) (0.15)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
λ 0.62 0.93 1.12 1.81 1.8E + 03 30.05
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.14) (0.25) (0.45) (5.8E + 03) (90.88)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.76] [0.04]
Table B.2.7: Distribution of individual estimates of complexity reduction 2, both weeks
jointly
A.5 in the appendix.
Again, subjects can be grouped as above. This second complexity reduction improves
the quality of fit for 22 subjects, but harms it for 11 subjects, relative to complexity
reduction 1 by terms of group membership. Still, it improves the quality of fit for 46
subjects and harms it for 1 subject, relative to the original non-reduced regressions by
terms of group membership. Table B.2.9 summarizes the average p-values and standard
errors of the various groups for the complexity reduction 2 regressions.
From the categorization it becomes clear that the complexity reduction increase the
overall quality of fit dramatically. For complexity reduction 2 only the behavior of 8
subjects is badly described by Prospect Theory in comparison to the 29 of our baseline
analysis.
112
ON THE DYNAMICS OF PROSPECT THEORY
Minimum 25% Median 75% Maximum Average
α1 0.48 0.78 0.99 1.20 2.79 1.04
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.15) (0.24) (0.38) (1.64) (0.29)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.14] [0.02]
β1 0.42 0.93 1.04 1.37 3.03 1.17
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.17) (0.28) (0.46) (1.18) (0.33)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.12] [0.02]
λ1 0.40 0.83 1.13 2.06 71.99 2.69
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.22) (0.40) (0.84) (377.74) (6.92)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.14] [0.85] [0.10]
α2 0.51 0.82 0.95 1.08 6.94 1.16
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.09) (0.15) (0.20) (4.81) (0.31)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.17] [0.01]
β2 0.25 0.88 0.96 1.04 1.86 0.96
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.10) (0.14) (0.19) (0.42) (0.16)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.00]
λ2 0.60 0.96 1.13 1.90 1.5E + 06 2.4E + 04
(Std.Error) (0.00) (0.15) (0.29) (0.83) (1.5E + 07) (2.4E + 05)
[p.value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.92] [0.08]
Table B.2.8: Distribution of individual estimates of complexity reduction 2, both weeks
separately
Std. Error of
Group p-value w+, w− α, β λ #
Green ≤ 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.40
∅ 0.00 − 0.09 0.15 16
Yellow ≤ 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00
∅ 0.02 − 0.21 0.43 24
Blue ≤ 0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00
∅ 0.04 − 0.32 25.73 12
Purple ≤ 0.50 1.00 2.00 4.00
∅ 0.05 − 0.32 0.97 4
Red ≤ 1.00 ∞ ∞ ∞
∅ 0.14 − 0.60 8.5E + 05 8
Table B.2.9: Definitions and basic characteristics of groups for complexity reduction 2
Consistency of Prospect Theory Behaviors
Based on the above estimations, we individually classify our subjects as stable or unsta-
ble Prospect Theory types according to the inter-temporal consistency of their Prospect
Theory parameters. For this purpose, we need to statistically test for (in-)equality of the
week 1 and week 2 parameters of each participant.
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Usual parametric tests such as the Wald Test are not suitable in our case, because they
do not allow for comparability between subjects or, put differently, they would not treat
different subjects equally “fair”. The trouble with those two-sided tests for coefficient
(in-)equality is that they are designed to answer the question whether there is a statis-
tically significant difference between the coefficients, but completely neglect how big a
difference there is. When investigating a single regression, this is not an issue, but a
feature, because strictness respectively lenience of the test can be calibrated by choice of
the confidence level. In our case, however, applying the same test (i.e. the same con-
fidence level) to all subjects would result in rejecting consistency for the subjects with
the most precise estimates because of miniscule differences in their point estimates, but
not rejecting consistency for subjects with completely different point estimates, as long
as they are noisy enough.
Clearly, we want to find a notion of consistency that reflects stability of behaviors. In
particular, we would not regard a subject with a very precise parameter difference of ε
as inconsistent, as very small parameter differences do not translate into any behavioral
differences. Also, we would not regard a subject as consistent if there was too much noise
in their estimates, because a lot of noise essentially means that a subject does not behave
consistently even within one week.
Hence, we “design” our own test for consistency by asking how much probability
weight of any week’s estimate falls within a fixed band around the joint estimate for
both weeks together. In order to do this, we impose the assumption that our estimated
coefficients are normally distributed around their point estimates with their standard er-
rors as standard deviations. Now, we can fix one band for each of the five Prospect Theory
parameters for all subjects and a “significance level” of how much probability weight of
the estimates has to fall within this interval.
We set our band as +/- 1.96 times the standard error of the pooled estimation of both
weeks jointly, i.e. a 95% confidence interval of the pooled estimation for both weeks
jointly, in order to account for different levels of noise for different parameters, but set
the mid-point of this interval to the individual subject’s own joint estimate (because we
do not demand that subjects are consistent with the average behavior of all subjects, but
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with their own individual behavior). If there is an estimate of one parameter in one week
with less than 5% probability weight within that interval around the joint estimation,
we reject the null hypothesis of consistency. So if we reject consistency, than there is a
parameter with at least 95% chance of both weeks’ estimates to be at least 1.96 times
the standard error of the pooled estimation apart from each other, which is behaviorally
meaningful for all parameters.
For the fully fledged 5-parameter model, we classify 35 subjects as in-consistent, 24 of
whom belong to the red group. They exhibit 1 to 8 violations of the above defined consis-
tency criteria with an average of 3.3 violations. Table B.2.10 summarizes the consistency
classification and average number of deviations per group of the original 5-parameter
model.
Total Consistent ∅ #
Group # # Violations*
Green 8 6 1.5
Yellow 6 4 3.0
Blue 8 3 1.6
Purple 13 11 1.5
Red 29 5 4.0
Table B.2.10: Summary of consistency classification of the original specification, *) con-
ditional on being inconsistent, maximum number 10
For complexity reduction 1, we classify only 17 subjects as inconsistent, 5 of whom
belong to the (complexity reduction 1) red group. They exhibit 1 to 4 violations of
the consistency criteria with an average of 1.9 violations. Table B.2.11 summarizes the
consistency classification and average number of deviations per group of complexity re-
duction 1.
Total Consistent ∅ #
Group # # Violations*
Green 13 10 2.3
Yellow 24 18 1.3
Blue 12 12 -
Purple 6 3 1.7
Red 9 4 2.6
Table B.2.11: Summary of consistency classification of complexity reduction 1, *) condi-
tional on being inconsistent, maximum number 8
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For complexity reduction 2, we classify 32 subjects as inconsistent, 8 of whom belong
to the (complexity reduction 2) red group. They exhibit 1 to 4 violations of the consis-
tency criteria with an average of 1.9 violations. Table B.2.12 summarizes the consistency
classification and average number of deviations per group of complexity reduction 2.
Total Consistent ∅ #
Group # # Violations*
Green 16 13 2.0
Yellow 24 15 1.3
Blue 12 3 1.2
Purple 4 1 2.0
Red 8 0 3.1
Table B.2.12: Summary of consistency classification of complexity reduction 2, *) condi-
tional on being inconsistent, maximum number 6
Consistency is our null hypothesis, we set a wide tolerance band of +/- 1.96 standard
errors of the pooled estimation, and we reject the hypothesis only if at least 95% of the
probability weight of one estimate falls outside the tolerance band. Put differently, we
are fairly generous in classifying subjects as consistent. Still, also in the most consistent
specification (complexity reduction 1) more than a quarter of our subjects is classified as
inconsistent. Hence, we feel safe to say that a considerable fraction of our subjects does
not exhibit consistent Prospect Theory behavior.
Changes in Sophistication with changing consistency of Prospect Theory Parameters
The ultimate goal of this paper is to investigate the quality of our subjects’ anticipations of
their own Prospect Theory behaviors. We do so by establishing two measures of naivete:
the quality of the complete contingent plan and the quality of the commitment decision.
However, since this assessment critically depends on the Prospect Theory parameter, we
discuss the changes to our measures through the change of quality of fit and consistency.
We classify a commitment decision as poor if the utility of the original week 1 plan,
where all payoffs are reduced by the willingness to pay for the commitment (respectively
increased by the willingness to accept) and another EUR 1.00 tolerance, exceeds the
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utility of the actual play.2 As we only account for actually observed plan-deviations (i.e.
a maximum of 4 deviations) and allow for considerable trembling (EUR 1.00 tolerance),
a subject’s commitment decision is classified as poor only in case of extremely harmful
deviations.
For our original regression, we classify 26 subjects as poor planners and 19 subjects as
poor committers. There are only 3 subjects in the overlap of the two types of errors, which
is a result of our conservative calibration: To end up in this overlap, one has to make a
plan that yields negative utility in the first place and than play so poorly that it would
have been worthwhile to pay at least one additional euro for committing to that plan.
Put differently, poor planning makes it very unlikely to also commit poorly, as we only
observe the commitment error of paying too little. Table B.2.13 summarizes the naivete
classification for our original estimations as well as our two complexity reductions. Table
B.2.14 does the same for the samples that are restricted to the respective non-red groups.
As we can see, the change of estimation method, i.e. switching from the baseline to
complexity reduction 1 and complexity reduction 2, changes the results in TableB.2.13
only slightly. Most notably, the number of subjects who made a good plan, but choose
poor commitments decreases form 16 to 12, 11 respectively. Through the complexity
reduction subjects in the full sample are more likely to be classified as good planner and
good committers.
It is important to notice, that the increase of subjects who both choose good plans and
commitments B.2.14 looks salient, but is actually driven by the inclusion of additional
subjects. Since complexity reductions 1 and 2 increase the number of subjects for which
Prospect Theory is a good fit, the increase of good committers is entirely driven by the
increase in number of subjects that are in the non-red category. Nonetheless the increase
of subjects with poor plans but good commitments is significant in comparison to Ta-
bleB.2.13. This increase implies that most subjects who switch from the red-category
make bad plans, but choose good commitments.
Our discussion of categorization, complexity reduction and consistency emphasizes
2 We include this EUR 1.00 tolerance to account for noise in order not to classify a subject as naive
because of a “mistake” of very little consequence.
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Commitment
poor good Sum
Plan
poor
3 23 26
4 /4 24 /25 28 /29
good
16 22 38
12 /11 24 /24 36 /35
Sum
19 45 64
16 /15 48 /49 64 /64
Table B.2.13: Classification of naivete, full sample; original regression, complexity reduc-
tion 1 / complexity reduction 2
Commitment
poor good Sum
Plan
poor
2 10 12
3 /3 20 /21 23 /24
good
7 16 23
10 /11 22 /21 32 /32
Sum
9 26 35
13 /14 42 /42 55 /56
Table B.2.14: Classification of naivete, non-red sample; original regression, complexity
reduction 1 / complexity reduction 2
two points. First, when it comes to inter temporal choice in Prospect Theory there is still
ground work to do with regard to how parameter can be estimated and what decision
criterion allows a researcher to assume a subject behaves consistent over time and ac-
cording to Prospect Theory. Second, the introduction of complexity reductions changes
the assessment of categorization, consistency and quality of plans. Since there is no stan-
dard in the literature so far, the possibility of different complexity reduction represents an
important degree of freedom for a researcher, that can change the results of an analysis.
B.3 Additional Cogntivie Relfection Test Results
The literature on CRT identified a series of testable predictions that help to assess the
quality of our measures. Frederick (2005) as well as Kahneman and Frederick (2002)
find that individuals with high CRT scores are on the one hand more patient than low
CRT individuals, and on the other hand are more willing to bear risk in favorable lotteries.
We can test the following three hypotheses:
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1. Participants with higher CRT scores plan to invest more.
2. Participants with higher CRT scores are less likely to pay too much for their com-
mitment.
3. Participants with higher CRT scores are less risk seeking in the loss domain.
Frederick (2005) states that participants with higher CRT scores are more willing to
participate in hypothetical lotteries with positive expected values. Since our investment
game has a positive expected value, participants with higher CRT scores should be more
willing to invest in the game. To test the first hypothesis, we look at the cumulated
investment in all plan contingencies. By using the plan instead of the game, we are able
to include all participants in our test.
119
ON THE DYNAMICS OF PROSPECT THEORY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Total Plan Total Plan Total Plan Total Plan Total Plan Total Plan
CRT Score 1.574 1.824* 1.866* 2.137** 2.309** 2.319**
(0.979) (1.016) (1.034) (1.051) (1.056) (1.073)
Age 0.116 0.112 0.119 0.0577 0.0568
(0.125) (0.127) (0.126) (0.135) (0.137)
Female 0.574 1.127 0.343 0.342
(1.952) (1.992) (2.082) (2.101)
λ2 -0.000840 -0.000903 -0.000909
(0.000667) (0.000666) (0.000677)
α2 0.357 0.370
(0.290) (0.342)
β2 -0.00868
(0.125)
Constant 20.19*** 16.84*** 16.60*** 15.88*** 16.46*** 16.47***
(2.091) (4.160) (4.269) (4.287) (4.294) (4.337)
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64
R2 0.040 0.054 0.055 0.080 0.103 0.103
We find that participants with higher CRT scores do plan to invest more over all, signif-
icantly so if we control for demographics, loss aversion, and curvature. This matches the
results from the literature and further confirms the validity of our Cognitive Reflection
Test.
The second hypothesis is based on two channels. First, a higher CRT score is a sign for
a higher level of self awareness, therefore we expect that participants with higher CRT
are better in anticipating their own loss aversion and risk-seeking in losses. Hence, they
will know whether they are likely to stick to their plans, in which case, they should not
pay for commitment, or whether they will know that unfavorable deviation from their
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plan is likely, thus making commitment more valuable.
Second, as we expect high CRT score participants to plan better, their plans are on
average more valuable (in terms of utility calculated with Prospect Theory parameters)
than others’ plans. Since we cropped the maximum commitment value at EUR 4.80, there
is less possibility for overpayment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Overpaid Overpaid Overpaid Overpaid Overpaid Overpaid
CRT Score -0.148 -0.325 -0.334 -0.329 -0.202 -0.148
(0.201) (0.207) (0.270) (0.282) (0.327) (0.341)
Value Comm. 1.001*** 0.973*** 1.084*** 1.045*** 1.050*** 0.988***
(0.0759) (0.0739) (0.0776) (0.0838) (0.107) (0.124)
Age -0.0339 0.0147 0.0252
(0.0245) (0.0367) (0.0547)
Female -1.047*** -0.725 -0.827
(0.392) (0.482) (0.612)
Mathgrade -0.0616 -0.136 0.00879
(0.217) (0.306) (0.400)
Constant 0.191 1.992* 0.628 0.859 0.386 0.0207
(0.429) (1.022) (0.600) (1.376) (0.750) (1.852)
Observations 64 64 35 35 26 26
R2 0.741 0.780 0.861 0.872 0.806 0.828
We test if CRT scores lead to less overpayment. While there seems to be a slight
tendency, we cannot confirm significant results for either all participants (Columns 1-2),
those with a good fit with Prospect Theory (Columns 3-4), or those who end up in the
loss domain later in the game (Columns 5-6).
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The third hypothesis checks whether participants with high CRT scores behave differ-
ently in the loss domain. Frederick (2005) finds that high CRT score participants are less
likely to gamble in loss lotteries. Hence we expect to find that, in both planning stage
and game, high CRT participants should gamble less after losing in previous rounds and
being in the loss domain. Such participants are therefore less likely to gamble for resur-
rection, which would make it easier for them to stick to their plans, making commitment
less valuable.
Plan Investments Game Investments
OLS Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4r Stage 4p Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
CRT Score 0.0816 0.133** 0.0484 0.0485 0.128** 0.0648 0.0689
(0.0614) (0.0621) (0.0826) (0.0723) (0.0584) (0.0731) (0.0837)
Constant 0.720*** 0.565*** 0.720*** 0.654*** 0.638*** 0.708*** 0.766***
(0.132) (0.133) (0.176) (0.154) (0.124) (0.155) (0.178)
Observations 63 64 64 64 56 46 43
R2 0.028 0.069 0.006 0.007 0.082 0.018 0.016
To test this hypothesis, we look at planning contingencies in which all previous rounds
had been losses and include only participants that are strictly in the loss domain. One
person did not invest anything in round one and was therefore not in the loss domain
in stage two. For the game investments, we only look at those who are strictly in the
loss domain. Participants who had won at least once ended up in the gain domain in our
experiment due to their investment amount and our return on investment in the winning
case, which explains why we get fewer observations with each round. If our high CRT
participants are less likely to gamble in the loss domain, we would expect them to invest
less than their low CRT counterparts.
We cannot confirm that high CRT scores lead to less risk seeking in the loss domain, if
anything, we find the opposite.
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B.4 Tables
Table A.1: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates, both weeks jointly with stan-
dard errors in (.) and p-values in [.]
w+ α w− β λ
1 0.00 9.18 0.08 3.41 4.9E + 06
(0.01) (17.59) (0.18) (3.41) (1.2E + 08)
[0.94] [0.61] [0.68] [0.33] [0.97]
2 0.53 0.68 0.21 2.47 1.38
(0.21) (0.46) (0.29) (2.42) (0.90)
[0.02] [0.16] [0.49] [0.32] [0.15]
3 0.30 1.55 0.26 1.66 1.92
(0.09) (0.44) (0.09) (0.47) (0.57)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
4 0.24 1.97 0.21 2.21 0.78
(0.15) (0.93) (0.14) (1.05) (0.32)
[0.12] [0.05] [0.16] [0.05] [0.03]
5 0.52 0.95 0.42 1.18 0.77
(0.13) (0.40) (0.14) (0.50) (0.20)
[0.00] [0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.00]
6 0.35 1.86 0.16 2.13 0.66
(0.09) (0.49) (0.07) (0.56) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00]
7 0.77 0.74 0.50 1.44 0.91
(0.08) (0.29) (0.12) (0.57) (0.21)
[0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00]
8 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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w+ α w− β λ
9 0.44 1.02 0.24 1.86 3.22
(0.07) (0.23) (0.08) (0.46) (0.96)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
10 0.58 0.81 0.55 0.82 1.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
11 0.81 0.50 0.03 2.97 9.79
(0.15) (0.47) (0.12) (3.13) (20.07)
[0.00] [0.30] [0.77] [0.36] [0.63]
12 0.44 1.20 0.55 0.85 1.71
(0.12) (0.43) (0.11) (0.30) (0.48)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
13 0.66 0.89 0.25 1.97 0.98
(0.13) (0.46) (0.17) (1.04) (0.40)
[0.00] [0.08] [0.16] [0.08] [0.03]
14 0.83 0.82 0.00 8.24 1.5E + 09
(0.15) (0.86) (0.00) (45.60) (1.7E + 11)
[0.00] [0.35] [0.99] [0.86] [0.99]
15 0.20 2.39 0.02 5.45 0.41
(0.18) (1.47) (0.04) (3.50) (0.42)
[0.28] [0.12] [0.70] [0.14] [0.34]
16 0.62 1.50 0.13 1.80 2.50
(0.12) (0.65) (0.10) (0.77) (1.12)
[0.00] [0.04] [0.24] [0.03] [0.04]
17 0.16 2.11 0.00 11.87 0.05
(0.23) (1.80) (0.00) (15.68) (0.25)
[0.48] [0.26] [0.93] [0.46] [0.84]
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w+ α w− β λ
18 0.00 17.23 0.00 12.99 1.2E + 03
(0.00) (98.17) (0.00) (74.00) (5.1E + 04)
[0.99] [0.86] [0.99] [0.86] [0.98]
19 0.00 8.48 0.00 24.92 0.01
(0.03) (33.25) (0.00) (98.35) (0.12)
[0.97] [0.80] [0.99] [0.80] [0.96]
20 0.56 0.85 0.37 1.15 0.88
(0.06) (0.16) (0.07) (0.22) (0.10)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
21 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
22 0.01 17.81 0.00 17.19 3.0E + 03
(1.67) (743.33) (0.00) (717.38) (9.9E + 05)
[1.00] [0.98] [1.00] [0.98] [1.00]
23 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.99
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
24 0.55 1.19 0.38 1.31 1.05
(0.11) (0.44) (0.12) (0.48) (0.22)
[0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00]
25 0.62 1.50 0.01 3.59 11.29
(0.20) (1.13) (0.04) (2.73) (20.63)
[0.01] [0.20] [0.76] [0.21] [0.59]
26 0.21 1.47 0.10 3.40 3.93
(0.11) (0.55) (0.11) (1.72) (2.87)
[0.08] [0.02] [0.37] [0.07] [0.19]
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w+ α w− β λ
27 0.01 6.01 0.02 5.41 0.29
(0.07) (8.26) (0.09) (7.44) (0.57)
[0.86] [0.48] [0.85] [0.48] [0.62]
28 0.52 0.95 0.18 2.65 0.44
(0.08) (0.24) (0.08) (0.74) (0.17)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.02]
29 0.43 1.04 0.37 1.45 0.71
(0.10) (0.31) (0.10) (0.44) (0.16)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
30 0.44 0.96 0.51 0.97 0.85
(0.07) (0.19) (0.06) (0.19) (0.09)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
31 0.37 1.87 0.30 1.36 3.30
(0.16) (0.87) (0.15) (0.63) (2.09)
[0.03] [0.05] [0.07] [0.05] [0.14]
32 0.36 1.74 0.32 2.26 2.07
(0.09) (0.49) (0.10) (0.65) (0.66)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
33 0.44 1.00 0.50 1.02 0.87
(0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.13) (0.06)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
34 0.64 0.73 0.31 1.42 1.06
(0.10) (0.27) (0.12) (0.53) (0.25)
[0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.00]
35 0.49 0.84 0.33 1.89 1.64
(0.09) (0.23) (0.11) (0.61) (0.40)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
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w+ α w− β λ
36 0.21 2.02 0.29 1.93 1.29
(0.08) (0.51) (0.08) (0.48) (0.29)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
37 0.43 1.20 0.49 1.04 1.22
(0.08) (0.27) (0.07) (0.24) (0.17)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
38 0.38 1.25 0.45 1.25 1.10
(0.07) (0.25) (0.07) (0.25) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
39 0.14 1.56 0.34 1.85 0.79
(0.06) (0.40) (0.09) (0.49) (0.19)
[0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
40 0.17 3.27 0.01 8.20 1.4E + 03
(0.27) (3.20) (0.04) (10.08) (1.1E + 04)
[0.55] [0.32] [0.87] [0.43] [0.90]
41 0.60 1.24 0.05 1.23 11.46
(0.06) (0.26) (0.03) (0.26) (6.07)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.12] [0.00] [0.08]
42 0.13 2.88 0.03 4.57 1.08
(0.08) (1.01) (0.03) (1.63) (0.41)
[0.16] [0.01] [0.43] [0.01] [0.02]
43 0.85 1.05 0.19 1.38 2.07
(0.08) (0.51) (0.14) (0.66) (0.79)
[0.00] [0.06] [0.18] [0.06] [0.02]
44 0.01 6.54 0.02 5.72 1.01
(0.12) (15.97) (0.20) (13.97) (1.41)
[0.93] [0.69] [0.91] [0.69] [0.48]
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w+ α w− β λ
45 0.71 0.47 0.34 0.90 1.97
(0.10) (0.19) (0.13) (0.35) (0.55)
[0.00] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.00]
46 0.40 1.09 0.47 1.51 0.91
(0.06) (0.20) (0.06) (0.29) (0.12)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
47 0.02 7.44 0.01 6.83 2.13
(0.45) (38.75) (0.27) (35.57) (8.60)
[0.96] [0.85] [0.97] [0.85] [0.81]
48 0.08 4.80 0.00 9.32 4.86
(0.32) (8.11) (0.01) (15.83) (14.15)
[0.81] [0.56] [0.93] [0.56] [0.74]
49 0.72 0.88 0.05 2.33 12.59
(0.21) (0.82) (0.13) (2.24) (27.50)
[0.00] [0.30] [0.72] [0.31] [0.65]
50 0.46 0.86 0.52 0.93 1.43
(0.08) (0.22) (0.08) (0.24) (0.25)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
51 0.32 2.68 0.00 37.38 8.2E + 08
(0.55) (4.40) (0.00) (222.86) (9.2E + 10)
[0.57] [0.55] [1.00] [0.87] [0.99]
52 0.03 3.98 0.04 5.93 0.61
(0.09) (3.42) (0.11) (5.21) (0.59)
[0.72] [0.26] [0.72] [0.27] [0.32]
53 0.36 1.68 0.20 2.17 1.56
(0.11) (0.55) (0.10) (0.72) (0.48)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.01] [0.01]
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w+ α w− β λ
54 0.46 1.21 0.46 1.19 1.04
(0.12) (0.42) (0.12) (0.41) (0.21)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
55 0.40 2.51 0.03 2.17 15.25
(0.18) (1.34) (0.06) (1.16) (22.30)
[0.05] [0.08] [0.58] [0.08] [0.50]
56 0.40 1.55 0.24 1.90 5.66
(0.09) (0.42) (0.08) (0.51) (2.79)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.06]
57 0.37 1.68 0.15 1.42 1.62
(0.10) (0.51) (0.08) (0.43) (0.42)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.08] [0.00] [0.00]
58 0.30 1.60 0.36 1.57 0.88
(0.07) (0.34) (0.07) (0.34) (0.14)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
59 0.44 1.06 0.47 1.07 0.94
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
60 0.77 0.97 0.23 1.18 5.11
(0.07) (0.36) (0.11) (0.40) (2.87)
[0.00] [0.02] [0.04] [0.01] [0.10]
61 0.30 1.54 0.25 2.21 2.03
(0.12) (0.55) (0.12) (0.83) (0.84)
[0.02] [0.01] [0.06] [0.02] [0.03]
62 0.34 2.52 0.44 2.47 4.64
(0.22) (1.66) (0.22) (1.64) (5.28)
[0.14] [0.15] [0.07] [0.15] [0.39]
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w+ α w− β λ
63 0.02 6.46 0.02 5.27 59.61
(0.10) (8.20) (0.10) (6.68) (307.96)
[0.84] [0.44] [0.83] [0.44] [0.85]
64 0.45 1.53 0.18 2.14 2.88
(0.12) (0.55) (0.10) (0.78) (1.34)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.10] [0.01] [0.05]
Table A.2: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates, both weeks separately with
standard errors in (.) and p-values in [.]
w+1 α1 w
−
1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 w
−
2 β2 λ2
1 0.00 24.00 0.31 2.40 1.9E + 11 0.01 5.27 0.11 2.48 1.1E + 04
(0.00) (1.1E + 03) (0.78) (5.43) (1.9E + 14) (0.06) (7.69) (0.18) (1.99) (1.2E + 05)
[1.00] [0.98] [0.70] [0.67] [1.00] [0.88] [0.51] [0.54] [0.24] [0.92]
2 0.21 0.99 0.66 0.62 0.54 0.53 0.87 0.11 3.61 13.35
(0.25) (0.77) (0.21) (0.49) (0.30) (0.12) (0.35) (0.20) (3.27) (25.04)
[0.43] [0.23] [0.01] [0.23] [0.10] [0.00] [0.03] [0.60] [0.30] [0.61]
3 0.26 1.34 0.46 1.59 0.85 0.35 1.48 0.23 1.59 2.44
(0.17) (0.65) (0.17) (0.79) (0.21) (0.06) (0.29) (0.06) (0.31) (0.61)
[0.14] [0.07] [0.03] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
4 0.35 1.12 0.24 2.43 0.34 0.24 2.21 0.16 2.47 0.86
(0.36) (1.13) (0.35) (2.55) (0.44) (0.17) (1.19) (0.14) (1.33) (0.46)
[0.35] [0.35] [0.51] [0.36] [0.45] [0.18] [0.09] [0.29] [0.09] [0.09]
5 0.57 0.82 0.43 1.23 0.58 0.49 1.05 0.45 1.06 1.07
(0.41) (1.05) (0.46) (1.58) (0.49) (0.16) (0.53) (0.16) (0.53) (0.35)
[0.19] [0.45] [0.37] [0.45] [0.26] [0.01] [0.07] [0.02] [0.07] [0.01]
6 0.71 0.77 0.40 1.07 0.84 0.30 1.97 0.15 2.23 0.59
(0.11) (0.36) (0.16) (0.49) (0.14) (0.07) (0.44) (0.06) (0.50) (0.14)
[0.00] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00]
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w+1 α1 w
−
1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 w
−
2 β2 λ2
7 0.21 3.42 0.00 16.12 0.00 0.78 0.79 0.56 1.14 1.33
(0.63) (6.80) (0.01) (34.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.29) (0.10) (0.40) (0.31)
[0.74] [0.63] [0.95] [0.65] [0.95] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00]
8 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
9 0.48 1.08 0.30 1.70 2.87 0.43 0.95 0.25 1.69 3.18
(0.23) (0.72) (0.24) (1.15) (2.06) (0.08) (0.25) (0.09) (0.50) (1.14)
[0.06] [0.16] [0.24] [0.17] [0.19] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
10 0.50 0.99 0.49 1.01 0.99 0.59 0.79 0.56 0.81 1.03
(0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
11 0.79 0.29 0.20 1.92 1.97 0.81 0.73 0.03 2.68 19.22
(0.41) (0.65) (0.66) (4.04) (2.84) (0.19) (0.87) (0.12) (3.10) (55.80)
[0.08] [0.66] [0.76] [0.64] [0.50] [0.00] [0.42] [0.80] [0.41] [0.74]
12 0.46 1.10 0.53 0.91 2.27 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.99
(0.06) (0.18) (0.05) (0.15) (0.32) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
13 0.75 0.69 0.50 0.72 1.35 0.58 1.18 0.19 2.68 1.31
(0.12) (0.39) (0.19) (0.40) (0.27) (0.09) (0.37) (0.10) (0.91) (0.49)
[0.00] [0.11] [0.02] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.08] [0.01] [0.02]
14 0.57 0.92 0.00 4.33 1.0E + 04 0.86 1.38 0.00 2.35 3.5E + 03
(0.31) (0.93) (0.02) (13.04) (2.8E + 05) (0.15) (1.81) (0.03) (3.25) (3.8E + 04)
[0.10] [0.34] [0.96] [0.75] [0.97] [0.00] [0.46] [0.90] [0.49] [0.93]
15 0.32 2.49 0.06 3.81 2.17 0.25 1.77 0.01 6.91 0.05
(0.38) (2.66) (0.17) (4.08) (2.33) (0.12) (0.72) (0.01) (3.59) (0.09)
[0.41] [0.37] [0.74] [0.37] [0.37] [0.07] [0.03] [0.71] [0.08] [0.63]
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w+1 α1 w
−
1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 w
−
2 β2 λ2
16 0.60 1.03 0.36 1.52 0.65 0.64 1.64 0.09 1.71 5.85
(0.13) (0.45) (0.16) (0.66) (0.17) (0.06) (0.38) (0.05) (0.38) (2.33)
[0.00] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.03]
17 0.55 0.79 0.30 2.91 0.39 0.14 2.18 0.00 42.09 0.00
(0.48) (1.20) (0.63) (5.18) (0.80) (0.21) (1.88) (0.00) (169.16) (0.00)
[0.28] [0.53] [0.64] [0.59] [0.64] [0.52] [0.27] [0.99] [0.81] [0.99]
18 0.00 6.74 0.00 12.22 1.6E + 03 0.00 21.51 0.00 21.52 947.38
(0.01) (36.70) (0.05) (66.81) (6.4E + 04) (0.00) (131.15) (0.00) (131.24) (4.0E + 04)
[0.98] [0.86] [0.98] [0.86] [0.98] [0.99] [0.87] [0.99] [0.87] [0.98]
19 0.32 1.12 0.41 1.15 0.75 0.00 9.55 0.00 54.95 0.00
(0.27) (0.84) (0.27) (0.87) (0.29) (0.03) (53.36) (0.00) (311.22) (0.00)
[0.26] [0.21] [0.16] [0.22] [0.03] [0.98] [0.86] [1.00] [0.86] [0.99]
20 0.62 0.68 0.40 0.93 0.91 0.53 0.97 0.38 1.16 1.03
(0.12) (0.27) (0.14) (0.37) (0.12) (0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.19) (0.12)
[0.00] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
21 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.99 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
22 0.96 8.35 0.00 7.51 914.18 0.03 9.70 0.00 9.69 17.84
(0.91) (52.28) (0.14) (46.93) (3.9E + 04) (1.72) (157.00) (0.16) (156.89) (816.96)
[0.31] [0.88] [0.98] [0.88] [0.98] [0.99] [0.95] [0.99] [0.95] [0.98]
23 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.98 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
24 0.68 1.48 0.27 1.84 1.19 0.53 1.04 0.44 1.06 1.09
(0.31) (1.74) (0.40) (2.14) (0.62) (0.11) (0.36) (0.11) (0.36) (0.24)
[0.05] [0.42] [0.52] [0.41] [0.08] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00]
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w+1 α1 w
−
1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 w
−
2 β2 λ2
25 0.85 0.53 0.32 0.80 2.79 0.40 3.08 0.00 24.73 29.95
(0.17) (0.62) (0.38) (0.86) (3.02) (0.74) (6.74) (0.00) (62.92) (279.50)
[0.00] [0.41] [0.42] [0.37] [0.38] [0.60] [0.66] [0.99] [0.70] [0.92]
26 0.45 1.19 0.35 1.92 2.71 0.22 1.19 0.09 3.45 3.24
(0.24) (0.84) (0.26) (1.41) (2.03) (0.09) (0.36) (0.10) (1.69) (2.07)
[0.09] [0.18] [0.21] [0.20] [0.21] [0.03] [0.01] [0.39] [0.07] [0.15]
27 0.56 1.16 0.36 1.72 0.47 0.00 12.00 0.00 10.42 0.09
(0.24) (0.86) (0.26) (1.27) (0.31) (0.00) (43.12) (0.01) (37.44) (0.79)
[0.04] [0.21] [0.20] [0.21] [0.16] [0.98] [0.79] [0.97] [0.79] [0.91]
28 0.53 0.98 0.39 1.65 0.65 0.54 0.89 0.09 3.64 0.23
(0.18) (0.55) (0.20) (0.94) (0.23) (0.08) (0.23) (0.07) (1.30) (0.18)
[0.02] [0.11] [0.08] [0.11] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.24] [0.02] [0.23]
29 0.39 1.07 0.50 1.16 0.60 0.42 1.09 0.36 1.37 0.97
(0.25) (0.76) (0.24) (0.82) (0.26) (0.09) (0.31) (0.10) (0.39) (0.23)
[0.15] [0.19] [0.06] [0.19] [0.05] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
30 0.35 0.76 0.58 0.76 0.60 0.44 1.14 0.47 1.13 0.97
(0.07) (0.15) (0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) (0.06)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
31 0.66 0.48 0.46 0.84 1.36 0.35 2.40 0.18 2.05 3.19
(0.16) (0.27) (0.20) (0.47) (0.29) (0.12) (0.84) (0.10) (0.71) (1.55)
[0.00] [0.11] [0.04] [0.11] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.09] [0.02] [0.07]
32 0.48 1.33 0.36 2.44 2.25 0.39 1.51 0.30 2.31 1.27
(0.18) (0.72) (0.21) (1.40) (1.14) (0.07) (0.33) (0.08) (0.54) (0.32)
[0.03] [0.09] [0.11] [0.11] [0.08] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
33 0.30 1.20 0.47 1.20 0.66 0.46 1.02 0.50 1.02 0.96
(0.11) (0.37) (0.11) (0.37) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) (0.08)
[0.02] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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w+1 α1 w
−
1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 w
−
2 β2 λ2
34 0.75 0.71 0.38 0.71 1.96 0.60 0.74 0.30 1.78 0.77
(0.04) (0.15) (0.07) (0.14) (0.27) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.17) (0.07)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
35 0.41 1.10 0.55 1.30 1.31 0.52 0.74 0.28 2.00 1.86
(0.25) (0.78) (0.24) (0.96) (0.46) (0.09) (0.22) (0.13) (0.80) (0.61)
[0.13] [0.19] [0.04] [0.21] [0.02] [0.00] [0.01] [0.05] [0.03] [0.01]
36 0.44 0.91 0.57 0.82 1.16 0.15 2.58 0.18 2.81 0.88
(0.15) (0.37) (0.13) (0.34) (0.17) (0.07) (0.75) (0.08) (0.82) (0.26)
[0.01] [0.04] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.07] [0.01] [0.05] [0.01] [0.01]
37 0.46 1.15 0.68 0.54 1.69 0.43 1.17 0.45 1.18 0.94
(0.13) (0.43) (0.10) (0.20) (0.39) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.17) (0.10)
[0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
38 0.30 1.11 0.56 1.02 0.78 0.40 1.34 0.39 1.42 1.15
(0.12) (0.38) (0.11) (0.35) (0.12) (0.05) (0.20) (0.05) (0.21) (0.14)
[0.03] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
39 0.35 0.76 0.68 0.84 0.72 0.12 1.73 0.30 1.92 1.01
(0.20) (0.44) (0.16) (0.51) (0.18) (0.06) (0.49) (0.09) (0.56) (0.33)
[0.12] [0.11] [0.00] [0.13] [0.00] [0.10] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
40 0.00 13.57 0.00 19.77 1.2E + 04 0.31 2.02 0.02 5.37 850.43
(0.13) (417.94) (0.21) (608.66) (3.3E + 06) (0.13) (0.85) (0.06) (4.21) (3.5E + 03)
[1.00] [0.97] [1.00] [0.97] [1.00] [0.04] [0.04] [0.74] [0.23] [0.81]
41 0.62 1.22 0.12 1.19 5.21 0.62 1.11 0.04 1.11 14.27
(0.13) (0.55) (0.11) (0.54) (3.92) (0.06) (0.24) (0.03) (0.25) (8.85)
[0.00] [0.05] [0.31] [0.05] [0.21] [0.00] [0.00] [0.18] [0.00] [0.14]
42 0.44 1.11 0.30 1.47 1.10 0.05 4.23 0.00 7.09 0.96
(0.18) (0.56) (0.18) (0.74) (0.25) (0.10) (2.91) (0.01) (4.93) (0.76)
[0.03] [0.07] [0.12] [0.07] [0.00] [0.61] [0.18] [0.80] [0.18] [0.23]
134
ON THE DYNAMICS OF PROSPECT THEORY
w+1 α1 w
−
1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 w
−
2 β2 λ2
43 0.84 0.96 0.32 0.84 2.31 0.84 1.21 0.17 1.56 2.35
(0.19) (1.15) (0.41) (0.99) (2.28) (0.10) (0.70) (0.15) (0.87) (1.26)
[0.00] [0.42] [0.45] [0.41] [0.33] [0.00] [0.11] [0.28] [0.10] [0.09]
44 0.50 0.79 0.29 2.51 0.28 0.00 17.17 0.00 15.48 0.63
(0.34) (0.81) (0.39) (2.79) (0.44) (0.01) (1.0E + 03) (0.01) (910.79) (17.82)
[0.17] [0.35] [0.47] [0.39] [0.53] [1.00] [0.99] [1.00] [0.99] [0.97]
45 0.66 0.50 0.25 2.05 2.09 0.75 0.42 0.32 0.77 2.04
(0.28) (0.53) (0.40) (2.42) (1.87) (0.08) (0.15) (0.11) (0.26) (0.51)
[0.04] [0.37] [0.54] [0.42] [0.29] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
46 0.12 2.74 0.29 2.55 1.37 0.43 0.94 0.48 1.42 0.85
(0.16) (1.72) (0.22) (1.62) (0.64) (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.28) (0.14)
[0.46] [0.14] [0.22] [0.15] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
47 0.35 1.37 0.28 2.82 0.36 0.01 10.01 0.00 11.30 0.17
(0.54) (2.09) (0.56) (4.49) (0.70) (0.95) (201.22) (0.05) (227.27) (6.25)
[0.53] [0.53] [0.63] [0.54] [0.61] [0.99] [0.96] [1.00] [0.96] [0.98]
48 0.13 4.09 0.00 10.15 0.20 0.19 2.89 0.05 3.66 10.11
(0.52) (8.41) (0.01) (21.15) (0.78) (0.15) (1.52) (0.07) (1.92) (13.33)
[0.81] [0.64] [0.95] [0.64] [0.80] [0.23] [0.09] [0.51] [0.09] [0.47]
49 0.44 0.69 0.05 2.14 10.64 0.71 1.83 0.00 4.47 80.25
(0.52) (1.03) (0.29) (4.26) (52.30) (0.35) (2.91) (0.04) (6.81) (520.53)
[0.42] [0.52] [0.87] [0.63] [0.84] [0.07] [0.54] [0.90] [0.53] [0.88]
50 0.45 1.13 0.55 0.83 2.55 0.49 0.71 0.49 1.06 0.95
(0.19) (0.60) (0.17) (0.44) (1.32) (0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.22) (0.13)
[0.04] [0.09] [0.01] [0.09] [0.08] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
51 0.40 1.20 0.15 2.85 3.13 0.53 1.67 0.00 6.94 229.53
(0.67) (2.29) (0.58) (6.05) (7.71) (0.43) (2.47) (0.07) (18.79) (2.6E + 03)
[0.57] [0.61] [0.81] [0.65] [0.69] [0.25] [0.51] [0.94] [0.72] [0.93]
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w+1 α1 w
−
1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 w
−
2 β2 λ2
52 0.46 0.80 0.53 0.89 0.94 0.00 8.81 0.00 11.36 3.19
(0.26) (0.59) (0.25) (0.66) (0.23) (0.02) (28.82) (0.05) (37.25) (15.71)
[0.10] [0.20] [0.06] [0.21] [0.00] [0.97] [0.77] [0.96] [0.77] [0.84]
53 0.51 0.78 0.29 1.53 0.94 0.29 2.40 0.15 2.70 2.82
(0.19) (0.45) (0.21) (0.90) (0.25) (0.13) (0.96) (0.10) (1.08) (1.61)
[0.03] [0.11] [0.19] [0.12] [0.00] [0.05] [0.03] [0.18] [0.03] [0.11]
54 0.43 2.51 0.22 3.07 1.29 0.48 0.90 0.50 0.93 0.87
(0.43) (3.09) (0.39) (3.77) (0.93) (0.08) (0.22) (0.08) (0.23) (0.13)
[0.35] [0.44] [0.59] [0.43] [0.20] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
55 0.12 3.56 0.01 2.91 17.44 0.45 2.64 0.02 2.49 19.29
(0.31) (4.47) (0.08) (3.66) (65.23) (0.19) (1.52) (0.04) (1.43) (32.93)
[0.70] [0.44] [0.86] [0.45] [0.79] [0.04] [0.11] [0.67] [0.11] [0.57]
56 0.50 1.29 0.42 1.44 3.34 0.41 1.45 0.23 1.79 5.51
(0.24) (0.92) (0.25) (1.02) (2.90) (0.10) (0.43) (0.09) (0.53) (3.06)
[0.06] [0.19] [0.12] [0.19] [0.28] [0.00] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.10]
57 0.58 0.88 0.20 0.99 1.54 0.33 1.94 0.13 1.64 1.49
(0.20) (0.58) (0.20) (0.65) (0.62) (0.10) (0.61) (0.08) (0.51) (0.42)
[0.02] [0.16] [0.36] [0.16] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.11] [0.01] [0.01]
58 0.69 0.56 0.67 0.57 1.02 0.23 1.90 0.31 1.84 0.80
(0.13) (0.28) (0.13) (0.29) (0.09) (0.07) (0.45) (0.08) (0.44) (0.18)
[0.00] [0.08] [0.00] [0.08] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
59 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.01 0.44 1.04 0.47 1.05 0.91
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
60 0.73 1.19 0.36 1.06 5.46 0.82 0.71 0.21 1.15 3.63
(0.23) (1.14) (0.31) (0.94) (8.45) (0.07) (0.28) (0.10) (0.41) (1.70)
[0.01] [0.32] [0.28] [0.29] [0.53] [0.00] [0.03] [0.07] [0.02] [0.06]
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w+1 α1 w
−
1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 w
−
2 β2 λ2
61 0.51 1.65 0.20 3.51 1.81 0.29 1.25 0.33 1.52 1.87
(0.10) (0.49) (0.10) (1.08) (0.45) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.12) (0.16)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.07] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
62 0.00 18.55 0.02 18.55 3.5E + 04 0.46 1.58 0.55 1.47 2.88
(113.42) (1.3E + 05) (599.90) (1.3E + 05) (2.6E + 09) (0.15) (0.72) (0.14) (0.68) (1.87)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [0.01] [0.05] [0.00] [0.06] [0.15]
63 0.00 11.45 0.00 15.68 210.27 0.11 3.47 0.07 3.09 8.40
(0.36) (242.76) (0.15) (332.59) (2.4E + 04) (0.09) (1.41) (0.07) (1.24) (8.06)
[0.99] [0.96] [0.99] [0.96] [0.99] [0.26] [0.03] [0.34] [0.03] [0.32]
64 0.74 0.83 0.32 1.19 2.40 0.39 1.62 0.19 2.21 2.70
(0.20) (0.74) (0.30) (1.01) (1.85) (0.13) (0.66) (0.12) (0.91) (1.56)
[0.00] [0.29] [0.32] [0.27] [0.22] [0.01] [0.03] [0.13] [0.03] [0.11]
Table A.3: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates for complexity reduction 1
and complexity reduction 2, both weeks jointly with standard errors in (.) and p-values
in [.]
Complexity Reduction 1 Complexity Reduction 2
w+ α β λ α β λ
1 0.00 15.94 0.88 1.6E + 09 0.83 0.87 10.43
(0.00) (201.45) (0.15) (4.1E + 11) (0.18) (0.19) (11.48)
[1.00] [0.94] [0.00] [1.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.38]
2 0.63 0.47 1.09 1.21 0.67 1.16 1.24
(0.15) (0.26) (0.28) (0.38) (0.15) (0.29) (0.45)
[0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
3 0.48 0.89 0.88 1.39 0.84 0.87 1.39
(0.06) (0.15) (0.11) (0.22) (0.08) (0.09) (0.21)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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Complexity Reduction 1 Complexity Reduction 2
w+ α β λ α β λ
4 0.47 0.94 1.03 0.82 0.89 0.99 0.85
(0.08) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
5 0.58 0.78 0.95 0.80 0.90 1.05 0.71
(0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
6 0.62 0.74 0.83 0.81 0.92 0.98 0.65
(0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
7 0.77 0.73 1.43 0.91 1.56 2.02 1.06
(0.05) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.25) (0.35) (0.48)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04]
8 0.51 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
9 0.57 0.66 0.90 1.93 0.78 0.93 2.06
(0.07) (0.14) (0.09) (0.31) (0.08) (0.09) (0.34)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
10 0.54 0.94 0.96 1.04 1.01 1.01 1.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
11 0.94 0.14 0.58 1.68 1.27 0.74 6.95
(0.07) (0.18) (0.14) (0.35) (0.42) (0.22) (5.97)
[0.00] [0.45] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.26]
12 0.40 1.38 0.99 1.88 1.15 0.88 1.83
(0.07) (0.24) (0.14) (0.43) (0.14) (0.10) (0.37)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
138
ON THE DYNAMICS OF PROSPECT THEORY
Complexity Reduction 1 Complexity Reduction 2
w+ α β λ α β λ
13 0.80 0.47 0.96 1.04 1.05 1.39 0.96
(0.06) (0.15) (0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (0.30) (0.40)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
14 0.96 0.17 0.31 2.73 3.66 0.30 1.8E + 03
(0.06) (0.24) (0.10) (0.91) (1.55) (0.11) (5.8E + 03)
[0.00] [0.47] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.76]
15 0.64 0.55 0.95 0.86 0.77 1.10 0.77
(0.09) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.13) (0.20) (0.21)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
16 0.83 0.52 0.61 1.35 1.07 0.99 1.06
(0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.23) (0.21) (0.32)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
17 0.62 0.46 1.01 0.80 0.61 1.11 0.73
(0.14) (0.21) (0.26) (0.25) (0.14) (0.27) (0.25)
[0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
18 0.12 1.59 1.00 1.61 0.62 0.83 1.44
(0.08) (0.47) (0.18) (0.77) (0.14) (0.18) (0.41)
[0.14] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
19 0.54 0.62 1.04 0.84 0.67 1.08 0.81
(0.13) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.14) (0.23) (0.25)
[0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
20 0.65 0.61 0.81 0.90 0.82 0.98 0.74
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
21 0.49 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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Complexity Reduction 1 Complexity Reduction 2
w+ α β λ α β λ
22 0.74 1.14 1.04 1.78 1.74 1.41 1.81
(0.10) (0.34) (0.25) (0.58) (0.41) (0.33) (0.90)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06]
23 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
24 0.64 0.86 0.94 1.03 1.11 1.12 0.89
(0.06) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
25 0.91 0.27 0.55 1.54 1.08 0.93 2.20
(0.05) (0.13) (0.12) (0.25) (0.31) (0.26) (1.20)
[0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.08]
26 0.39 0.81 1.07 1.64 0.62 1.03 1.57
(0.11) (0.25) (0.17) (0.43) (0.09) (0.16) (0.34)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
27 0.39 1.11 0.97 0.69 0.93 0.85 0.84
(0.10) (0.24) (0.20) (0.20) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
28 0.70 0.48 1.08 0.73 0.80 1.34 0.62
(0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (0.16)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
29 0.52 0.75 1.01 0.76 0.79 1.04 0.74
(0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
30 0.43 0.99 1.00 0.85 0.87 0.91 0.92
(0.04) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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Complexity Reduction 1 Complexity Reduction 2
w+ α β λ α β λ
31 0.54 1.09 0.78 1.92 1.16 0.81 1.93
(0.08) (0.21) (0.13) (0.39) (0.15) (0.10) (0.41)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
32 0.48 1.16 1.41 1.61 1.11 1.39 1.57
(0.05) (0.18) (0.14) (0.31) (0.09) (0.12) (0.27)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
33 0.43 1.01 1.03 0.87 0.90 0.95 0.94
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
34 0.74 0.47 0.84 1.05 0.85 1.11 0.93
(0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.19) (0.25)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
35 0.55 0.68 1.20 1.44 0.78 1.22 1.50
(0.07) (0.15) (0.13) (0.24) (0.08) (0.13) (0.26)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
36 0.37 1.19 1.09 1.12 0.93 0.95 1.20
(0.05) (0.15) (0.11) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
37 0.44 1.16 1.01 1.21 1.05 0.94 1.26
(0.04) (0.12) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.14)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
38 0.42 1.09 1.08 1.08 0.94 0.99 1.12
(0.04) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
39 0.23 1.09 1.21 0.81 0.57 1.06 0.92
(0.05) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.08) (0.15) (0.17)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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Complexity Reduction 1 Complexity Reduction 2
w+ α β λ α β λ
40 0.52 1.03 1.16 4.53 1.10 1.17 4.89
(0.14) (0.46) (0.22) (2.73) (0.19) (0.21) (2.17)
[0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.12] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04]
41 0.86 0.32 0.31 1.76 0.82 0.60 1.50
(0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.18) (0.13) (0.37)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
42 0.55 0.69 0.92 0.98 0.77 0.97 0.94
(0.08) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.11) (0.14) (0.19)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
43 0.93 0.43 0.57 1.37 1.29 1.25 0.92
(0.03) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.38) (0.36) (0.44)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05]
44 0.36 1.31 1.09 0.92 1.03 0.93 1.08
(0.11) (0.35) (0.26) (0.32) (0.19) (0.17) (0.27)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
45 0.76 0.36 0.59 1.60 0.80 0.71 1.94
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.21) (0.14) (0.12) (0.51)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
46 0.42 1.01 1.38 0.92 0.84 1.29 0.93
(0.04) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) (0.11)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
47 0.49 1.26 1.11 1.11 1.25 1.10 1.11
(0.13) (0.39) (0.30) (0.40) (0.27) (0.23) (0.36)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
48 0.66 0.65 0.93 1.25 0.93 1.08 1.28
(0.10) (0.21) (0.19) (0.30) (0.17) (0.20) (0.40)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
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Complexity Reduction 1 Complexity Reduction 2
w+ α β λ α β λ
49 0.88 0.29 0.53 1.95 1.31 0.66 6.92
(0.09) (0.22) (0.15) (0.51) (0.44) (0.20) (6.11)
[0.00] [0.20] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.27]
50 0.44 0.91 0.99 1.46 0.80 0.95 1.42
(0.06) (0.15) (0.10) (0.23) (0.07) (0.09) (0.20)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
51 0.76 0.53 0.96 2.52 1.21 1.08 5.75
(0.15) (0.41) (0.26) (1.31) (0.35) (0.31) (4.34)
[0.00] [0.22] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.20]
52 0.33 1.12 1.39 0.82 0.77 1.22 0.88
(0.10) (0.30) (0.26) (0.27) (0.12) (0.21) (0.25)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
53 0.59 0.79 0.94 1.22 0.96 1.04 1.21
(0.06) (0.14) (0.12) (0.20) (0.11) (0.12) (0.23)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
54 0.49 1.08 1.06 1.03 1.06 1.05 1.03
(0.06) (0.17) (0.14) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
55 0.79 0.53 0.44 1.68 0.96 0.70 1.40
(0.06) (0.12) (0.09) (0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.33)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
56 0.57 0.88 0.92 2.51 1.05 0.96 2.87
(0.07) (0.18) (0.10) (0.55) (0.11) (0.10) (0.61)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
57 0.65 0.65 0.54 1.13 0.84 0.68 0.87
(0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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Complexity Reduction 1 Complexity Reduction 2
w+ α β λ α β λ
58 0.42 1.11 1.07 0.90 0.96 0.97 0.98
(0.04) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
59 0.46 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.97
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
60 0.87 0.47 0.55 2.21 1.50 0.77 6.96
(0.04) (0.12) (0.08) (0.33) (0.36) (0.16) (4.73)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.16]
61 0.46 0.91 1.10 1.50 0.83 1.08 1.46
(0.08) (0.21) (0.15) (0.33) (0.10) (0.13) (0.29)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
62 0.40 2.12 2.06 3.64 1.70 1.87 2.71
(0.08) (0.46) (0.32) (1.82) (0.21) (0.24) (0.98)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
63 0.42 1.27 0.95 2.12 1.09 0.89 2.01
(0.09) (0.29) (0.16) (0.64) (0.16) (0.13) (0.52)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
64 0.66 0.71 0.89 1.60 1.05 1.03 1.81
(0.07) (0.16) (0.12) (0.29) (0.15) (0.14) (0.47)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Table A.4: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates for complexity reduction 1,
both weeks separately with standard errors in (.) and p-values in [.]
w+1 α1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 β2 λ2
1 0.00 25.71 1.39 1.2E + 11 0.01 4.75 0.74 654.64
(0.00) (2.2E + 04) (0.53) (2.4E + 15) (0.09) (7.88) (0.15) (6.3E + 03)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.02] [1.00] [0.88] [0.56] [0.00] [0.92]
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w+1 α1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 β2 λ2
2 0.07 1.65 1.04 0.37 0.60 0.67 1.06 3.21
(0.09) (0.61) (0.27) (0.30) (0.11) (0.27) (0.18) (1.32)
[0.41] [0.02] [0.00] [0.25] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.03]
3 0.30 1.20 1.41 0.86 0.53 0.79 0.76 1.56
(0.15) (0.49) (0.33) (0.31) (0.06) (0.14) (0.09) (0.27)
[0.07] [0.03] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
4 0.55 0.62 1.23 0.56 0.50 0.91 0.98 0.86
(0.20) (0.35) (0.40) (0.26) (0.09) (0.21) (0.19) (0.23)
[0.02] [0.10] [0.01] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
5 0.62 0.67 1.00 0.64 0.53 0.91 0.92 1.05
(0.16) (0.30) (0.32) (0.27) (0.09) (0.22) (0.18) (0.28)
[0.00] [0.05] [0.01] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
6 0.77 0.58 0.80 0.88 0.58 0.75 0.83 0.77
(0.08) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.06) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
7 0.79 0.49 1.61 0.56 0.75 0.94 1.37 1.38
(0.11) (0.27) (0.38) (0.21) (0.06) (0.21) (0.19) (0.40)
[0.00] [0.10] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
8 0.51 0.99 0.99 1.01 0.51 0.99 0.99 1.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
9 0.61 0.70 0.98 1.89 0.53 0.68 0.85 2.10
(0.17) (0.38) (0.21) (0.53) (0.08) (0.18) (0.11) (0.49)
[0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
10 0.51 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.55 0.93 0.96 1.05
(0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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w+1 α1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 β2 λ2
11 0.92 0.11 0.82 1.35 0.94 0.21 0.51 1.98
(0.28) (0.38) (0.38) (0.44) (0.08) (0.26) (0.16) (0.72)
[0.01] [0.78] [0.05] [0.01] [0.00] [0.44] [0.01] [0.02]
12 0.44 1.19 1.00 2.45 0.49 1.01 1.01 0.99
(0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.20) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
13 0.75 0.69 0.72 1.35 0.74 0.60 1.06 1.31
(0.07) (0.18) (0.13) (0.22) (0.06) (0.15) (0.13) (0.27)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
14 0.91 0.16 0.43 2.65 0.98 0.20 0.26 2.85
(0.26) (0.47) (0.18) (1.04) (0.04) (0.30) (0.13) (1.46)
[0.00] [0.74] [0.04] [0.03] [0.00] [0.52] [0.06] [0.08]
15 0.74 0.65 0.92 1.26 0.64 0.46 0.96 0.68
(0.17) (0.44) (0.34) (0.49) (0.11) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22)
[0.00] [0.16] [0.02] [0.03] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.01]
16 0.70 0.71 1.03 0.75 0.86 0.49 0.49 1.67
(0.12) (0.28) (0.29) (0.25) (0.04) (0.11) (0.09) (0.20)
[0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
17 0.67 0.53 1.70 0.58 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.30
(0.47) (0.92) (1.29) (0.67) (194.99) (0.24) (0.25) (176.86)
[0.18] [0.58] [0.21] [0.40] [1.00] [1.00] [0.02] [1.00]
18 0.15 1.42 1.32 2.03 0.17 1.26 0.93 1.25
(0.35) (1.72) (0.53) (1.89) (0.12) (0.48) (0.21) (0.67)
[0.67] [0.43] [0.03] [0.31] [0.16] [0.02] [0.00] [0.09]
19 0.40 0.89 0.90 0.79 0.48 0.77 1.06 1.17
(0.26) (0.55) (0.39) (0.45) (0.16) (0.36) (0.30) (0.54)
[0.15] [0.13] [0.04] [0.11] [0.01] [0.06] [0.00] [0.05]
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w+1 α1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 β2 λ2
20 0.68 0.53 0.71 0.92 0.61 0.72 0.84 1.01
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
21 0.49 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.49 1.01 1.01 0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
22 1.00 1.07 0.95 2.41 0.64 1.24 1.10 1.63
(0.16) (0.72) (0.43) (1.78) (0.13) (0.46) (0.33) (0.80)
[0.00] [0.16] [0.05] [0.20] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.07]
23 0.49 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
24 0.82 0.77 0.96 1.10 0.57 0.89 0.90 1.06
(0.08) (0.24) (0.21) (0.26) (0.06) (0.15) (0.12) (0.19)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
25 0.90 0.33 0.48 1.86 0.94 0.17 0.57 1.26
(0.11) (0.33) (0.22) (0.56) (0.05) (0.15) (0.16) (0.30)
[0.00] [0.34] [0.05] [0.01] [0.00] [0.27] [0.00] [0.00]
26 0.55 0.88 1.27 2.00 0.34 0.76 0.97 1.51
(0.24) (0.63) (0.36) (0.93) (0.11) (0.26) (0.16) (0.46)
[0.04] [0.19] [0.00] [0.05] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01]
27 0.66 0.81 1.18 0.59 0.34 1.07 0.90 0.66
(0.17) (0.40) (0.44) (0.32) (0.10) (0.26) (0.19) (0.21)
[0.00] [0.07] [0.02] [0.09] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
28 0.62 0.74 1.22 0.73 0.72 0.41 1.04 0.73
(0.14) (0.31) (0.32) (0.25) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16)
[0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
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w+1 α1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 β2 λ2
29 0.39 1.08 1.17 0.60 0.51 0.79 0.95 0.97
(0.12) (0.30) (0.24) (0.19) (0.06) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
30 0.27 0.96 0.97 0.53 0.47 1.05 1.03 0.97
(0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
31 0.68 0.43 0.74 1.31 0.61 0.99 0.83 1.55
(0.14) (0.22) (0.16) (0.22) (0.06) (0.17) (0.11) (0.28)
[0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
32 0.57 0.99 1.65 1.80 0.51 0.99 1.35 1.21
(0.13) (0.40) (0.29) (0.58) (0.05) (0.16) (0.13) (0.24)
[0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
33 0.33 1.10 1.10 0.68 0.46 1.02 1.01 0.96
(0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
34 0.81 0.52 0.51 1.63 0.69 0.51 1.02 0.91
(0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.13) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
35 0.37 1.25 1.51 1.36 0.56 0.63 1.09 1.61
(0.17) (0.55) (0.35) (0.51) (0.08) (0.17) (0.14) (0.36)
[0.05] [0.04] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
36 0.38 1.09 1.00 1.20 0.39 1.14 1.14 0.96
(0.13) (0.35) (0.19) (0.31) (0.06) (0.18) (0.14) (0.20)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
37 0.27 2.00 0.95 2.62 0.47 1.04 1.04 0.94
(0.06) (0.31) (0.10) (0.61) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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w+1 α1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 β2 λ2
38 0.24 1.31 1.22 0.75 0.48 1.02 1.05 1.10
(0.07) (0.23) (0.14) (0.15) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
39 0.19 1.26 1.49 0.61 0.22 1.12 1.12 0.96
(0.13) (0.49) (0.33) (0.25) (0.06) (0.21) (0.13) (0.24)
[0.17] [0.02] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
40 0.31 2.11 2.13 4.05 0.46 1.25 0.93 9.41
(0.30) (1.74) (0.91) (5.58) (0.17) (0.68) (0.18) (9.96)
[0.33] [0.25] [0.04] [0.48] [0.02] [0.09] [0.00] [0.36]
41 0.85 0.41 0.40 1.73 0.87 0.29 0.28 1.77
(0.10) (0.22) (0.16) (0.30) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.17)
[0.00] [0.09] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.00]
42 0.60 0.67 0.86 1.05 0.52 0.74 0.93 1.02
(0.20) (0.38) (0.30) (0.37) (0.11) (0.24) (0.20) (0.31)
[0.01] [0.10] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01]
43 0.90 0.59 0.52 1.67 0.93 0.46 0.59 1.42
(0.08) (0.23) (0.16) (0.32) (0.04) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22)
[0.00] [0.03] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
44 0.64 0.50 1.43 0.48 0.39 1.22 1.02 0.93
(0.26) (0.44) (0.63) (0.33) (0.12) (0.34) (0.25) (0.34)
[0.03] [0.28] [0.04] [0.17] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
45 0.77 0.31 1.02 1.47 0.80 0.30 0.47 1.59
(0.20) (0.31) (0.27) (0.36) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.18)
[0.00] [0.35] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
46 0.28 1.60 1.45 1.17 0.44 0.91 1.35 0.86
(0.08) (0.34) (0.19) (0.27) (0.04) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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w+1 α1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 β2 λ2
47 0.52 0.82 1.56 0.56 0.61 0.98 1.02 0.88
(0.32) (0.74) (0.83) (0.47) (0.12) (0.32) (0.29) (0.33)
[0.13] [0.29] [0.09] [0.25] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02]
48 0.77 0.50 1.03 0.88 0.55 0.91 0.86 2.09
(0.16) (0.36) (0.38) (0.36) (0.12) (0.33) (0.19) (0.90)
[0.00] [0.18] [0.02] [0.03] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.04]
49 0.75 0.23 0.50 1.68 0.94 0.29 0.55 1.94
(0.35) (0.37) (0.24) (0.44) (0.06) (0.26) (0.17) (0.74)
[0.05] [0.54] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00] [0.28] [0.01] [0.02]
50 0.41 1.25 0.95 2.87 0.49 0.70 1.03 0.95
(0.12) (0.39) (0.12) (0.85) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
51 0.64 0.56 1.04 1.54 0.71 0.85 0.91 6.03
(0.44) (0.85) (0.58) (0.93) (0.24) (0.91) (0.31) (9.01)
[0.17] [0.52] [0.09] [0.12] [0.01] [0.37] [0.01] [0.52]
52 0.44 0.86 0.97 0.94 0.24 1.48 1.52 1.14
(0.21) (0.45) (0.31) (0.37) (0.11) (0.50) (0.35) (0.64)
[0.06] [0.08] [0.01] [0.02] [0.06] [0.01] [0.00] [0.10]
53 0.66 0.46 0.86 0.96 0.57 0.96 0.98 1.54
(0.14) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.07) (0.21) (0.15) (0.39)
[0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
54 0.67 1.16 1.38 1.13 0.48 0.90 0.94 0.87
(0.10) (0.33) (0.27) (0.32) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
55 0.67 0.64 0.49 1.58 0.84 0.47 0.43 1.64
(0.17) (0.34) (0.19) (0.41) (0.06) (0.14) (0.12) (0.23)
[0.00] [0.08] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
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w+1 α1 β1 λ1 w
+
2 α2 β2 λ2
56 0.56 1.07 1.16 2.69 0.56 0.86 0.84 2.58
(0.19) (0.60) (0.27) (1.36) (0.08) (0.22) (0.11) (0.79)
[0.01] [0.10] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
57 0.78 0.39 0.43 1.19 0.63 0.71 0.59 1.07
(0.09) (0.15) (0.14) (0.23) (0.07) (0.14) (0.11) (0.17)
[0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
58 0.55 0.92 0.96 1.04 0.38 1.18 1.10 0.86
(0.09) (0.22) (0.16) (0.20) (0.05) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
59 0.50 0.99 0.99 1.01 0.46 0.97 0.98 0.91
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
60 0.80 0.82 0.72 3.21 0.91 0.33 0.49 1.82
(0.13) (0.51) (0.18) (1.75) (0.04) (0.11) (0.09) (0.27)
[0.00] [0.14] [0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
61 0.71 0.80 1.51 1.35 0.39 0.90 0.95 1.54
(0.08) (0.26) (0.22) (0.31) (0.05) (0.12) (0.07) (0.22)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
62 0.32 3.56 3.54 7.14 0.42 1.80 1.70 3.29
(0.23) (2.10) (1.45) (12.11) (0.09) (0.44) (0.27) (1.84)
[0.19] [0.12] [0.03] [0.57] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.10]
63 0.44 1.59 1.65 2.25 0.46 1.01 0.80 1.76
(0.27) (1.12) (0.64) (2.01) (0.10) (0.27) (0.15) (0.55)
[0.13] [0.18] [0.02] [0.28] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
64 0.83 0.51 0.72 1.70 0.59 0.81 0.95 1.63
(0.10) (0.27) (0.18) (0.42) (0.08) (0.22) (0.15) (0.46)
[0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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Table A.5: Individual Prospect Theory parameter estimates for complexity reduction 2,
both weeks separately with standard errors in (.) and p-values in [.]
α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
1 1.21 1.38 71.99 0.72 0.74 6.68
(0.52) (0.64) (377.74) (0.18) (0.18) (6.46)
[0.04] [0.05] [0.85] [0.00] [0.00] [0.32]
2 0.58 0.78 0.85 0.90 1.08 4.15
(0.15) (0.20) (0.22) (0.17) (0.21) (1.99)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06]
3 0.74 1.27 0.91 0.85 0.78 1.59
(0.14) (0.26) (0.25) (0.09) (0.09) (0.29)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
4 0.70 1.28 0.53 0.91 0.98 0.86
(0.17) (0.35) (0.22) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
5 0.87 1.18 0.51 0.97 0.95 1.03
(0.22) (0.31) (0.20) (0.15) (0.15) (0.26)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
6 1.06 1.18 0.56 0.87 0.92 0.67
(0.25) (0.28) (0.20) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
7 1.19 2.30 0.40 1.83 1.86 2.49
(0.34) (0.83) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (1.60)
[0.00] [0.02] [0.26] [0.00] [0.00] [0.14]
8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
9 0.96 1.03 2.09 0.74 0.86 2.19
(0.18) (0.20) (0.59) (0.09) (0.10) (0.45)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
10 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.02 1.02 1.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
11 0.68 1.07 1.33 2.91 0.49 286.10
(0.34) (0.57) (0.84) (1.60) (0.18) (945.50)
[0.06] [0.08] [0.13] [0.09] [0.02] [0.77]
12 1.02 0.98 2.25 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
13 1.20 0.96 1.25 1.17 1.31 1.90
(0.30) (0.23) (0.46) (0.21) (0.24) (0.83)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04]
14 1.13 0.42 6.55 6.94 0.25 1.5E + 06
(0.44) (0.17) (5.18) (4.81) (0.12) (1.5E + 07)
[0.02] [0.03] [0.23] [0.17] [0.06] [0.92]
15 1.17 1.14 1.29 0.64 1.09 0.60
(0.41) (0.40) (0.74) (0.14) (0.24) (0.22)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
16 1.10 1.33 0.57 1.15 0.82 1.85
(0.46) (0.57) (0.41) (0.30) (0.20) (0.87)
[0.03] [0.04] [0.19] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05]
17 0.86 1.95 0.51 0.51 0.93 0.74
(0.39) (1.18) (0.57) (0.15) (0.27) (0.29)
[0.05] [0.12] [0.39] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
18 0.54 1.26 2.22 0.60 0.77 1.24
(0.23) (0.61) (1.75) (0.15) (0.19) (0.41)
[0.04] [0.06] [0.23] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
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α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
19 0.73 0.82 0.88 0.74 1.05 1.16
(0.24) (0.28) (0.33) (0.17) (0.26) (0.48)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
20 0.78 0.88 0.72 0.89 0.95 0.95
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
21 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
22 2.79 1.53 5.92 1.57 1.29 1.71
(1.64) (0.80) (10.72) (0.46) (0.36) (1.15)
[0.11] [0.08] [0.59] [0.00] [0.00] [0.16]
23 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
24 1.52 1.47 0.84 1.02 0.98 1.02
(0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.14) (0.14) (0.24)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
25 1.22 0.74 2.81 1.08 0.97 2.22
(0.77) (0.43) (3.02) (0.42) (0.37) (1.82)
[0.14] [0.11] [0.37] [0.02] [0.02] [0.24]
26 1.01 1.30 2.11 0.51 0.94 1.43
(0.26) (0.36) (0.93) (0.09) (0.16) (0.34)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
27 1.13 1.46 0.44 0.83 0.74 0.88
(0.36) (0.49) (0.27) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
28 0.96 1.37 0.65 0.77 1.27 0.67
(0.25) (0.39) (0.31) (0.13) (0.23) (0.23)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
29 0.88 1.04 0.71 0.82 0.96 0.96
(0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
30 0.60 0.80 0.78 0.98 1.00 0.99
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
31 0.71 0.82 1.28 1.21 0.94 1.56
(0.15) (0.18) (0.31) (0.16) (0.12) (0.36)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
32 1.21 1.70 2.00 1.02 1.36 1.23
(0.17) (0.27) (0.57) (0.08) (0.12) (0.22)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
33 0.79 0.95 0.83 0.94 0.96 0.98
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
34 1.09 0.73 1.63 0.84 1.19 0.94
(0.24) (0.15) (0.49) (0.13) (0.19) (0.27)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
35 0.90 1.43 1.28 0.76 1.11 1.75
(0.16) (0.29) (0.38) (0.09) (0.14) (0.38)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
36 0.83 0.93 1.22 0.93 1.02 1.00
(0.15) (0.17) (0.28) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
37 1.29 0.81 2.11 0.98 1.00 0.97
(0.16) (0.09) (0.42) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
38 0.73 1.03 0.90 0.98 1.03 1.10
(0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
39 0.55 1.36 0.79 0.57 0.98 0.96
(0.15) (0.42) (0.30) (0.10) (0.17) (0.23)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
40 1.34 1.92 2.67 1.10 0.93 7.64
(0.41) (0.68) (1.85) (0.20) (0.17) (4.08)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.17] [0.00] [0.00] [0.08]
41 1.03 0.61 1.77 0.83 0.53 1.81
(0.48) (0.28) (1.06) (0.24) (0.16) (0.73)
[0.05] [0.05] [0.12] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
42 0.84 0.94 0.98 0.77 0.95 1.02
(0.23) (0.27) (0.36) (0.14) (0.17) (0.30)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
43 1.47 0.85 1.75 1.42 1.20 1.46
(0.81) (0.44) (1.45) (0.51) (0.42) (1.10)
[0.09] [0.07] [0.25] [0.02] [0.01] [0.21]
44 0.73 1.62 0.40 1.01 0.90 1.04
(0.24) (0.65) (0.29) (0.19) (0.17) (0.29)
[0.01] [0.03] [0.19] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
45 0.75 1.16 1.57 0.79 0.61 2.09
(0.27) (0.46) (0.79) (0.17) (0.13) (0.71)
[0.01] [0.02] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
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α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
46 0.97 1.26 1.11 0.79 1.30 0.85
(0.12) (0.17) (0.23) (0.06) (0.11) (0.14)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
47 0.86 1.59 0.55 1.19 1.17 0.77
(0.33) (0.72) (0.43) (0.27) (0.26) (0.30)
[0.02] [0.04] [0.22] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
48 1.02 1.37 0.74 1.01 0.89 2.25
(0.33) (0.47) (0.42) (0.21) (0.18) (0.94)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
49 0.48 0.57 1.53 3.99 0.54 2.1E + 03
(0.26) (0.29) (0.66) (2.65) (0.19) (1.2E + 04)
[0.08] [0.07] [0.04] [0.15] [0.01] [0.86]
50 0.99 0.94 2.49 0.69 1.02 0.95
(0.12) (0.11) (0.46) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
51 0.81 1.13 1.59 1.81 0.88 37.63
(0.38) (0.57) (1.07) (0.74) (0.29) (63.84)
[0.05] [0.07] [0.16] [0.03] [0.01] [0.56]
52 0.74 0.93 0.97 0.81 1.29 0.95
(0.23) (0.29) (0.36) (0.17) (0.29) (0.40)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
53 0.70 0.98 0.85 1.12 1.04 1.64
(0.14) (0.21) (0.22) (0.15) (0.14) (0.45)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
54 1.64 1.65 1.15 0.87 0.92 0.89
(0.29) (0.29) (0.43) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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α1 β1 λ1 α2 β2 λ2
55 0.91 0.59 1.49 1.01 0.73 1.44
(0.39) (0.25) (0.71) (0.27) (0.19) (0.56)
[0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
56 1.26 1.19 3.01 1.01 0.87 3.01
(0.27) (0.25) (1.23) (0.13) (0.11) (0.80)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
57 0.72 0.66 0.77 0.88 0.71 0.88
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
58 1.02 1.01 1.02 0.94 0.96 0.96
(0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
59 0.99 0.99 1.01 0.89 0.93 0.94
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
60 1.96 0.81 9.56 2.92 0.48 210.69
(1.07) (0.33) (14.70) (1.34) (0.15) (581.38)
[0.09] [0.03] [0.53] [0.05] [0.01] [0.72]
61 1.43 1.75 1.77 0.69 0.90 1.42
(0.24) (0.32) (0.64) (0.06) (0.08) (0.20)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
62 2.36 3.03 3.34 1.50 1.59 2.53
(0.65) (0.94) (3.03) (0.19) (0.21) (0.97)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.29] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
63 1.38 1.58 2.06 0.94 0.77 1.72
(0.42) (0.51) (1.30) (0.15) (0.12) (0.46)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.14] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
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64 1.28 0.96 2.28 1.01 1.01 1.85
(0.37) (0.26) (1.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.65)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
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Herzlich willkommen im Regensburg Economic Science Lab 
RESL und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment! 
 
Bitte sprechen Sie ab jetzt nicht mehr mit anderen Teilnehmern und schalten Sie Ihr 
Mobiltelefon aus. Verhalten Sie sich während des gesamten Experiments ruhig. 
 
Allgemeines zum Ablauf 
 
Dieses Experiment dient der Untersuchung ökonomischen Entscheidungsverhaltens. Sie 
können dabei Geld verdienen, das Ihnen im Anschluss an das Experiment privat in bar 
ausbezahlt wird. 
Das gesamte Experiment besteht aus zwei zeitlich getrennten Sitzungen. Die erste Sitzung 
wird etwa 100 Minuten dauern und besteht aus drei Teilen. Die zweite Sitzung wird etwa 80 
Minuten dauern und besteht aus zwei Teilen. Zu Beginn jedes Teils erhalten Sie detaillierte 
Instruktionen. Die Summe Ihres Verdienstes aus allen Teilen ergibt Ihren Gesamtverdienst 
aus dem Experiment. Dieser wird Ihnen nach Abschluss des zweiten Teils mitgeteilt und am 
Ende des Experiments einzeln und in bar ausbezahlt. 
Während des Experiments werden Sie darum gebeten, Entscheidungen zu treffen. Ihre 
Entscheidungen haben keinen Einfluss auf die Auszahlungen der anderen Teilnehmer, nur 
auf Ihre eigene Auszahlung. 
Sie erhalten in der ersten Sitzung eine Platzkarte, damit Sie in der zweiten Sitzung denselben 
Platz einnehmen können. Bringen Sie diese Karte unbedingt zur zweiten Sitzung mit!  
 
Bezahlung 
Während des Experiments berechnen sich Verdienste direkt in Euro. Zusätzlich zu dem 
Einkommen, das Sie während des Experiments verdienen können, erhalten Sie 5 € für Ihr 
pünktliches Erscheinen je Sitzung. Bitte berücksichtigen Sie, dass der Gesamtbetrag erst nach 
der zweiten Sitzung ausgezahlt wird. Daher ist es unbedingt notwendig, dass Sie auch zur 
zweiten Sitzung erscheinen und Ihre Platzkarte mitbringen. 
 
Anonymität 
Keiner der anderen Teilnehmer wird Ihre Entscheidungen im Experiment nachvollziehen 
können. Darüber hinaus werden die Daten aus dem Experiment ausschließlich anonym 
ausgewertet. Am Ende des Experiments müssen Sie eine Quittung über den Erhalt des 
Verdienstes unterschreiben. Diese dient nur der Abrechnung und wird nicht dazu 
verwendet, Ihre persönlichen Daten mit Ihren Entscheidungen zu verknüpfen. Ihr Name wird  
zu keinem Zeitpunkt mit Ihrem Verhalten im Experiment kombiniert. Die verteilten 
Platzkarten enthalten Ihren Namen, um sicherzustellen, dass auch tatsächlich Sie und 
niemand anderes an der zweiten Sitzung teilnehmen. Die Platzkarten verbleiben sowohl 
während, als auch nach dem Experiment, in Ihrem Besitz. 
 
Hilfsmittel 
An Ihrem Platz finden Sie einen Kugelschreiber und einen Taschenrechner. Bitte lassen Sie 
beide nach dem Experiment auf dem Tisch liegen. Bitte lassen Sie auch Ihre Notizen auf dem 
Tisch liegen, diese werden direkt im Anschluss vernichtet. 
 
ON THE DYNAMICS OF PROSPECT THEORY
160
2 
 
Sollten Sie nach den Instruktionen oder während des Experiments Fragen haben, heben Sie 
bitte die Hand. Einer der Experimentleiter wird dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Fragen 
unter vier Augen beantworten. 
 
Sonstiges 
Bitte verwenden Sie als Trennzeichen bei Kommazahlen einen Punkt anstelle des Kommas. 
Beispielsweise verwende Sie „6.40“ für den Betrag „6 Euro und 40 Cent“. 
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Teil 1 
 
Ablauf 
 
Nächste Woche werden Sie hintereinander vier voneinander unabhängige 
Investitionsentscheidungen treffen. Sie bekommen für jede der vier Runden ein Startkapital 
von je 1,60 Euro. Das Geld wird Ihnen zu Beginn des Experiments nächste Woche in einem 
Umschlag in bar ausgehändigt. 
 
In jeder Runde müssen Sie entscheiden, welchen Teilbetrag (in 20-Cent-Schritten) Ihres 
Startkapitals Sie investieren möchten. Der nichtinvestierte Teil Ihres Startkapitals wird Ihrem 
Vermögen eins-zu-eins gutgeschrieben.  
 
Die Auszahlung Ihres Investments ist im Durchschnitt höher, hängt allerdings vom Zufall ab: 
Sie wählen in jeder Runde Ihre Erfolgszahl zwischen 1 und 6. Ein zufällig bestimmter 
Teilnehmer würfelt dann die gültige Erfolgszahl aus. Stimmt Ihre selbstgewählte Erfolgszahl 
mit der anschließend ausgewürfelten Erfolgszahl überein (dies geschieht mit einer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von 16,67%), wird Ihnen der siebenfache Investitionsbetrag 
gutgeschrieben; andernfalls erhalten Sie den Investitionsbetrag nicht zurück. 
 
 Die Eingabemaske der Investitionsentscheidungen sieht dabei wie folgt aus: 
 
Abbildung 1: Investitionsentscheidung mit Glückszahl 
 
Beispiel: 
Sie investieren 80 Cent und entscheiden sich für die „4“ als Erfolgszahl. Wenn der zufällig 
bestimmte Teilnehmer die „4“ würfelt, erhalten Sie 5,60 Euro aus dem Investment zurück. 
Zusätzlich erhalten Sie den nichtinvestierten Betrag von 80 Cent. Insgesamt werden Ihnen 
also 6,40 Euro für diese Runde gutgeschrieben.  
Würfelt der Teilnehmer eine andere Zahl, erhalten Sie lediglich den nichtinvestierten Betrag 
von 80 Cent zurück. 
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Sie treffen diese Entscheidung für jede der vier Runden neu und können maximal Ihr 
jeweiliges Startkapital investieren. 
 
 
Heute sollen Sie planen, welche Entscheidungen Sie in der kommenden Woche treffen 
möchten. 
 
In der Planungsphase können Sie für jede Runde eingeben, wieviel Sie investieren sollten. Sie 
finden jeweils links auf Ihrem Bildschirm die Auszahlung im Gewinnfall und rechts für den 
Verlustfall. Für jeden der Fälle können Sie dann individuell weiterplanen.   
 
Ihr Bildschirm sieht dabei wie folgt aus: 
 
Abbildung 2: Beispiel für Ihre Vorhersage 
Sie treffen die Investitionsentscheidungen also zweimal: Einmal heute als Plan und einmal 
nächste Woche tatsächlich.  
 
Es wird allerdings nur entweder ihr heutiger Plan oder ihre Investitionsentscheidungen von 
nächster Woche umgesetzt. 
 
Sie entscheiden 45-mal, ob Sie die Umsetzung Ihres heutigen Planes und einen Geldbetrag 
möchten, oder die Umsetzung Ihrer Investitionsentscheidungen von nächster Woche. Die 45 
Entscheidungen variieren im Geldbetrag, der sowohl positiv (Gutschrift, +), als auch negativ 
(Abzug vom Guthaben, -) sein kann. 
 
Eine dieser Entscheidungen wird nächste Woche ganz zum Schluss zufällig ausgewählt und 
umgesetzt. Unabhängig davon, wie Sie sich bei diesen 45 Entscheidungen entscheiden, 
müssen Sie nächste Woche in jedem Fall die tatsächlichen Investitionsentscheidungen 
treffen. 
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Ihr Bildschirm sieht dabei aus wie folgt: 
 
Abbildung 3: Soll Ihre Vorhersage umgesetzt werden? 
 
Sobald Sie diese Informationen gelesen und verstanden haben, können Sie auf „Weiter“ 
klicken. 
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Teil 2  
 
 
Ablauf 
In diesem Teil bekommen Sie zwei Aufgaben gestellt. 
 
Als erstes sollen Sie drei Rechenaufgaben lösen. Für jede richtig gelöste Aufgabe werden 
Ihnen 0,50 Euro gutgeschrieben. 
 
Als zweites bitten wir Sie, einen kurzen Fragebogen auszufüllen. Dieser enthält Aussagen zu 
Ihrer Person, die Sie auf einer Sieben-Punkte-Skala von „trifft nicht auf mich zu“ bis „trifft 
sehr auf mich zu“ qualifizieren sollen. Wir bitten Sie, diese wahrheitsgemäß zu beantworten. 
Für das Ausfüllen des Fragebogens schreiben wir Ihrem Vermögen 2 Euro gut. Ihr Bildschirm 
sieht dabei aus wie folgt: 
 
Abbildung 4: Fragebogen 
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Teil 3 
 
 
Ablauf 
In diesem Teil treffen Sie eine Reihe an Entscheidungen zwischen einem sicheren Geldbetrag 
(links) und einer Lotterie (rechts). Die Lotterie führt zu einer zufälligen Auszahlung von einem 
von zwei Beträgen, die sowohl positiv als auch negativ sein können. Jeder Betrag kommt mit 
50% Wahrscheinlichkeit zur Auszahlung.  
 
Ihr Bildschirm sieht dabei aus wie folgt: 
 
Abbildung 5: Beispiel Sichere Option vs. Lotterie 
Nächste Woche werden Sie u.a. eine Reihe ähnlicher Entscheidungen treffen. Am Ende des 
Experiments werden wir eine Ihrer Entscheidungen (aus beiden Wochen) zufällig ermitteln 
und ausführen. Positive Beträge werden Ihrem Einkommen gutgeschrieben, negative davon 
abgezogen. 
 
 
Ende dieser Sitzung 
Die Auszahlung für die Teilnahme gibt es erst nach der Teilnahme an der zweiten Sitzung. 
Dennoch bitten wir Sie, auf Ihrem Platz sitzen zu bleiben, bis ein Experimentator Bescheid 
gibt, dass das Labor verlassen werden kann. Vergessen Sie nicht, Ihre Platzkarte in einer 
Woche wieder mitzubringen! 
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Herzlich willkommen im Regensburg Economic Science Lab 
RESL und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment! 
 
Bitte sprechen Sie ab jetzt nicht mehr mit anderen Teilnehmern und schalten Sie Ihr 
Mobiltelefon aus. Verhalten Sie sich während des gesamten Experiments ruhig. 
 
Allgemeines zum Ablauf 
 
Diese Sitzung ist der zweite Teil des in der vergangenen Woche gestarteten Experiments. 
Bitte stellen Sie sicher, dass Sie an dem Rechner derselben Platznummer sitzen, wie auf Ihrer 
Platzkarte vermerkt ist. 
Diese Sitzung dauert voraussichtlich 80 Minuten und besteht aus zwei Teilen. 
 
Bezahlung 
Ihr Einkommen für Ihr pünktliches Erscheinen je Sitzung wurde auf 6 € erhöht. Am Ende 
dieser Sitzung wird Ihnen Ihr Verdienst aus beiden Sitzungen in bar ausbezahlt. Wir kommen 
dazu zu Ihnen an den Platz. Um die Anonymität zu wahren bitten wir Sie während der 
Auszahlung weiter an Ihrem Platz zu bleiben. Sobald Sie Ihr Verdienst erhalten und quittiert 
haben, bitten wir Sie den Raum leise zu verlassen. 
 
Hilfsmittel 
An Ihrem Platz finden Sie einen Kugelschreiber und einen Taschenrechner. Bitte lassen Sie 
beide nach dem Experiment auf dem Tisch liegen. Bitte lassen Sie auch Ihre Notizen auf dem 
Tisch liegen, diese werden direkt im Anschluss vernichtet. 
 
Sollten Sie nach den Instruktionen oder während des Experiments Fragen haben, heben Sie 
bitte die Hand. Einer der Experimentleiter wird dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Fragen 
unter vier Augen beantworten. 
 
Sonstiges 
Bitte verwenden Sie als Trennzeichen bei Kommazahlen einen Punkt anstelle des Kommas. 
Beispielsweise verwende Sie „6.40“ für den Betrag „6 Euro und 40 Cent“. 
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Teil 1 
 
Ablauf 
In diesem Teil treffen Sie eine Reihe an Entscheidungen zwischen einem sicheren Geldbetrag 
(links) und einer Lotterie (rechts). Die Lotterie führt zu einer zufälligen Auszahlung von einem 
von zwei Beträgen, die sowohl positiv als auch negativ sein können. Jeder Betrag kommt mit 
50% Wahrscheinlichkeit zur Auszahlung.  
 
Ihr Bildschirm sieht dabei aus wie folgt: 
 
Abbildung 1: Beispiel Sichere Option vs. Lotterie 
Am Ende dieser Sitzung werden wir eine Ihrer Entscheidungen (aus beiden Wochen) 
ermitteln und ausführen. Positive Beträge werden Ihrem Einkommen gutgeschrieben, 
negative davon abgezogen. 
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Teil 2 
 
Ablauf 
In dieser Sitzung treffen Sie die Investitionsentscheidungen, die Sie vergangene Woche 
bereits vorhergesagt haben. Der wesentliche Unterschied gegenüber letzter Woche besteht 
darin, dass Sie diesmal nach jeder Investitionsentscheidung direkt erfahren, ob Ihre 
Investition erfolgreich gewesen ist oder nicht, weswegen Sie nicht mehr für jede 
Kombination aus Gewinnen und Verlusten entscheiden müssen, sondern nur noch für Ihren 
tatsächlichen Verlauf. 
Vor Ihnen liegt ein Umschlag mit 6,40 Euro, 1,60 Euro für jede Investitionsrunde. Die 
Stückelung beträgt 2€, 2€, 1€, 50¢, 50¢, 20¢, 10¢, 10¢. Bitte öffnen Sie den Umschlag und 
vergewissern Sie sich, dass er die genannten Münzen enthält. Belassen Sie das Geld im 
Umschlag. 
In jeder von vier Runden können Sie bis zu 1,60 Euro ihres Vermögens in die risikobehaftete 
Anlage investieren. Zu Beginn jeder Runde erhalten Sie zufällig vom Computer eine 
Glückszahl zwischen 1 und 6 zugeteilt. Nachdem Sie diese Zahl gesehen haben, können Sie 
einen beliebigen Betrag (in 20 Eurocent Schritten) Ihres Vermögens investieren. Ihr 
Bildschirm sieht dabei aus wie folgt: 
 
Abbildung 2: Investitionsentscheidung mit Glückszahl 
Sobald sich alle Teilnehmer entschieden und ihre jeweiligen Beträge eingegeben haben, 
bestimmen die Experimentatoren einen zufälligen Teilnehmer, der mit einem fairen 
sechsseitigen Würfel würfelt. Entspricht das Ergebnis des Wurfes Ihrer persönlichen 
Glückszahl, wird Ihr Einsatz versiebenfacht. Entspricht das Ergebnis nicht Ihrer Glückszahl, 
verlieren Sie Ihren Einsatz. 
 
Beispiel: 
Ihre Glückszahl ist die „4“. Sie investieren 80 Eurocent. Wenn der zufällig bestimmte 
Teilnehmer die „4“ würfelt, erhalten Sie 5,60 Euro ausbezahlt. Würfelt der Teilnehmer eine 
andere Zahl, dann verlieren Sie Ihren Einsatz und erhalten 0 Euro. 
 
Sie treffen diese Entscheidung für jede der vier Runden neu. 
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Sie treffen diese Entscheidung für jede der vier Runden neu und können maximal Ihr 
jeweiliges Startkapital investieren. 
 
Bezahlung 
Während wir die Auszahlung vorbereiten, bitten wir Sie, noch einen Fragebogen auszufüllen. 
Sobald alle Teilnehmer diesen abgeschlossen und auf „Weiter“ gedrückt haben, werden wir 
zu Ihnen an den Platz kommen. Sie erhalten Ihr Einkommen aus beiden Sitzungen, sowie für 
Ihr pünktliches Erscheinen ausbezahlt. Um die Anonymität zu wahren bitten wir Sie während 
der Auszahlung weiter an Ihrem Platz zu bleiben. Sobald Sie Ihr Verdienst erhalten und 
quittiert haben, bitten wir Sie den Raum leise zu verlassen. 
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Appendix C
Unions, Communication, and
Cooperation in Organizations
C.1 Derivation of Benachmark Case 2
The workers discounted utility from cooperating:
T=∞∑
t=0
δt(w + b− c) = w + b− c
1− δ .
The workers discounted utility from defecting:
T=∞∑
t=0
δtU¯ =
U¯
1− δ = 0.
Together they define bbenchmark as the minimum bonus that implements e = 1 as:
w + b− c
1− δ =
U¯
1− δ .
Or equivalently: w + b− c = 0 and since w = 0, we know bbenchmark = c.
Given the workers strategy, the firm has to be at least weakly better off from imple-
menting e = 1. The discounted sum of firm’s profits from adhering to pay the bonus b in
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the current period if the worker chose e = 1 is given by:
T=∞∑
t=0
βt(Π(G, 1)− w − b) = (Π(G, 1)− w − b)
1− β .
The discounted firm’s profits from defaulting on the bonus b in this given period are given
by:
Π(G, 1)− w +
T=∞∑
t=0
βt(Π(G, 0)− w) = Π(G, 1)− w + 0 = Π(G, 1)− w.
Therefore the maximum level bmaxbenchmark that the bonus can take is:
1
1− β (Π(G, 1)− w − b
max
benchmark) = Π(G, 1)− w (C.1)
βΠ(G, 1) = bmaxbenchmark. (C.2)
C.2 Derivation of the Symmetric Information Result
For the case of Symmetric Information we derive the minimum bonus b¯S that is necessary
to implement e = 1.
If the agent continues to exert high effort, his discounted sum over all periods is:
t=∞∑
t=0
δt[pb¯S + (1− p)b− c] = 1
1− δ [pb¯S + (1− p)b− c].
The agent’s outside option is:
t=∞∑
t=0
δtU¯ =
U¯
1− δ = 0.
The worker has to prefere e = 1 to e = 0, therefore:
1
1− δ [pb¯S + (1− p)b− c] ≥
U¯
1− δ .
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In equilibrium this has to hold with equality:
[pb¯S + (1− p)b− c] = 0.
Since b is given by b = Π(B, e = 1), we can express b¯S as:
pb¯S + (1− p)Π(B, e = 1)− c = 0
b¯S =
c− (1− p)Π(B, e = 1)
p
.
While we derived the lower bound of the bonus b¯S in order for the worker to choose
high effort, we now derive the upper bound for the bonus, the highest amount the firm
is willing to pay. The firm has to prefer to pay the bonus in both states of the world, B
and G.
The firm’s decision in the bad state:
The total firm profits if bonus is not paid is the sum of the profit today, Π(B, 1), plus
the discounted value of the expected profit tomorrow and for all periods thereafter. The
expected profits tomorrow (and in each period thereafter) are given by
p(Π(G, 0)− w) + (1− p)(Π(B, 0)− w) = p× 0 + (1− p)× 0 = 0.
Thus the discounted sum of a form’s profit if it defaults on the bonus is given by:
Π(B, 1) +
t=∞∑
t=1
βt0 = Π(B, 1).
The total expected firm’s profit if the bonus is paid and the state is bad is given by the
sum of the profit today, Π(B, 1) − b = 0, and the discounted value of the expected profit
tomorrow and for all periods thereafter. In this case, the expected profits tomorrow (and
in each period thereafter) are given by:
p[Π(G, 1)− b¯S] + (1− p)[Π(B, 1)− b] = p[Π(G, 1)− b¯S].
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The firm has to (weakly) prefer paying the bonus, thus
Π(B, 1) ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtp[Π(G, 1)− b¯S]Π(B, 1) +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpb¯S ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtp[Π(G, 1)].
The firm’s decision in the good state:
The total firm profit if it defaults on the bonus and the state is good is the sum of the
profit today, Π(G, 1), plus the discounted value of the expected profit tomorrow and for
all periods thereafter, pΠ(G, 0) = 0. Thus the discounted sum is given by
Π(G, 1) +
t=∞∑
t=1
βt0 = Π(G, 1).
The total firm profit if the bonus is paid and the state is good is the sum of the profit
today, Π(G, 1) − b¯S, plus the discounted value of expected profit tomorrow and for all
periods thereafter, p(Π(G, 1)− b¯S). Thus the discounted sum is given by:
Π(G, 1)− b¯S +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtp[Π(G, 1)− b¯S].
The firm has to (weakly) prefer to pay the bonus, i.e.,
Π(G, 1) ≤ Π(G, 1)− b¯S +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtp[Π(G, 1)− b¯S] (C.3)
b¯S +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpb¯S ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpΠ(G, 1). (C.4)
Now we compare the two conditions for the firm in the good and in the bad states:
state G
b¯S +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpb¯S ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpΠ(G, 1).
state B
Π(B, 1) +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpb¯S ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtp[Π(G, 1)].
Note that the right hand side of both conditions is identical. Furthermore, by the assump-
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tions made above it is implied that Π(B, 1) < b¯S. Thus, the condition in the good state G
is more restrictive and determines implicitly the upper bound for b¯S, b¯maxS , that the firm
would be willing to pay in order to implement e = 1. Therefore,
b¯maxS +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpb¯maxS ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpΠ(G, 1)
leads to
b¯maxS =
βp
1− β + βpΠ(G, 1).
We assume that it is always efficient to implement e = 1. In this case this means that for
an equilibrium to yield high effort, b¯maxS > b¯S has to hold. This implies that the maximal
bonus payment, the firm would be willing to make, is higher than the actual required
bonus payment for the worker to exert high effort. Therefore this condition ensures the
existence of an equilibrium:
b¯maxS > b¯S
βp
1− β + βpΠ(G, 1) >
c− (1− p)Π(B, 1)
p
Π(G, 1) >
(1− β + βp)( c
p
− 1−p
p
Π(B, 1))
βp
.
We can always find a large enough Π(G, 1) to ensure this.1
C.3 A more general Model
C.3.1 Setup of the Model
One firm and one worker are interacting repeatedly with an infinite horizon. The dis-
count factors are β for the firm and δ for the worker.2 The worker decides whether or
1 This result deviates from the risk averse case, making it easier to fulfill in the risk neutral case. Because
the inverse of a strictly increasing concave function is a convex function, the second term in brackets
in the right hand side numerator would be further increased.
2 While much of the classical literature on relational contracts has been concerned with the question
when relational contracts are sustainable, i.e. to find a critical β, we are interested in the patterns of
the relational contract and hence implicitly will assume that the discount rates are “high enough” and
the relational contract is sustainable.
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not to exert costly effort that has a positive effect on the firm’s profit. The worker’s effort
choice is observable by the firm, but is not contractible. To focus on our main argument,
we abstract from any explicit performance contracts. The firm has all the bargaining
power and makes a take it or leave it offer to the worker.3
The worker’s utility is increasing and concave in monetary compensation, which takes
the form of a contractible base salary, w, and a discretionary bonus, b, and decreasing in
effort. The worker decides whether to exert effort, e = 1, or shirk, e = 0. Thus, her utility
in period t is given by Ut = u (w + b) − c (e) with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0. To ease notation we
assume c (e = 0) = 0 and define c (e = 1) = c. The worker’s outside option is U¯ .
There are two states of the world, good and bad (G and B, respectively) that affect the
firm’s profit. Thus the firm’s profits can take on four values: Π (G, e = 1), Π (G, e = 0),
Π (B, e = 1), and Π (B, e = 0) with Π (G, ·) ≥ Π (B, ·). To shorten the exposition we
denote these values as Π (G, 1), Π (G, 0), Π (B, 1), and Π(B, 0), respectively. The exoge-
nously given probability for the good state, G, is pi and for the bad state, B, it is (1− pi).
The timing of the model is as follows: for each period t, first the contract is offered.
Then the worker chooses effort (e = 0, 1). The state (G,B) is realized. Afterwards the
proifts are realized and the bonus is paid.
We assume that in expectation it is always efficient to implement high effort (e = 1),
or
[piΠ (G, 1) + (1− pi) Π (B, 1)]− [piΠ (G, 0) + (1− pi) Π(B, 0)] > c. (C.5)
To further ease exposition we assume that Π(B, 0) − U¯ = Π (G, 0) − U¯ = 0, i.e., if the
worker is shirking the surplus being generated is just enough to provide the worker with
her outside option in either state.
We are looking for a relational contract that, with a combination of contractible wage
and discretionary bonus, implements high effort. A relational contract is a pair of strate-
gies for the firm and the worker that form a Perfect Public Nash Equilibrium. Before
finding the relational contract in this case it is illustrative to first consider two bench-
3 This assumption is relaxed in Section C.3.4 where we allow for unions with varying bargaining power.
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mark cases.
Benchmark Case 1: The Stage Game The firm and the worker interact only once. In
this case it is obviously impossible to implement high effort. Hence, the firm will employ
the worker, pay her a fixed wage w such that u(w) = U¯ and the worker will choose e = 0.
Benchmark Case 2: A World with Only One (Observable) State Assume that only
the good state of the world can occur, i.e., the firm’s profit is either Π (G, 1) or Π (G, 0) .
In this situation, the following relational contract implements high effort:
The firm’s strategy is to pay the worker a base salary w s.t. u(w) = U¯ . As long
as the worker chooses e = 1 the firm also pays a bonus bconst > 0 (derived
in Appendix A) which is implicitly defined by u(w + bconst) − c = U¯ . If the
worker chooses e = 0 the firm does not pay the bonus in this period and in
all subsequent ones. The worker’s strategy is to choose e = 1 as long as the
firm has paid the bonus in all previous periods and to choose e = 0 forever
as soon as the firm has defaulted on the bonus once.
For the Benchmark Case 2: A World with Only One (Observable) State we derive the
bonus bconst > 0 that implements e = 1 and the maximum level b¯max this bonus can take
such that the firm is still willing to live up to its promises.
Given the firm’s strategy the worker’s discounted utility from exerting high effort, i.e.,
cooperating, in the current period is given by
t=∞∑
t=0
δt (u (w + b)− c) = u(w + b)− c
1− δ .
The worker’s discounted utility from defecting, i.e., choosing e = 0 in the current
period is given by
t=∞∑
t=0
δtU¯ =
U¯
1− δ .
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As the worker has to be indifferent between choosing e = 0 and e = 1. This implicitly
defines bconst – the minimum bonus that implements e = 1 – as
t=∞∑
t=0
δt (u (w + bconst)− c) =
t=∞∑
t=0
δtU¯ (C.6)
or equivalently
u(w + bconst)− c = U¯ . (C.7)
Given the worker’s strategy, the firm has to be at least weakly better off from imple-
menting e = 1. The discounted sum of firm’s profits from adhering to pay the bonus b in
the current period if the worker chose e = 1 is given by
t=∞∑
t=0
βt (Π (G, 1)− w − b) = 1
1− β (Π (G, 1)− w − b) .
The discounted sum of firm’s profits from defaulting on b in this period is given by
Π (G, 1)− w +
t=∞∑
t=1
βt [Π (G, 0)− w] = Π (G, 1)− w + 0 = Π (G, e = 1)− w.
Thus the maximum level b¯max that the bonus can take is
1
1− β
(
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯max) = Π (G, 1)− w
β (Π (G, 1)− w) = b¯max.
We assume in condition (C.5) that it always pays to implement e = 1. In the case under
consideration this amounts to b¯max > bconst. For this condition to hold we need to assume
that effort is sufficiently productive such that Π (G, 1) > 1
β
ν(U¯ + c) + 1
β
w(β − 1), where
ν(·) is the inverse of the utility function.
Thus, the firm and the worker return to the equilibrium of the stage game once coop-
eration has broken down.
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C.3.2 Symmetric Information
Now we turn attention to the original setting where the state can be either G or B and
is observable to the worker. To make this situation interesting we assume that the profits
in the bad state are not high enough to pay bconst even if the worker has chosen e = 1,
i.e., 0 < Π (B, 1)) − w < bconst. We assume that the firm cannot save or borrow money
at the capital market.4 This assumption is equivalent to assuming that there exists an
upper bound on how much the firm can borrow which is lower than what is necessary to
pay bconst or that the costs from borrowing are sufficiently convex.5 Thus, implicitly, we
assume a situation of “large” shocks. While this assumption has little consequences for
equilibrium cooperation in the symmetric information case, it will have a bearing in the
asymmetric information case.
In this new situation, the simple contract described in Section 2.1.2 can no longer be
used to implement e = 1. In the bad states the worker actually gets a utility below his
outside option. Therefore, a higher bonus b¯S > bconst in the good states is needed, other-
wise the worker will not find it worthwhile to choose e = 1 in any state.6 Therefore, the
following relational contract implements high effort in this more complicated situation:
The firm’s strategy is to pay the worker a base salary w s.t. u(w) = U¯ . As
long as the worker chooses e = 1, the firm pays in addition a bonus. The
bonus is b¯S if the state of the world is revealed to be a good state and b
otherwise, where b¯S > b (the values for these bonuses are derived below). If
the worker chooses e = 0 the firm does not pay the bonus in this period and
all subsequent periods. The worker’s strategy is to choose e = 1 as long as
the firm has paid the promised bonus in all previous periods and to choose
e = 0 forever as soon as the firm has defaulted on the bonus once.
Due to the worker’s risk aversion it will be optimal for the firm to minimize the worker’s
4 Obviously, then it has to generally hold that Π(θ, e) ≥ w + b. We omit an explicit discussion to focus
on the interesting aspect of liquidity constraints under shocks.
5 See Englmaier and Fahn (2014) for a formal exposition in a distinct but related setting, showing that
allowing for saving or granting the firm access to the financial market does not undo the results.
6 The subscript S denotes the case of symmetric information. The subscript A, used below, denotes the
case of asymmetric information about the realization of the state of the world.
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wage fluctuation and pay him as much as possible in the bad state. This means that in
these bad states the firm foregoes any profits and that b is defined by Π (B, e = 1)−w−b =
0.
The following condition, derived in Appendix B, implicitly defines the minimum b¯S
necessary to implement e = 1:
EUS (·, 1) = U¯ (C.8)
where EUS (·, 1) ≡ piu(w + b¯S) + (1− pi)u(w + b)− c.
This condition is straightforward to interpret. The relational contract has to generate
enough expected utility in the future to make it worthwhile for the worker to forego his
outside option and to incur the effort costs.
Due to incentive compatibility, the firm has to prefer to pay the bonus in both states of
the world, B andG. Analyzing the problem yields that the condition, derived in Appendix
C, for the good state is more restrictive and determines the upper bound for b¯S, b¯maxS , that
the firm would be willing to pay in order to implement e = 1 :
b¯maxS =
βpi
(1− β + βpi) [Π (G, e = 1)− w] . (C.9)
If effort is sufficiently productive such that Π (G, 1) is sufficiently large (see Appendix
C for the exact condition), it will hold that b¯maxS > b¯S.
The findings above are summarized in the following proposition. Note that the rela-
tional contract characterizes the most efficient equilibrium in this game.
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Proposition C.3.1. In a situation with observable stochastic shocks to the firm’s
profit as described above the following two strategies form an relational contract
that implements e = 1 :
The worker chooses e = 1 as long as the firm has paid the promised
bonuses in all previous periods. Once the firm has defaulted on paying
the bonus, the worker chooses e = 0 forever. The firm pays the base wage
w and the bonuses, b in the bad state and b¯S > b in the good state, in all pe-
riods as long as the worker has always chosen e = 1. The firm stops paying
any bonus immediately after the worker has chosen e = 0 once.
b is defined by b = Π (B, 1)− w, w is defined by u(w) = U¯ , and b¯S is implicitly
defined by EUS (·, 1) = U¯ .
We derive the minimum bonus b¯S that is necessary to implement e = 1.
Recall that in this setting the worker does not know the state of the world when decid-
ing on how much effort to exert but only learns it later. Thus, the discounted sum of the
worker’s expected utility from exerting effort e = 1 is given by
t=∞∑
t=0
δt
[
pi(u(w + b¯S)) + (1− pi) (u (w + b))− c
]
=
piu(w + b¯S) + (1− pi)u(w + b)− c
1− δ .
The discounted sum of the worker’s expected utility from defecting, i.e., choosing e = 0
in the current period if the firm fulfilled its promises so far is given by
t=∞∑
t=0
δtU¯ =
U¯
1− δ .
As the worker has to (weakly) prefer to choose e = 1 to e = 0, it must be that
piu(w + b¯S) + (1− pi)u(w + b)− c ≥ U¯ .
In equilibrium this condition will bind
piu(w + b¯S) + (1− pi)u(w + b¯)− c = U¯ .
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Since b is given by Π (B, 1) − w − b = 0, this condition implicitly defines b¯S necessary to
implement high effort.
Here we derive the conditions that ensure that the firm prefers to pay the bonus in
both states of the world and show that the condition for the good state is more restrictive,
determining the upper bound for b¯S, b¯maxS that the firm would still be willing to pay in
order to implement e = 1.
The firm has to prefer to pay the bonus in both states of the world, B and G.
The firm’s decision in the bad state: The total firm profits if bonus is not paid is the
sum of the profit today, Π (B, 1) − w, plus the discounted value of the expected profit
tomorrow and for all periods thereafter. The expected profits tomorrow (and in each
period thereafter) are given by
pi (Π (G, 0)− w) + (1− pi) (Π(B, 0)− w) = pi0 + (1− pi) 0 = 0.
Thus the discounted sum of a firm’s profit if it defaults on the bonus is given by
Π (B, 1)− w +
t=∞∑
t=1
βt0 = Π (B, 1)− w.
The total expected firm’s profit if the bonus is paid and the state is bad is given by the
sum of the profit today, Π (B, 1) − w − b = 0, and the discounted value of the expected
profit tomorrow and for all periods thereafter. In this case, the expected profits tomorrow
(and in each period thereafter) are given by
pi
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯S
]
+ (1− pi) [Π (B, 1)− w − b] =
pi
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯S
]
+ (1− pi) 0 = pi [Π (G, 1)− w − b¯S] .
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The firm has to (weakly) prefer paying the bonus, thus
Π (B, 1)− w ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpi
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯S
]
Π (B, 1)− w +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpib¯S ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpi [Π (G, 1)− w] .
The firm’s decision in the good state: The total firm profit if it defaults on the bonus
and the state is good is the sum of the profit today, Π (G, 1)−w, plus the discounted value
of the expected profit tomorrow and for all periods thereafter, pi [Π (G, 0)− w] = 0. Thus
the discounted sum is given by
Π (G, 1)− w +
t=∞∑
t=1
βt0 = Π (G, 1)− w.
The total firm profit if the bonus is paid and the state is good is the sum of the profit
today, Π (G, 1) − w − b¯S, plus the discounted value of the expected profit tomorrow and
for all periods thereafter, pi
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯S
]
. Thus the discounted sum is given by
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯S
]
+
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpi
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯S
]
.
The firm has to (weakly) prefer to pay the bonus, i.e.,
Π (G, 1)− w ≤ Π (G, 1)− w − b¯S +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpi
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯S
]
b¯S +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpib¯S ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpi [Π (G, 1)− w] .
Now we compare the two conditions for the firm in the good and the bad states:
state G b¯S +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpib¯S ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpi [Π (G, 1)− w]
state B Π (B, 1)− w +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpib¯S ≤
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpi [Π (G, 1)− w] .
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Note that the right hand side of both conditions is identical. Furthermore, by the
assumptions made above it is implied that Π (B, 1) − w < b¯S. Thus, the condition in the
good state G is more restrictive and determines implicitly the upper bound for b¯S, b¯maxS ,
that the firm would be willing to pay in order to implement e = 1. Therefore,
b¯maxS +
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpib¯maxS =
t=∞∑
t=1
βtpi [Π (G, 1)− w]
b¯maxS =
βpi
(1− β + βpi) [Π (G, 1)− w] .
We assume in condition (C.5) that it always efficient to implement e = 1. In this case
this means that for an equilibrium to yield high effort, b¯maxS > b¯S has to hold. Substituting
for b, for this condition to hold it must be that
Π (G, 1) >
(1− β + βpi) ν ( 1
pi
[
(U¯ + c)− (1− pi)u(Π (B, 1))])− (1− β)w
βpi
,
where ν(·) is the inverse of the utility function. We can always find a large enough
Π (G, 1) to ensure this.
C.3.3 Asymmetric Information Model
Having characterized the symmetric case, we now investigate the asymmetric one. Thus,
we assume that the true state of the world, G or B, is only observable to the firm. As a
result, the relational contract described in Proposition 1 can no longer implement e = 1
as the firm always has an incentive to claim that the state is B and save b¯S − b in bonus
payments. In this new environment the relational contract has to be refined. We fo-
cus on a “simple” equilibrium to implement cooperation and truthtelling and follow the
arguments in Green and Porter (1984) or Radner (1985) and amend the equilibrium
strategies such that whenever the firm announces that the state is B and the bonus pay-
ment will be b a conflict (or punishment) phase follows. The conflict lasts for T periods
in which the worker chooses e = 0 and only w is paid, i.e., the equilibrium of the stage
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game is played.7 After these T periods the firm and the worker revert to the cooperative
equilibrium in which the firm pays a bonus b¯A whenever the state is good and the worker
chooses e = 1. Another bad state with a bonus payment of b then triggers a new conflict
phase.
Note that we do not have to check again that it is optimal for the firm not to default
completely on the bonus. This would be detected by the worker and the condition is
qualitatively the same as the one under symmetric information. However, for this new
pair of strategies to form an equilibrium it has to hold that:
a) The firm prefers to announce the state truthfully,
b) the worker prefers to execute the punishment, and
c) the worker prefers to choose e = 1 as long as the bonuses are paid (and the game is
not in a conflict phase).
We check these conditions now, starting with a). For the firm to prefer to announce the
state truthfully the expected profits from this strategy have to exceed the expected profits
from defecting. We only have to check this for the good state as the firm cannot deviate
from truthtelling in the bad state as it cannot pay the high bonus.
By announcing state B when the actual state is G the firm saves b¯A − b on bonus
payments. However, by announcing stateB the firm triggers a conflict phase of T periods.
Denote the continuation value of the firm’s profits from cooperating (i.e., announcing
the state truthfully) if the state is G and if the state is B as V CF (G, 1) and V
C
F (B, 1) ,
respectively. The continuation value of the firm’s profits in the beginning of the con-
flict or punishment period is denoted by V PF (·, 0) . The following equations define these
7 Note that we abstract from divisibility issues in deriving T to ease the exposition of our arguments.
To close the gap to our continuous formulation, there would have to be a public randomization with
suitably chosen probabilities that would determine whether the last period of punishment is executed
or whether the conflict phase is ended.
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continuation values.
V CF (G, 1) = Π (G, 1)− w − b¯A + β
[
piV CF (G, 1) + (1− pi)V CF (B, 1)
]
V CF (B, 1) = 0 + βV
P
F (·, 0) = βV PF (·, 0)
V PF (·, 0) =
t=T−1∑
t=0
βt0 + βT
[
piV CF (G, 1) + (1− pi)V CF (B, 1)
]
= βT
[
piV CF (G, 1) + (1− pi)V CF (B, 1)
]
.
Solving these equations we get that
V CF (G, 1) =
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯A
] 1− (1− pi) βT+1
1− (1− pi) βT+1 − βpi (C.10)
V CF (B, 1) =
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯A
] βT+1pi
1− (1− pi) βT+1 − βpi (C.11)
V PF (·, 0) =
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯A
] βTpi
1− (1− pi) βT+1 − βpi . (C.12)
The continuation value of the firm’s profits if it announces state B when the true state is
G (i.e. if the firm defects), V DF (G, 1) , is given by
V DF (G, 1) = Π (G, 1)− w − b+ βV PF (·, 0) .
Substituting for V PF (·, 0) and rearranging we get that
V DF (G, 1) = [Π (G, 1)− w − b] +
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯A
] βT+1pi
1− (1− pi) βT+1 − βpi . (C.13)
The firm has to prefer to announce the state truthfully. Thus it has to hold that V DF (G, 1) <
V CF (G, 1) , or more explicitly that
[Π (G, 1)− w − b] < [Π (G, 1)− w − b¯A] [ 1− βT+1
1− (1− pi) βT+1 − βpi
]
.
Note that 1−β
T+1
1−(1−pi)βT+1−βpi is increasing in T . Moreover, for T = 0 the condition above
is violated as it would imply that [Π (G, 1)− w − b] < [Π (G, 1)− w − b¯A] and thus that
b¯A < b, which as we know cannot be true. Thus, there exists a T ∗ > 0 for which the
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condition above holds. In equilibrium the firm will be just indifferent and thus
[Π (G, 1)− w − b] 1− (1− pi) β
T ∗+1 − βpi
1− βT ∗+1 −
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯A
]
= 0 (C.14)
implicitly defines the efficient length of the conflict phase T ∗.
Now we check condition b), namely that the worker prefers to execute the punish-
ment. Given the strategy of the firm, i.e., pay w such that u(w) = U¯ for T ∗ periods after
announcing state B, exerting high effort will not benefit the worker as no bonus is being
paid. Thus the worker has no incentive to choose e = 1 in these T ∗ periods.
Finally we check condition c) and show that as long as the firm has never defaulted
on the bonus the worker prefers to choose e = 1. The worker does not know which state
will realize when she makes her effort choice, and thus does not know whether she will
receive a bonus b or b¯A. Define the worker’s expected utility as
piu(w + b¯A) + (1− pi)u (w + b)− c = EUA (·, 1)− c.
The continuation value for the worker’s utility from exerting high effort if the firm
fulfilled its promises, V CW , is given by
V CW = EUA (·, 1)− c+ δ
(
piV CW + (1− pi)V PW
)
where V PW denotes the continuation value for the worker’s utility at the beginning of a
conflict (or punishment) phase which is defined as
V PW =
T−1∑
t=0
δtU¯ + δTV CW = U¯
1− δT
1− δ + δ
TV CW .
We can use these two expressions to solve for V CW
V CW = EUA (·, 1)− c+ δ
(
piV CW + (1− pi)V PW
)
= EUA (·, 1)− c+ δ
(
piV CW + (1− pi)(U¯
1− δT
1− δ + δ
TV CW )
)
.
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Rearranging then yields
V CW =
(
EUA (·, 1)− c+ δ(1− pi)U¯ 1− δ
T
1− δ
)
1
1− δpi − (1− pi)δT+1 . (C.15)
The continuation value for the worker’s utility from defecting and exerting low effort
even though the firm did not default on its promises and the game is not in the conflict
phase, V DW , is given by
V DW =
∞∑
t=0
δtU¯ =
U¯
1− δ , (C.16)
i.e., outside the conflict periods, when the worker chooses e = 0 she will get no bonus
now or forever after and is just left with her outside option utility, U¯ .
To ensure incentive compatibility the worker has to weakly prefer to choose e = 1, i.e.,
V CW ≥ V DW , which will be binding in equilibrium. Therefore(
EUA (·, 1)− c+ δ(1− pi)U¯ 1− δ
T
1− δ
)
1
1− δpi − (1− pi)δT+1 =
U¯
1− δ
which simplifies to
EUA (·, 1)− c = U¯ , (C.17)
i.e., the same condition as under symmetric information. Hence it holds that b¯S = b¯A = b¯
and the agent is again held down to her outside option.
We summarize these findings in the following proposition.
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Proposition C.3.2. In a situation in which stochastic shocks to the firm’s profits
can only be observed by the firm itself, the following two strategies form an
relational contract that implements e = 1 :
In a cooperation period, the worker chooses e = 1 as long as the firm has not
announced a bad state and has always paid the promised bonuses, b in the
bad state and b¯ in the good state, in all previous cooperation periods. When
the firm announces the bad state and pays b a conflict phase, lasting T ∗
periods, starts where in each period the worker chooses e = 0. Thereafter
the worker moves back to cooperating, i.e., choosing e = 1 as long as the
firm announces the good state and pays the bonus. Once the firm has
defaulted on paying the bonus in a cooperation period the worker chooses
e = 0 forever. The firm pays the base wage w and the bonus, b in the bad
state and b¯ in the good state, in all cooperation periods as long as the worker
has always chosen e = 1 in the previous cooperation periods. After a bad
state has occurred the firm pays no bonus for the next T ∗ periods. The firm
stops paying any bonus immediately after the worker has once chosen e = 0
in a cooperation period.
b is defined by Π (B, 1) − w = b, w is defined by u(w) = U¯ , and b¯ and T ∗ are
implicitly defined by the following conditions:
EUA (·, 1)− c− U¯ = 0
[Π (G, 1)− w − b] 1− (1− pi) β
T ∗+1 − βpi
1− βT ∗+1 −
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯] = 0.
To clarify the mechanics of the model, in Appendix D we consider a couple of com-
parative statistic derivations. Based on these comparative statics it becomes clear that
equilibrium inefficiencies are gravest in past-their-prime (low β), highly volatile (low pi),
and more liquidity constraint (low b) industries.
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C.3.4 The Role of Unions
Suppose a union’s power is captured by σ with σ ∈ [0, 1]. On the one hand, σ captures
the bargaining power of the union, i.e., the more powerful the union is (i.e., the larger is
σ) the bigger share of surplus the union can secure.8 In addition, unique to our setting,
a stronger union is more likely to verify a firm’s claim that the state of the world is bad.
Thus, not all (truthful) claims by the firm that the state of the world is bad will necessary
lead to a conflict phase. To simplify the exposition we use σ to denote both the share of
profits the union can secure to the worker and the probability that the union will verify
that the state of the world is indeed bad. The results below do not depend on this specific
assumption, which can be relaxed easily. For example, define the power of the union to
appropriate rents as σ and the probability that the union can verify the state of the world
as f(σ), with f ′ > 0. Our results hold also for this flexible formulation. In any case, the
equilibrium strategies are analogous to the ones in the asymmetric information case.
When investing high effort, the worker’s utility in the good state is given by U (G, 1) =
u(w + b¯σA + σ(Π (G, 1) − w − b¯σA)) − c = u(σΠ (G, 1) + (1 − σ)(w + b¯σA)) − c, where b¯σA is
the bonus in the good state. Similarly, in the bad state, the worker’s utility is given by
U (B, 1) = u(σΠ (B, 1) + (1 − σ)(w + bσ)) − c, where bσ is the bonus in the bad state.
Therefore, we can define the worker’s expected utility from exerting effort as
EUA,σ (·, 1;σ) = piu
(
σΠ (G, 1) + (1− σ)(w + b¯σA)
)
+ (1− pi)u (σΠ (B, 1) + (1− σ)(w + bσ))− c
To see that the worker will indeed prefer to choose e = 1 as long as the bonuses are
paid (and the game is not in a conflict phase) we apply the same arguments as before.
We denote the continuation value for the worker’s utility from exerting high effort in a
cooperation period if the firm fulfilled its promises, V CW,σ. This value is given by
V CW,σ = EUA,σ (·, 1;σ)− c+ δ
(
piV CW,σ + (1− pi)
[
σV CW,σ + (1− σ)V PW,σ
])
where V PW,σ denotes the continuation value for the worker’s utility at the beginning of a
8 Following the above intuition of the collective action problem, suppose that a stronger union - standing
to earn a higher rent - has stronger incentives to invest in getting informed.
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conflict (or punishment) phase, which is defined as
V PW,σ =
T−1∑
t=0
δtU¯ + δTV CW,σ = U¯
1− δT
1− δ + δ
TV CW,σ.
We use these two expressions to solve for V CW,σ and we get that
V CW,σ =
(1− δ) (EUA,σ (·, 1;σ)− c) + (1− σ)δ(1− pi)U¯(1− δT )
(1− δ) (1− δ(pi + (1− pi)σ)− (1− pi)(1− σ)δT+1) . (C.18)
Note that for σ → 0, i.e., union power is negligible we get the exact same condition that
we got in the case without unions.
The continuation value for the worker’s utility from defecting and exerting low effort
even though the firm did not default on its promises, V DW,σ, is given by
V DW,σ =
∞∑
t=0
δtU¯ =
U¯
1− δ . (C.19)
To ensure incentive compatibility the worker has to weakly prefer to choose e = 1, i.e.,
V CW,σ ≥ V DW,σ, which gives us (similarly to the no-union case)
piu
(
σΠ (G, 1) + (1− σ)(w + b¯σA)
)
+ (1− pi)u (σΠ (B, 1) + (1− σ)(w + bσ))− c ≥ U¯(C.20)
This condition is qualitatively the same condition as the one in the absence of unions.
However, note that now it is possible that this condition holds already for b¯σA = 0 and
possibly also for bσ = 0 if σ is high enough. In case that it does not, the firm needs to pay
bonuses and then the condition will hold with equality. Note that when σ is low, the firm
would like to set bσ = Π (B, 1)−w, as was the case in the absence of unions for the same
reason. Namely, due to the worker’s risk aversion it is cheaper for the firm to minimize
the worker’s wage fluctuations. Define σ¯ as the union power that solves the equation:
piu (σ¯Π (G, 1) + (1− σ¯)w) + (1− pi)u (Π (B, 1))− c = U¯ .
Therefore, σ¯ is the highest value of σ for which the firm will still pay a bonus in the
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good state of the world. Note that as σ increases beyond σ¯, the firm can still make
condition (C.20) hold with equality if it lowers the bonus in the bad state. Though
there will be a value of σ, denoted by σ¯H above which the worker’s participation con-
straint, i.e., equation (C.20), will be slack. This value is determined by the equation:
piu (σ¯HΠ (G, 1) + (1− σ¯H)(w)) + (1− pi)u (σ¯HΠ (B, 1) + (1− σ)w)− c = U¯ . Therefore,
b¯σA =

piu
(
σΠ (G, 1) + (1− σ)(w + b¯σA)
)
+ (1− pi)u (Π (B, 1))− c = U¯ if σ ≤ σ¯
0 Otherwise
(C.21)
and
bσ =

Π (B, 1)− w = Π (B, 1)− U¯ if σ ≤ σ¯
piu (σΠ (G, 1) + (1− σ)w) + (1− pi)u (σΠ (B, 1) + (1− σ)(w + bσ))− c = U¯ if σ¯ < σ ≤ σ¯H
0 Otherwise.
(C.22)
Now we turn to the firm’s decision problem. In the good state of the world the firm’s
profits are (1 − σ)(Π (G, 1) − w − b¯σA), while in the bad state the firm’s profits are given
by: (1− σ)(Π (B, 1)− w − bσ). If σ > σ¯ the firms will have profits in the bad state, too.
Remembering that conditional on the firm announcing B, the union and hence the
worker gets informed with probability σ that the state of the world is indeed B, we
denote by V CF,σ (G, 1;σ) and V
C
F,σ (B, 1;σ) the continuation value of the firm’s profits from
cooperating, i.e., announcing the state truthfully. The continuation value of the firm’s
profits at the beginning of a conflict (or punishment) period is denoted by V PF,σ (·, 0;σ) .
The following equations define these continuation values:
V CF,σ (G, 1;σ) = (1− σ)
(
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯σA
)
+ β
[
piV CF,σ (G, 1;σ) + (1− pi)V CF,σ (B, 1;σ)
]
V CF,σ (B, 1;σ) = (1− σ) (Π (B, 1)− w − bσ) +
+β
(
(1− σ)V PF,σ (·, 0;σ) + σ
[
piV CF,σ (G, 1;σ) + (1− pi)V CF,σ (B, 1;σ)
])
V PF,σ (·, 0;σ) =
T∑
βt0 + βT
[
piV CF,σ (G, 1;σ) + (1− pi)V CF,σ (B, 1;σ)
]
= βT
[
piV CF,σ (G, 1;σ) + (1− pi)V CF,σ (B, 1;σ)
]
.
192
UNIONS, COMMUNICATION, AND COOPERATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
We can use these expressions to solve for the continuation values
V CF,σ (G, 1;σ) =
(1−σ)[Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA][1−β(1−pi)(βT (1−σ)+σ)]+β(1−σ)(1−pi)[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi (C.23)
V CF,σ (B, 1;σ) =
βpi(1−σ)[βT (1−σ)+σ][Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA]+(1−σ)(1−βpi)[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi (C.24)
V PF,σ (·, 0;σ) = βT (1− σ)
pi[Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA]+(1−pi)[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi . (C.25)
The continuation value of the firm’s profits from defecting, i.e., announcing a state B
when the true state is G, V DF,σ (G, 1;σ) , is given by
V DF,σ (G, 1;σ) = Π (G, 1)− w − bσ − σ(Π (B, 1)− w − bσ) +
βT+1(1−σ)2[pi[Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA]+(1−pi)[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]]
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi .
The firm has to prefer to announce the state truthfully. Thus it has to hold that
V DF,σ (G, 1;σ) ≤ V CF,σ (G, 1;σ) .
Substituting and rearranging the equations above yields
σ(Π (G, 1)−Π (B, 1)) + (1− σ)[b¯σA − bσ] ≤
β(1−σ)[1−(1−σ)βT ][pi[Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA]+(1−pi)[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]]
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi .(C.26)
First, note that if σ = 1 then the firm will prefer to lie and announce that the state
of the world is B when it is in fact G. The intuition in obvious, in this case the firm
relinquishes all its profits to the workers, and hence defection – which has a positive
value – is attractive from its perspective. We know that when σ = 0 there exists T ∗ such
that condition (C.26) holds with equality. When σ increases, the LHS of condition (C.26)
stays the same, while the RHS increases. Therefore there will be a solution with T < T ∗.
Therefore, there must be a range of σ-values for which condition (C.26) holds. We denote
the largest σ-value for which condition (C.26) holds by σ˜. We summarize these findings
in the following proposition.
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Proposition C.3.3. In a situation in which stochastic shocks to the firm’s profits
can only be observed by the firm itself and the worker is part of a union of power
σ ≤ σ˜, the following two strategies form an relational contract that implements
e = 1 :
In a cooperation period, the worker chooses e = 1 as long as 1. the firm
either announced a good state or announced a bad state that was verified
by the union and 2. the firm has always paid the promised bonuses, b in the
bad state and b¯σA in the good state, in all previous cooperation periods. When
the firm announces a bad state that the union cannot verify the firm pays b
and a conflict phase, lasting T ∗A,σ periods, starts where in each period the
worker chooses e = 0. Thereafter the worker moves back to cooperating,
i.e., choosing e = 1 as long as the firm pays the bonus and announces the
good state or the union can verify that the stat is bad. Once the firm has
defaulted on paying the bonus in a cooperation period the worker chooses
e = 0 forever. The firm pays the base wage w and the bonus, bσ in the
bad state and b¯σA in the good state, in all cooperation periods as long as
the worker has always chosen e = 1 in the previous cooperation periods.
After a bad state that the union could not verify has occurred the firm pays
no bonus for the next T ∗A,σ (punishment) periods. The firm stops paying any
bonus immediately after the worker has once chosen e = 0 in a cooperation
period.
w is defined by u(w) = U¯ , and bσ, b¯σA and T
∗
A,σ are implicitly defined by the
following conditions:
b¯σA =

piu
(
σΠ (G, 1) + (1− σ)(w + b¯σA)
)
+ (1− pi)u (Π (B, 1))− c = U¯ if σ ≤ σ¯
0 Otherwise
bσ =

Π (B, 1)− w = Π (B, 1)− U¯ if σ ≤ σ¯
piu (σΠ (G, 1) + (1− σ)w) + (1− pi)u (σΠ (B, 1) + (1− σ)(w + bσ))− c = U¯ if σ¯ < σ ≤ σ¯H
0 Otherwise
σ(Π (G, 1)−Π (B, 1))+(1−σ)[b¯σA−bσ] ≤
β(1−σ)
[
1−(1−σ)βT
∗
A,σ
]
[pi[Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA]+(1−pi)[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]]
1−β(1−pi)
[
β
T∗
A,σ (1−σ)+σ
]
−βpi
.
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Next we investigate whether a firm will want to cede power to a union. Meaning,
assuming that the firm can decide on the size of σ, will it choose a positive one? The
firm’s problem is given by:
Max
σ,b¯σA,b
σ
pi
[
Π (G, 1)− w − b¯σA
]
+ (1− pi) [Π (B, 1)− w − bσ]
1− β(1− pi) [βT (1− σ) + σ]− βpi
s.t.
piu
(
σΠ (G, 1) + (1− σ)(w + b¯σA)
)
+ (1− pi)u (σΠ (B, 1) + (1− σ)(w + bσ))− c ≥ U¯
σ(Π (G, 1)−Π (B, 1)) + (1− σ)[b¯σA − bσ] ≤
β(1−σ)[1−(1−σ)βT ][pi[Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA]+(1−pi)[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]]
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi (IC).
The first order conditions are given by:
−pi
[
[Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA]+(1−σ)
db¯σA
dσ
]
−(1−pi)
[
[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]+(1−σ)db
σ
dσ
]
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi +
+
β(1−σ)(1−pi)[1−βT ][pi[Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA]+(1−pi)[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]]
[1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi]2 . (C.27)
The interpretation of this condition is straightforward, The second term is the increase
in the profits as a result of unions decreasing the occurrence of conflict periods. The first
term capures the effect that an increase in union power has on the division of profits. It
can be divided into two. The term
−pi
[
[Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA]+
db¯σA
dσ
]
−(1−pi)
[
[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]+db
σ
dσ
]
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi
captures the loss in revenues due to ceding a share σ to the workers. However, as the
worker gets a share of the revenue in all state, smaller bonuses are needed to ensure high
effort. Therefore, the term
σ
pi
db¯σA
dσ
+(1−pi)db
σ
dσ
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi
captures an increase in profits due to this decrease in bonus payments. We next consider
the different cases to see whether the firm will decide to cede any power to the union.
First, let us consider the case in which σ ≤ σ¯. Calculating the derivatives of equations
for bσ and b¯σA, we know that in this case
dbσ
dσ
= 0 and db¯
σ
A
dσ
= −Π(G,1)−w−b¯σA
1−σ . Therefore,
condition (C.27) is reduced to β(1−pi)[1−β
T ]
[1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi]2 , which is always positive. Hence,
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as long as the firm’s incentive compatibility constraint holds, the firm will choose union
power which is at least as large as σ¯.
Next we consider the case in which σ > σ¯H . In that case, b¯σA = b
σ = db
σ
dσ
=
db¯σA
dσ
= 0.
Thus, condition (C.27) now becomes: − (1−β)[pi[Π(G,1)−w]+(1−pi)[Π(B,1)−w]]
[1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi]2 , which is nega-
tive.9 Therefore, the firm will never choose a solution in the range where σ > σ¯H .
When σ¯ < σ ≤ σ¯H , we know that b¯σA = db
σ
dσ
= 0, and that bσ < Π (B, 1) − U¯ , and
dbσ
dσ
= −Π(B,1)−w−bσ
1−σ − pi(1−σ)(1−pi) u
′(σΠ(G,1)+(1−σ)w)
u′(σΠ(B,1)+(1−σ)(w+bσ)) . Therefore, the first order condition
(C.27) is:
pi[Π(G,1)−w]
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi
[
−1 + u′(σΠ(G,1)+(1−σ)w)
u′(σΠ(B,1)+(1−σ)(w+bσ))
]
+
+β(1−σ)(1−pi)[1−β
T ][pi[Π(G,1)−w]+(1−pi)[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]]
[1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi]2 . (C.28)
Note that since u is concave, when σ = σ¯H the first term of condition (C.28) above is
negative. The second term is always positive. Therefore, there may exists σS in this range
such that condition (C.28) is equal to zero. This σS is the union power that maximize
the firm’s profits. If not, then the optimal union power chosen by the firm will be σ¯H . We
summarize these findings in the following proposition.
Proposition C.3.4. In a situation in which stochastic shocks to the firm’s profits
can only be observed by the firm itself, the firm will choose to cede power σ∗ to
a union, where σ∗ = min{σS, σ¯H} and σS solves
pi[Π (G, 1)− w]
[
−1 + u′(σΠ(G,1)+(1−σ)w)u′(σΠ(B,1)+(1−σ)(w+bσ))
]
+ β(1−σ)(1−pi)[1−β
T ][pi[Π(G,1)−w]+(1−pi)[Π(B,1)−w−bσ ]]
1−β(1−pi)[βT (1−σ)+σ]−βpi = 0.
Intuitively, it is easy to see that the optimal σ has to be strictly interior as for σ = 0 the
firm’s value function strictly increases in σ and at σ = 1 all the revenue is appropriated
by the union and workers.
9 If we change the model such that the union power is σ while the probability of finding that the true
state of the world is f(σ) the numerator of the condition would be −(1 − β)[1 − (1 − pi)(σf(σ) −
f ′(σ))(1− βT ](pi[Π (G, 1)− w] + (1− pi)[Π (B, 1)− w])]. As long as f(σ) is an increasing and concave
function with f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1 the results remain the same.
196
UNIONS, COMMUNICATION, AND COOPERATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
C.3.5 Comparative Statistic
To better understand the mechanics of the model, it is instructive to consider a couple
of comparative statistic derivations. We start with the conditions from Proposition 2 and
apply the implicit function theorem to derive comparative statics. In particular we are
interested in how b¯ and T ∗ are affected when either pi, b, or β change. First we consider
the derivatives w.r.t. pi, the likelihood of the good state, where an increase in pi should
be interpreted as a decrease in an industry’s volatility (remember that we think of bad
states as rare phenomena, i.e., pi close to 1):10
db¯
dpi
= −u
(
w + b¯
)− u (w + b)
piu′
(
w + b¯
) < 0
as b¯ > b and hence u
(
w + b¯
)− u (w + b) > 0.
dT ∗
dpi
=
− db¯
dpi
(
1
Π(G,1)−w−b
)
+ β(1−β
T∗ )
1−βT∗+1
pi(1−β)βT∗+1 lnβ
(1−βT∗+1)2
< 0
as we know from above that db¯
dpi
< 0 and ln β < 0.
Thus, a less volatile industry has shorter (and mechanically less) conflict phases and
a smaller pay differential between good and bad states. The intuition is clear: in a less
volatile industry there are, in expectation, more good states that deliver rent. Therefore,
the expected per period surplus is larger and it takes less time to destroy surplus.
Next we examine the derivatives w.r.t. b. Remember that a higher b immediately implies
that Π (B, 1) is higher, i.e., the firm is less liquidity constrained. Thus, in this exercise we
investigate the effects of the adverse shocks’ severity. For ease of exposition we do so by
10 Note that an increase in pi affects the volatility and the expected value of the relationship. As discussed
above, we focus on 1−pi close to zero and argue that the first order effect here is the increased volatility
and not the expected value effect.
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directly differentiating with respect to b:
db¯
db
= −(1− pi)u
′ (w + b)
piu′
(
w + b¯
) < 0
dT ∗
db
=
−db¯
db
+ 1−βpi−(1−pi)β
T∗+1
1−βT∗+1
[Π(G,1)−w−b]pi(1−β)βT∗+1
(1−βT∗+1)2
ln β
< 0
as we know from above that db¯
db
< 0 and we know that ln β < 0.
If the bad state is “not as bad” the conflict phases are shorter, as the firm’s deviation
incentive is lower. In addition, the bonus in the good state is lower as there is less to be
compensated for.
Finally, the derivatives w.r.t. β reflect variations in the importance of the future in an
industry. A high β industry can be interpreted as a growing industry, while a low β can
be interpreted as an already declining one:
db¯
dβ
= 0
dT ∗
dβ
=
pi
pi (1− β) βT ∗+1 ln β
[
1− βT ∗ (T ∗ (1− β) + 1)] .
Note that pi
pi(1−β)βT∗+1 lnβ < 0. Hence the sign of the second expression depends on the sign
of
[
1− βT ∗T ∗ (1− β) + 1]. The minimum of this expression in the admissible range of β
w.r.t. T ∗ is at − 1
lnβ
− 1
1−β . At this minimum the above expression is positive (for values of
β ensuring that T ∗ is positive). Hence it is positive everywhere. Therefore, together with
pi
pi(1−β)βT∗+1 lnβ < 0, we get that
dT ∗
dβ
< 0.
That means that if the future becomes more valuable for the firm, the length of the
necessary conflict phase goes down as future lost rents are also more valuable, i.e., it
becomes easier to deter deviations. The bonus, obviously, does not depend on the firm’s
discount factor.
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